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Interest in politics and the political process—topics that economists consider to be the purview of
the sub-field of study known as public choice—appears to be as high as ever. This edited volume, Public
Choice, provides a collection of high-quality studies covering many of the varied topics traditionally
investigated in the growing field of public choice economics. These include, but are not limited
to, voting/voters, elections, constitutions, legislatures, executives, judiciaries, bureaucracy, special
interest groups, parliamentary procedures, government failure, rent seeking, public finance, and
international organizations. In bringing these topics together in one place, this volume offers a nice
mix of conceptual/formal and empirical studies in public choice economics.
The study by J.R. Clark, of the University of Tennessee—Chattanooga, and Dwight Lee, of
Southern Methodist University, re-considers the conclusions of a well-known test by Geoffrey Brennan
and Loren Lomasky of instrumental voting (Brennan and Lomasky 1993), a concept indicating that as
presidential elections become close, the probability of a tie, and of casting a decisive vote, increases
“multi-billionfold”, resulting in a large increase in voter turnout. As reported in their 25-year old study,
Brennan and Lomasky failed to find a relationship between closeness and turnout in presidential
elections since 1940, thus leading to their rejection of the instrumental voter hypothesis. Clark and Lee
(2018) do not dispute the results of the Brennan-Lomasky test, only their arguments about the reason
for the results.
Clark and Lee (2018) assert that expressive voting is the most reasonable explanation for why
large-participation elections occur. As they argue, once an expressive voter has developed a political
ideology that allows him or her to acquire a sense of moral virtue at little personal cost at the polls,
that voter has little motivation to seek out information that might call his or her own political beliefs
into question. In this regard, arguments hostile to one’s political beliefs can be, and typically are,
easily neutralized by confirmation bias, which is widely recognized as having a strong influence on
voting decisions. According to Clark and Lee (2018), the prevalence of confirmation bias in voting runs
counter to the concept of instrumental voting, given that instrumental voters should be more open to
arguments indicating that their political beliefs are mistaken.
In his piece on constitutional constraints, Randall Holcombe of Florida State University points out
that “the literature in constitutional economics has focused heavily on the design of effective rules
to prevent the abuse of government power, and to facilitate government production that benefits the
general population rather than concentrated special interests,” while it “has focused less on the design
of institutions that are able to effectively enforce those rules.” Holcombe (2018) states that the question
of enforcement begins with interpretation (e.g., laws are often intentionally vague), and includes
selectivity (e.g., some laws are enforced to the benefit of enforcers) and oversight (e.g., rent-seeking
and regulatory capture work to the detriment of oversight).
In describing the issues associated with interpretation, selectivity, and oversight in rules
enforcement, Holcombe’s study combines public choice theory with elite theory, which defines
the “power elite” as those few at the top of a democratic society “who make the public policies to
which everyone else is required to conform.” As Holcombe (2018) points out, “[e]lite theory explains
who designs and controls public policy, but it does not explain how they are able to exercise this
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control,” while “[p]ublic choice theory explains how some are able to use the system for their benefit
at the expense of others, but it does not identify who those some are . . . [Ultimately,] the elite make
public policy, so one should expect that when they find themselves relatively unconstrained, public
policy works to the advantage of the elite.” While the power held by elites necessitates rules, problems
surrounding interpretation, selectivity, and oversight lead Holcombe (2018) to conclude that checks
and balances within government are essential to rules enforcement.
As Holcombe (2018) asserts, a necessary condition for checks and balances is a separation of
powers, whereby the different branches of government should be designed so that they have conflicting
interests, but must reach an agreement (i.e., they cannot act unilaterally) to take collective action.
The system of checks and balances works, as Holcombe (2018) concludes, on “the principle that
the individual branches of government guard their powers from being usurped by other branches,”
wherein “[t]he key feature here is that some elites check and balance the power of others.”
The study by Miguel Martínez-Panero and Teresa Peña of Universidad de Valladolid, Verónica
Arredondo of Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, and Victoriano Ramírez of Universidad de Granada
takes a slightly more formal approach to the issue of electoral disproportionality, which exists when
the notion of proportional representation is extended to a single legislative seat that cannot be divided
between competing candidates. As a result of electoral disproportionality, some political parties are
ultimately overrepresented, while others are underrepresented.
Researchers have attempted to address these distortions with disproportionality indexes, which,
in many cases, are based on exact proportionality, something that is unaffordable in practice.
Martínez-Panero et al. (2019) develop a new disproportionality index that entails a more realistic
requirement, that “[n]o party’s representation should deviate from its quota ([i.e.,] the number of seats
that should be received by the parties in exact proportionality) by more than one unit.” The new index
measures only non-forced disproportionality (i.e., where the quota rule is not satisfied, which is usually
the case), avoiding that portion of disproportionality inherent to the fact that exact proportionality is
not feasible.
Another formal approach is presented by João Ricardo Faria of Florida Atlantic University and
Daniel Arce of the University of Texas, Dallas in their study, motivated by the United States’ recent
opening of relations with Cuba under President Barack Obama’s administration, on the relationship
between foreign aid and freedom. More specifically, Faria and Arce (2018) present an extension of the
two-period Samaritan’s Dilemma game in order to analyze the potential for foreign aid to promote
freedom, particularly in cases of dictatorships that might welcome economic growth but that are
opposed to economic and political freedoms (i.e., the Samaritan’s Dilemma).
Faria and Arce (2018) consider three different types of aid policies—one targeted on the recipient’s
economic performance, one coupling aid with freedom, and one targeted on the recipient’s economic
performance indirectly by way of pro-entrepreneurship reforms. These aid policies are combined
with each of two policymaking environments—Stackelberg (leader-follower), which is most closely
associated with the Samaritan’s Dilemma within two-period settings, and Nash. In these contexts, Faria
and Arce (2018) show that a Stackelberg policy environment that couples aid with freedom neither
resolves the Samaritan’s Dilemma nor fosters freedom, while a Nash policy environment that couples
aid with freedom resolves the Samaritan’s Dilemma but it does not commensurately increase freedoms
within the recipient nation. Their final consideration—Nash play (representing donor commitment)
and an explicitly freedom-based policy—succeeds at resolving both the Samaritan’s Dilemma and
increasing freedoms, provided that the donor tempers its altruistic motivation for supporting the
recipient, especially in cases where the recipient is willing to test the donor’s resolve.
The study by Raúl Pérez-Fernández and Bernard De Baets of Ghent University, and José Luis
García-Lapresta of Universidad de Valladolid provides a bridge from the conceptual and more formal
pieces in this volume to the empirical public choice studies included herein. These researchers analyze
the 2017 Rector election at Ghent University, which covered 59 days between the first round of voting
and the final round of voting. This study begins with a discussion of the differences between simple
2
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majority, the closely related concept of absolute majority, and other forms of qualified majority, such as
unanimous majority. Among other regulatory features, the Ghent University Rector elections rely on
a supermajority of two-thirds of the vote for a winner (or winning duo) to be declared. The Rector
elections, described by Pérez-Fernández et al. (2019), are set to go no more than five rounds without
declaring a winner, in which case the elections are restarted.
Pérez-Fernández et al. (2019) provide some solutions to the lengthy situation that occurred at
Ghent University. One is a multi-stage process, wherein something slightly greater than a simple
majority (e.g., 52%) determines the outcome in the first stage, and in the second stage the process
implements the two-thirds supermajority. As they point out, such a procedure “will . . . ‘guarantee’
. . . a winner being selected after some voting rounds, while not electing a candidate that has just
one more vote than its adversary.” These researchers also suggest that “a more elegant solution
would require . . . totally reformulat[ing] the semantics of the election in an approval-voting fashion.”
Pérez-Pérez-Fernández et al. (2019) ultimately favor a process referred to as “majority judgment,”
which is based on what they state is “a common language of . . . labels in a linearly ordered scale
[that] needs to be agreed upon, [a]fter [which] each of the voters is required to evaluate each of the
candidates independently according to this common language of [labels . . . which] are ordered in an
increasing manner.” As they conclude, this process is easy for voters to understand and avoids other
issues, such as irrelevant alternatives and voting cycles.
The empirical studies contained in this volume include my own piece on the stability of political
ideology with Chandini Sankaran of Boston College and Kamal Upadhyaya of the University of New
Haven. Our study extends the political science and political psychology literature on the political
ideology of lawmakers by employing Nokken-Poole scores (Nokken and Poole 2004) of legislators’
political ideology for members of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate who were
elected prior to the 103rd Congress that began in early 1991 and who served consecutively through
the 115th Congress, which ended in early 2019. These unidimensional policy scores assume that each
Congress is entirely separate in terms of a legislator’s political ideology, and they allow for movement
of legislators along the unidimensional policy space from Congress to Congress.
As we indicate in the study (Mixon et al. 2019), our empirical investigation of the stability
of political ideology of lawmakers is two-pronged. First, we investigate the political instability at
the individual level by collecting both the largest and smallest Nokken-Poole scores over each U.S.
Representative’s legislative career. These are used to compute the absolute deviation in political
ideology (over time) for each lawmaker, where smaller (larger) values represent greater stability
(instability) of political ideology. An alternative approach to investigating the stability of political
ideology of lawmakers relies on regression analysis, employing a legislator’s Nokken-Poole scores.
The results in Mixon et al. (2019) suggest that political ideology is unstable over time for a sizable
portion of the long-serving members of both major political parties in the U.S. Congress. These results
run somewhat counter to the finding in prior studies that the political ideologies of lawmakers and
other political elites are stable over time.
An empirical study by Jessi Troyan of the Cardinal Institute for West Virginia Policy and Joshua
Hall of West Virginia University explores the specific factors that determine federal spending on
environmental goods, and whether severity of the hazard is the only metric of consideration, or if
other factors play an important role in explaining spending. These issues are explored within the
context of the Abandoned Mine Land Fund (AMLF) program in the U.S., a fund created as a feature
of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. As they indicate, “this analytical setting is
interesting because of the limited scope of program objectives and the rigidly defined funding source
. . . [, which] . . . suggests that the execution of abandoned mine reclamation projects facilitated by the
fund should be difficult to influence politically.”
Troyan and Hall (2019) explore whether political factors, such as environmental interest group
influence, legislator preferences and pressures to fund sites in their home states or districts, and
environmental and health factors, play an explanatory role in disbursement of AMLF monies. Analysis
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of some relatively large data sets suggests that funding for abandoned mine reclamation is a mixture of
the products of public and political interests, particularly regarding tenure on the Senate Appropriations
Committee and state-ownership of lands, and whether the AMLF coffers are supported by the U.S.
Treasury Department. They find that “after the allocations out of Treasury funds are capped to states,
the political influence wanes and the hazard level of sites again becomes the primary influential factor
in funding receipts—further bolstering a public interest view of the AML program in total.” As Troyan
and Hall (2019) conclude, this result supports the notion that political institutions can be changed to
remove politics.
As Zachary Klingensmith of Pennsylvania State University—Erie explains in the introduction of
his study, “targeted [government] expenditures, which are also called pork-barrel spending, allow
incumbents to both credit claim and advertise simultaneously through three channels.” Klingensmith
(2019) is primarily concerned with the third of these channels, which is whether an incumbent can
use pork-barrel spending to increase his or her ability to advertise through campaign contributions.
His study extends the literature on on pork-barrel spending and campaign contributions, mainly by
investigating whether the timing of the pork-barrel appropriations matter, and whether general federal
appropriations have the same impact on fundraising as pork-barrel spending.
In order to investigate these issues, Klingensmith (2019) focuses on United States Senate elections
from 2004 to 2018, rather than a single election. The results of his analyses indicate that (1) “pork-barrel
spending can have a positive and significant impact on fundraising,” (2) “the timing of the pork-barrel
spending matters[, with] . . . only pork-barrel spending in the election year . . . hav[ing] an impact
on campaign contributions,” and (3) “the relationship between federal aid to states and incumbent
fundraising is ambiguous[, although] . . . it is clear that the amount of fundraising per dollar of
pork-barrel spending is far greater than the amount of fundraising per dollar of federal aid.” The
overall conclusion from Klingensmith’s study is “that pork-barrel spending is used as a source of
political capital for both politicians and political entrepreneurs.”
Candon Johnson and Joshua Hall of West Virginia University point out that the sports economics
literature has generally found that new professional sport facilities do not generate any new net
economic activity. Their study “provide[s] context to this literature by exploring the public choice in
the public financing of stadiums,” with particular attention to the two 2016 ballot measures related to
the San Diego Chargers (NFL franchise). More specifically, Johnson and Hall (2019) analyze voting
on two ballot measures that would, respectively, allow officials to raise hotel taxes to pay for a new
downtown stadium for the Chargers, and allow officials to raise hotel taxes, but would also explicitly
prevent any money being spent on the Chargers. Neither of these ballot measures received 50% of the
total votes cast.
The results of their empirical analyses indicate that populations in “zip codes with a higher voter
turnout were more likely to vote against both measures, highlighting the importance of the timing
of referenda in limiting the ability of clearly defined groups, such as Chargers fans, to have a large
influence on the voting outcome,” and that “areas with more Trump voters were more likely to support
higher taxes for the purpose of building the Chargers a new stadium.” With regard to this latter finding,
Johnson and Hall (2019) state that the “results suggest that Trump voters were against tax increases
for these public projects; but, if taxes were going to be raised, they wanted the Chargers to be part of
the deal.”
Finally, my study (Mixon 2018) on the 2017 U.S. Senate Special Election in Alabama extends the
public choice literature on localism (i.e., “friends and neighbors”) in voting, which occurs as a way of
mitigating the agency costs of representative democracy, by investigating the impact on localism of
political scandal. Prior literature in this genre places the home area advantage, or the advantage to
local candidates, somewhere between 2.4 and 12.4 percentage points, with the most common estimate
residing near five percentage points. The Republican candidate in this election, Roy Moore, gained
notoriety during the 2017 campaign when a number of women alleged to national media that as
4
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teenagers they were subject to sexual advances by Moore, who was then in his early 30s and serving as
a local assistant district attorney.
Econometric results presented in Mixon (2018) suggest that a candidate who is embroiled in
political scandal suffers an erosion in the usual friends-and-neighbors effect on his or her local vote
share in a general election. In this particular case, the scandal hanging over Moore, who lost the
election contest to Democratic candidate Doug Jones, eroded all of the friends-and-neighbors effect that
would have been expected (i.e., about five percentage points) in Moore’s home county, as well as about
40% of the advantage Moore had at home over his opponent in terms of constituent political ideology.
As the study concludes, “the exploration of the impact of political scandal on friends-and-neighbors
voting undertaken in this study indicates that, this genre of the public choice literature is perhaps
under-theorized, thus, opening up avenues for future research.”
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
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Abstract: We consider a test of expressive voting developed by Brennan and Lomasky (1993).
They point out that in presidential elections the probability of a tie, and casting a decisive vote,
increases “multi-billionfold” as the election becomes increasingly close. They conjecture that if voters
are instrumentally motivated there would be enormous increases in voter turnout for presidential
elections as they became close. When they find no consistent relationship between closeness and
turnout in presidential elections since 1940, they conclude their test justifies a “decisive rejection of
the instrumental voter hypothesis.” As dramatic as such a “multi-billionfold” increase is, we argue
it would not motivate voting if an instrumental payoff was the only motivation for doing so.
The Brennan–Lomasky test does give the correct result, but not for the reason they emphasize.
They do see reasons why voting turnout would be moderated other than the dramatic probability
of a decisive vote in close elections. Furthermore, they close their test by indicating that one reason
turnout might be higher in close elections is that they are more interesting, which is congenial to an
expressive account. We agree. We also argue that the observed tendency for voters to confirm their
biases rather than change their minds provides additional support for expressive voting.
Keywords: expressive voting; instrumental voting; voter turnout; rational voter apathy; rational
ignorance; confirmation bias
JEL Classification: D70; D72; H00
1. Introduction
Models based on expressive voting have yielded interesting results, implying support for such
things as charitable policies by uncharitable voters (Tullock 1971) and brutal policies by decent
voters (Lee and Murphy 2017). This represents a range of voter support difficult to imagine if
voters were motivated solely by instrumental considerations, but intuitively plausible if voters are
motivated by expressive considerations. The implications of expressive voting models not only are
interesting, but also are consistent with common voting behavior that is both heartening and troubling.
Yet, attempts to test whether voting decisions are influenced primarily by expressive motivations
under conditions (very low probability of a tied election) which imply that those motivations would
dominate instrumental motivations have been less than convincing.
The most popular approach for testing the explanatory power of expressive voting has been
based on evidence provided by laboratory experiments. A paper by Tyran and Wagner (2016)
indicates that the evidence favoring expressive voting is mixed. Of the nine papers they examine,
two support the expressive voting theory, three provide weak support, and four provide no support at
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all. Tyran and Wagner (2016, p. 15) see the mixed findings to be “found in limitations of the experiment
paradigms and techniques that have been used to identify expressive voting.”
We believe that stronger support exists for expressive motivations being the overwhelming,
indeed sole, impetus for going to the polls in which many millions are expected to turnout.
That support can be highlighted by a critical examination of a test of expressive voting put forth
by Brennan and Lomasky (1993, pp. 117–20) in their widely cited book. Their test is based on the
logic of expressive voting coupled with observations on the connection between the closeness of
U.S. presidential elections and voter turnout. Based on that test, Brennan and Lomasky reject the
instrumental voter hypothesis. Our examination of their test leads us to conclude that it always yields
the correct conclusion even though the central rationale for the test is flawed.
2. An Impressive but Meaningless Difference
Brennan and Lomasky (1993, pp. 117–20) test of the expressive voter model is grounded
in an unquestionable mathematical result that leads to a testable conjecture. The unquestionable
mathematical result is that the probability of a tied election rises dramatically (“multi-billionfold”)
as it becomes increasingly close. That result obviously implies that the instrumental payoff to
voting increases by the same “multi-billion fold” amount as the election becomes increasingly close.
Their conjecture is that “[i]f voting is solely instrumental, then one would expect enormous changes in
turnout with quite small changes in expected closeness” (p. 118; emphasis in original). The conjecture
is easily tested with evidence from presidential elections, and clearly found to be incorrect.1 Thus, they
state: “In our view, the fact that increases in expected closeness do not have a spectacular positive effect
on voter turnout comes as close as one can in this muddy life to a decisive rejection of the instrumental
voter hypothesis.”2 (p. 119)
Interestingly, Brennan and Lomasky did not expect enormous changes in turnout. Leading up
to and after discussing their test, they point to other reasons why large turnout increases should not
be expected in very close elections. For example, only those prospective voters “on the margin of
participation” (p. 118) would be affected by an increase in the probability of a tied election. Yet they
continue to emphasize that “even if the expected difference is one-tenth of the actual—the probability
of being decisive in the close election would have been many billions of times greater than in the
non-close ones, and the expected corresponding benefit correspondingly so” (pp. 119–20). We find
their emphasis on the startling increase in the probability of a tie as elections become close to be a
misleading distraction to their case for expressive voting despite the accuracy of the math.
The problem with the Brennan and Lomasky emphasis on the multi-billionfold increase in the
instrumental payoff is that such an increase would create, at most, a miniscule incentive for an
instrumentally motivated potential voter to become an actual voter. Before explaining why, it helps
to consider the approximate sizes of the probabilities being discussed, assuming an election with
100 million voters, roughly the turnouts of recent U.S. presidential elections. Let PT be the probability
of a tied election by assuming that every voter is equally likely to vote for either one of two candidates.
1 We follow Brennan and Lomasky in assuming a presidential election with 100 million and one voters casting a vote for one
of two candidates with the winner winning by one vote. So, the probability of a decisive vote (really 50 million and one
decisive votes) is equal to the probability of a tied vote without one of the votes for the winner. Obviously, this ignores the
complications created by the electoral college which creates the possibility of a higher probability of decisive votes being
cast by one-half plus one of the voters in a small state in which the election is known to be extremely close and turns to be a
swing state. This higher probability would have to be multiplied by the probability of the small state have more electoral
college votes than the difference in those votes from the other states. Of course, a very large state, such as California is likely
to be a swing state, but it is extremely unlikely that its presidential votes are decided by one vote. We would like to thank an
unknown referee for mentioning the electoral college complication.
2 Brennan and Lomasky follow this comment by stating “[n]or does one need ‘elaborate statistical technique” to make this
point”’ (p. 119). We agree that “elaborate statistical technique” is not needed since, as we are about to argue, potential voters
motivated by instrumental interests would remain nonvoters in a presidential election no matter how close it is expected
to be.
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And let PC be the probability of a tied election when every voter is slightly more likely to vote
for the favored candidate than for the other candidate. In that case PT is closely approximated by
0.00008 percent, or 8 one hundred thousandths of one percent. To approximate the value of PC,
we assume that each voter votes for the favored candidate with a probability of 51%, which means PC
effectively is 1/∞, or 0.3
The relative difference in these two probabilities, and in the instrumental payoffs in the two
elections just described, are clearly as dramatic as Brennan and Lomasky claim, with the ratio PT/PC
being effectively infinite. But dramatic relative differences can be completely irrelevant to practical
decision making.4 A more salient way to look at the differences in the two probabilities is as the ratio
of the probabilities that an individual vote will be indecisive in the two elections just considered,
or (1 − PT)/(1 − PC). The ratio of these probabilities is (1–0.00008)/1, or 0.99992. As practical advice to
a voter, rationally ignorant or otherwise, it would be more helpful to say that the probability of casting
an indecisive vote is effectively 1 in both of the presidential elections than to say that the probability of
casting a decisive vote is many billions of times greater in the former than in the latter election.
As far as the effect of the probability differences on the turnout of instrumental voters, the same
advice—“it doesn’t make any difference”—is still sound. Certainly, no instrumentally motivated voter
who is not voting when the probability of casting a decisive vote is 1/∞ is going to rush to the polls to
take advantage of a marginal increase in the probability of casting a decisive vote, even if the marginal
increase is multi-billions of times larger than the probability 1/∞. This suggests that when Brennan
and Lomasky tell us that only those “on the margin of participation” (p. 118) would be affected by
the increase in the expected probability of a tied election, they are effectively referring to all would-be
instrumentally motivated voters, since none of them will be voting before the expected closeness
occurs, not just the few they lead us to believe they are talking about. And those voters will still be
marginal, or inactive, instrumental voters after the multi-billionfold increase in the probability of a tie.
But wait. If you still have doubts about the instrumental impotence of the multi-billionfold
probability increase from PC to PT, there is more. Even though Brennan and Lomasky concentrate on
the influence of changing probabilities of tied elections, they do mention the costs of voting, which
include things like the opportunity costs of registering to vote, going to polls, waiting in line and
possibly, though unlikely, giving serious thought to the candidates and their policy positions. They do
point out that these costs have more negative influence on voter turnout than the positive influence
of dramatic relative increases in the probability of a tied election, at least in part because those costs
affect the decisions of both instrumental and expressive voters. But they do not include them in their
test. Yet, voting costs make it even more obvious that the dramatic increases in the probability of a
tied election Brennan and Lomasky are considering are highly unlikely to turn dormant instrumental
voters into active instrumental voters. For example, assume that the opportunity cost of voting in a
presidential election is $20, a modest amount given that high-opportunity-cost people are more likely
to vote than low-opportunity-cost people. If instrumental voters are aware that the probability of a
tie has increased to 0.00008, then it would require an instrumental payoff of $250,000 from casting a
decisive vote to expect to cover the cost of voting. Even if a voter overestimated the probability of
casting a decisive vote by a factor of 100, it would require an instrumental payoff of $2500 from casting
3 The probabilities of a tied election with 100 million voters are derived from Brennan and Lomasky (1993, p. 57, Table 4.1).
The table gives several differences in the probability that each voter will vote for one of two candidates or policies, with
the first being 0, meaning a 0.5 probability for each, and the last being 0.01, meaning a 0.51 probability for the favorite and
a 0.49 probability for the other. The column below each probability is the dollar payoff from casting a decisive vote that
would be required to give the voter an expected return of one dollar, given the number of voters shown in the far-left hand
column. Those numbers go from 101 to 100 million. We made use of the 0 and 0.01 columns and the 100 million voters row.
At the 100 million, 0 coordinate is 12,500 which implies the probability of a tied election is 1/(12,500) or 0.00008. For the
100 million, 0.01 coordinate is ∞, which implies a probability of a tied election of effectively 0.
4 Consider space travel. The MACSO647-JD galaxy is about 13.3 billion light years from earth, but the instrumental payoff
from sending a space probe there is indistinguishable from sending one to the Andromeda X1 galaxy, which is only
2.4 million light years from earth.
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a decisive vote to cover the cost of voting.5 On the other hand, it is easy to imagine an expressive voter
receiving, with a probability of 1, enough expressive satisfaction from voting to comfortably exceed
the $20 cost of voting.
Again, we see Brennan and Lomasky’s focus on the effect of close elections on probabilities of
tied elections as a misleading distraction in their case for expressive voting. In other words, the effect
of large relative increases in miniscule probabilities of a tied election on voter turnout is miniscule.
We believe that if there is a tendency for increased voter turnout when elections are close, it is
the result of expressive voters responding to the additional attention close elections receive, not of
instrumental voters responding to the dramatic increases in the probability of a tied vote as elections
become close. Brennan and Lomasky’s test will always be correct by seeing small increase, or no
increases at all, as justifying the rejection of the instrumental voter hypothesis, but for the wrong reason.
It is not even clear that Brennan and Lomasky will disagree with our criticism. As they say in
concluding the discussion of their test:
Close contests in the sporting arena are more engaging and induce more spectator interest
than clear-cut contests. Given the analogy between voter and spectator behavior, it would
surely not be implausible if closer contests induced more involvement in the electoral setting
as well. In that sense, some small connection between closeness and turnout of the kind
that empirical work seems to reveal (or at least does not reject) is quite congenial to the
expressive account. (p. 120)
3. Conclusions
The concepts of rational voter apathy, rational voter ignorance and expressive voting are all
based on the small probability that an individual’s vote will be decisive, at least in large-participation
elections. As far as we know, there has been little controversy about the influence of instrumental or
expressive motivations of voters on the validity of rational voter apathy or ignorance.
Downs (1957, p. 48) clearly assumes instrumental voting when stating that “[a] rational voter first
decides what party will benefit him the most . . . [but] even if he prefers party A, he is wasting his vote
on A, if it has no chance of winning . . . the relevant choice in this case is between B and C. Since a
vote for A is not useful in the actual process of selection, casting it is irrational.” There is no indication
of an expressive benefit here.6 When considering voter apathy, or abstaining (p. 265) Downs points
out that “voting is inherently costly . . . [and] since the returns to voting are often miniscule, even
low voting cost may cause many partisan citizens to abstain.” In considering rational apathy, or what
they call “rational abstention,” Brennan and Lomasky (1993, pp. 65–66) see “[t]he general thrust of
the public choice literature on the turnout issue is to argue that the probability of being decisive is
nothing like large enough to explain turnouts that are observed without appealing to something other
than instrumental returns.” (p. 66). They then consider Nash equilibrium models that attempt to
show how “substantial voter turnout may occur in a totally instrumental, outcome-oriented polity” (p.
66). While Brennan and Lomasky “do not deny that some equilibria of this kind may exist in some
cases—[they] believe the prospect unlikely. What [they] do deny is that the resulting equilibria much
5 People commonly respond to the argument that a vote is unlikely to make any difference in the outcome of an election
by pointing to close elections, such as the Florida presidential election in 2000. But the final official count had a 537-vote
difference between Bush and Gore. So, one more vote for Bush would have made no difference. But this does not mean that
people cannot convince themselves that their vote is far more likely to be decisive than it is. Findings by Kahneman and
Tversky, and reported in Kahneman (2011, p. 315–16), indicate that voters tend to respond to probabilities less than 1 as
if they are zero. Yet, if a highly improbably event becomes the focus of attention, like a terrorist attack, the probability of
it occurring can be perceived as far greater than it is. Whether this means that some people really believe their vote in a
presidential election is likely to be decisive seems to us to be pushing rational voter ignorance a little too far.
6 Downs (1957, p. 46) does say “[t]hat to decide what impact each government act has upon his [the voter’s] income,
he appraises it as good or bad in light of his own view of ‘the good society’.” And it appears he is referring here to
“hypothetical streams of utility income.” Yet this “income” does not seem to help offset the cost of voting when deciding to
vote or not to vote in Down’s discussion.
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resemble those we observe in electoral practice” (p. 69). What all this seems to say in a qualified way is
that expressive voting is the most reasonable explanation for why voting turnouts in large-participation
elections are anywhere near as high as they are.
The empirical evidence is overwhelming that a large percentage of voters in large-participation
elections lack such basic information on the political process as who their political representatives
are, the position of those representatives on important issues, or the pros and cons of the different
positions.7 None of this evidence on rational voter ignorance depends on whether voters are motivated
by instrumental or expressive interests. One might argue, along the lines of Brennan and Lomasky,
that if the dominant reason for voting is instrumental then a dramatic increase in the probability
of a tied election, and therefore of a decisive vote, would not only motivate an increase in voter
turnout, but also the average voter’s being more informed politically to better evaluate the relative
instrumental payoffs from alternative voting decisions. We know of no attempt to use this logic,
along with possible reductions in voter ignorance as elections got close, to conduct a test of the
instrumental voter hypothesis. There are two reasons why we would not expect such a test to be
attempted. First, as we have argued in this paper, even the most dramatic increase in the probability of
a tie in the large-participation elections being considered would have little, if any, effect on either voter
turnout of instrumental voters, or on their desire to become more informed politically. Second, it is
much easier to measure changes in voter turnout than to measure how the political ignorance of the
average voter changes as the probability of tied elections increases.
Interestingly, if instrumental voters exist and could be identified, we would expect them to be
more informed politically on average than voters motivated solely by expressive satisfaction for a
reason having nothing to do with the probability of tied elections. The return received by an expressive
voter depends entirely on how good he feels about voting for something or someone he believes to
be worthy of the support of decent people like himself, such as those he identifies with as friends,
associates, and role models. Such beliefs might result from serious study of complicated issues,
but often they develop from the tendency to be in agreement with the views that prevail in one’s social
group, agreement which serves one’s interest in becoming or remaining an accepted member of that
group. The satisfaction one gets from such beliefs as a voter and a member of a like-minded group
depends far more on retaining the prevailing beliefs of one’s ideological tribe than it does on their
accuracy.8 So, once an expressive voter has developed a political ideology that allows him to acquire
a sense of moral virtue at little personal cost at the polls, and to enjoy the political comradery of his
ideological fellow travelers, he has little motivation to seek out information that might call his political
beliefs into question. Of course, arguments hostile to one’s political beliefs cannot be completely
avoided, but they can be, and typically are, easily neutralized with confirmation bias. If most voters
voted instrumentally because they believed their vote was likely to be decisive, they would be more
open to arguments indicating that their political beliefs are mistaken. The fact that confirmation bias
is recognized as a strong influence on voting decisions is further evidence that voting is primarily
motivated by expressive instead of instrumental interests.9
This short paper should not be thought of as a criticism of Brennan and Lomasky’s impressive
book, Democracy & Decision. It is the seminal work on expressive voting, containing 225 pages of
insights on the theory and applications of one of the key contributions of public choice to voting.
Our paper considers only four of those pages to argue that the dramatic increase in the probability of
a tie in a large-participation election is far less important to their rejection of the instrumental voter
hypothesis than they seem to indicate. We believe that our argument adds insight into the theory of
expressive voting and that Brennan and Lomasky will agree. We hope so.
7 See Somin (2016, chp. 1).
8 See Mason (2018). The entire book is relevant to this discussion, but particularly Chapter 1.
9 See Nickerson (2016).
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Abstract: Constitutional political economy has focused heavily on designing constitutional rules
sufficient to constrain governmental power. More attention has been devoted to designing rules that
are effective constraints than on the institutions that would be required to enforce them. One problem
is that rules are interpreted and enforced by the political elite, who tend to interpret and enforce
them in ways that favor their interests over those of the masses. Democratic oversight is ineffective
because voters realize they have no influence over public policy, and are therefore rationally ignorant.
A system of checks and balances within government is necessary for enforcing constitutional
constraints because it divides power among elites with competing interests and enables one group
of elites to check the power of others. Checks and balances within governmental institutions are
necessary to constrain the government from abusing its power.
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1. Introduction
Buchanan (1975, pp. 2–3, italics in original) discusses the distinguishing feature of constitutional
economics. “In ordinary or orthodox economics, no matter how simple or how complex, analysis
is concentrated on choices made within constraints that are, themselves, imposed exogenously to
the person or persons charged with making the choice. Constitutional economics directs analytical
attention to the choice among constraints”. North (1991, p. 97) says “Institutions are the humanly devised
constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction”. Constitutional economics,
following Buchanan and North, studies the choice among institutions—the choice among humanly
devised constraints. The literature in constitutional economics has focused heavily on the design of
effective rules to prevent the abuse of government power, and to facilitate government production that
benefits the general population rather than concentrated special interests. It has focused less on the
design of institutions that are able to effectively enforce those rules. This paper explains why checks
and balances are essential as a constitutional enforcement mechanism.
2. Constitutional Rules
Much of the work in constitutional economics focuses on the process by which citizens choose
constitutional rules, with a heavy emphasis on consensus among those who are governed by them.
The literature draws a parallel between market exchange, in which all parties to transactions agree and
thereby signal that they benefit from their exchanges, and political exchange, in which people cooperate
to collectively produce goods and services that they would not be able to produce by themselves or
through bilateral exchange. Maintaining that parallel construction, the political decision rule that
signifies everyone agrees is unanimity. Just as all parties to market transactions voluntarily agree to
them, unanimous agreement is the signal that all parties to political exchange are in agreement.
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The constitutional framework pioneered by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Buchanan (1975)
explains that for governmental activity to benefit everybody, agreement is required on the rules under
which people interact, but not generally on every action government takes. For example, people might
all agree that they benefit from paying taxes to finance roads, and might agree to delegate the decision
of where to build those roads to some governmental authority. In some cases, citizens might be made
worse off by the building (and financing) of some specific roads, but they would all agree they are
better off with the government-financed roads than they would be without them. In keeping with the
analogy to market exchange, optimal rules are rules to which everybody would agree.
Most of the literature in constitutional economics has dealt with the process by which
constitutional rules are designed, and the types of rules that would result from those processes.
There are many interesting and unresolved issues in this literature, which this paper bypasses.
Assuming that a desirable set of constitutional rules has been put into place, how can those rules be
enforced? The question of enforcement starts with interpretation. In a complex world, words can be
interpreted in different ways. An easy way to see that is to note that slightly more than half of United
States Supreme Court cases have been decided unanimously, which means that in nearly half of those
cases, legal experts—the Justices themselves—were in disagreement about how the law applies to
specific cases.
Schweizer (2013) says that laws are written to be deliberately ambiguous, for several reasons.
One reason is that ambiguous laws can be selectively enforced. Those who exercise political power can
use ambiguous laws to go after adversaries but to give allies a pass. Another is that those who write
ambiguous laws become experts on their intent and interpretation, allowing them to sell their services
to those who might be subject to enforcement.
Ambiguities in interpretation point to a second issue: Selective enforcement. Selective enforcement
allows laws to be enforced for the benefit of the enforcers and to the detriment of others who are in an
adversarial position to the enforcers, or are not being as cooperative as the enforcers would prefer.1
Factors like these have not been addressed in the constitutional political economy literature, which has
for the most part assumed that rules are unambiguous and objectively applied.2
To the extent that enforcement issues have been considered, the primary mechanism that appears
in the public choice literature is democratic oversight of government actions. While voting models
tend to point toward public policy being determined by the preferences of the electorate—in particular,
models like the median voter model explained by Downs (1957)—the conclusion of much of the
public choice literature is that democratic oversight is likely to be ineffective for a number of reasons.
Rent-seeking (Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974), regulatory capture (Stigler 1971), and the undue influence of
special interests (Olson 1965) all weigh against the idea that democratic oversight is an effective check
on the abuse of government power. Meanwhile, checks and balances within government institutions
have been underappreciated in the literature as an enforcement mechanism. To see why democratic
oversight is likely to be ineffective, and why checks and balances within government are essential,
the first step is to undertake a critical examination of the process by which public policy is made and
carried out in democratic governments.
1 Allison (2013), CEO of BB&T bank during the 2008 financial crisis, recounts banking regulators pressuring him into
participating in the government’s bailout program, even though he said his bank was financially sound and did not need a
bailout. They told him that new regulations were being written, and while they did not know what those regulations would
be, if he did not join the program, his bank would be in danger of being out of compliance. Allison took that as a threat that
unless he cooperated, regulations would be written and enforced to target his bank.
2 There is a literature on corruption that considers these issues. Aidt (2016) notes that there are commonalities between this
literature and the public choice literature on rent-seeking that have been left relatively undeveloped.
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3. The Public Policy Process
Democratic governments are, by necessity, representative democracies. Governments that
rule over millions of people, or even thousands, cannot be governed by direct democracy because
transaction costs are too high to allow that many people to negotiate public policy. Even if referendums
on public policy were offered to voters, the choices given to voters would be determined by an elite
few who have been delegated to exercise government power. Sometimes the political elite get their
power through democratic elections and sometimes through political appointment. Applying the
Coase (1960) theorem, a small group of people face low transaction costs and can bargain to design
public policy. They are the political elite. Most people face high transaction costs and are unable to
participate in the policy-making process. They are the masses.
The US House of Representatives, for example, has 435 members, a small enough group that they
all know each other and are able to engage in logrolling to produce policies that they view as beneficial.
Most readers of this paper will find themselves in the high transaction cost group, and will be unable
to participate in the political bargaining process that produces legislation. Public policy is created by a
small group of people, and the resulting policies apply to everyone.
The public choice literature offers well-established explanations for how the political process can
be used to benefit some while imposing costs on others. Rent-seeking, following Tullock (1967) and
Krueger (1974), describes how some are able have resources transferred to them from others using the
political process. Stigler (1971) has explained how some are able to capture the regulatory process so
that regulations nominally designed to constrain their actions benefit those who are being regulated
at the expense of others. Olson (1965, 1982) has explained how concentrated and well-organized
interests are able to use the political process for their benefit, at the expense of larger groups that are
less well-organized. All of these theories explain how some people are able to use the political process
to benefit themselves at the expense of others.
While the public choice literature offers many explanations for how some can use the political
process for their own benefit, it has not followed up by explaining that there is a relatively small and
stable group of individuals who are able to command rents, capture regulatory agencies, and organize
influential interest groups. One reason is that the public choice literature tends to take an individualistic
approach to analyzing political processes, which limits its vision in identifying the specific group of
people who benefit from political processes. Buchanan and Tullock (1962, p. 12) “reject any theory or
conception of the collectivity which embodies the exploitation of a ruled by a ruling class. This includes
the Marxist vision, which incorporates the polity as one means through which the economically
dominant group imposes its will on the downtrodden”. When one analyzes the political process,
though, public policy is made by a few—a ruling class—and imposed on everyone. Some people
are consistently in the group that benefits, and most people are consistently in the group that bears
the costs.
Elite theory, developed mainly in sociology and political science, paints a different picture,
describing ruled and ruling classes along the lines that Buchanan and Tullock dismiss. Mills (1956, p. 3)
says “The powers of ordinary men are circumscribed by the everyday worlds in which they live . . .
But not all men are in this sense ordinary. As the means of information and power are centralized, some
men come to occupy positions in American society from which they can look down upon, so to speak,
and by their decisions mightily affect, the everyday world of ordinary men and women”. Those are
the power elite—the few who make the public policies to which everyone else is required to conform.
Elite theory explains who designs and controls public policy, but it does not explain how they are
able to exercise this control. Public choice theory explains how some are able to use the system for
their benefit at the expense of others, but it does not identify who those some are. Holcombe (2018)
explains that when these two strands of academic literature are combined, they show that those who
obtain the rents, capture regulatory agencies, and form powerful interest groups are a relatively stable
group—the elite.
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Elite control of the public policy process has not escaped observation by economists. Stiglitz (2012,
pp. 39–40) says “We have a political system that gives inordinate power to those at the top, and they have
used that power not only to limit the extent of redistribution but also to shape the rules of the game in
their favor”. Stiglitz (2012, p. 59) goes on to say, “It’s one thing to win a ‘fair’ game. It’s quite another to be
able to write the rules of the game—and to write them in ways that enhance one’s prospects of winning.
And it’s even worse when you can choose your own referees. It doesn’t have to be this way, but powerful
interests ensure that it is”. Along these same lines, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) develop a model in
which democratic political institutions evolve to favor the elite.
Nor has elite control of the public policy process escaped observation by the general public.
After the financial crisis that began in 2008, the Occupy Wall Street movement protested the government
policies that bailed out the Wall Street financial firms that took losses on their mortgage-backed
securities but did nothing to help people who found themselves under water on their mortgages and
were unable to pay them because they had lost their jobs due to the recession. They were complaining
about policies that they said favored the 1 percent over the 99 percent. In academic jargon, the 1 percent
are the elite; the 99 percent are the masses.
To a certain extent, the actions of the 99 percent produced the very policies they were protesting.
The twenty-first century view of the role of democratic government is to carry out the will of its citizens
as revealed through a democratic political process.3 When a crisis appeared in 2008, the 99 percent
demanded that the government do something to mitigate the crisis. Looking at how the political
process actually works, government is run by the 1 percent—the elite. Thus, the 99 percent were
demanding that the 1 percent be given more power to take action in response to the financial crisis,
which the 1 percent did. Understanding how the process works, one should not be surprised that
when the 1 percent took action, the action they took furthered their own interests. The elite make
public policy, so one should expect that when they find themselves relatively unconstrained, public
policy works to the advantage of the elite.
This is, Brennan and Buchanan (1985) explain, the reason for rules. They explain that a
constitutional framework provides the foundation for individual interaction. Those constitutional
rules should be designed to create a framework that channels individual actions away from predatory
zero-sum and negative-sum action toward action that is positive-sum and mutually advantageous.
Brennan and Buchanan (1985, p. 5) reference Hobbes to say that we benefit from a set of rules
that govern people’s interactions with each other because “ . . . without them we would surely
fight. We would fight because the object of desire for one individual would be claimed by another.
Rules define the private spaces within which each of us can carry out our own activities”.
What Brennan and Buchanan do not say is that when some people write and interpret the rules,
one would expect them to write rules that favor themselves, and interpret any rules in ways that
favor themselves. Buchanan and Congleton (1998) conclude that rules that are relatively permanent
and that apply generally to everyone will receive widespread approval from the masses. What this
line of reasoning does not take into account is that the elite write, interpret, and enforce the rules.
Writing the rules is the first step in the process. Even in this first step, those who write the rules
must be constrained to write them in a way that benefits everyone, not just the elite who write them.
Then, the elite must be constrained to interpret the rules in an even-handed manner that does not favor
themselves over the masses. And then, rules must not be selectively enforced so that enforcement
favors those who have political power over those who do not. The analysis that follows takes the first
3 This contrasts with the vision of democracy held by the American Founders, who designed a government with
constitutionally limited enumerated powers, and designed constraints to try to prevent government from actions not
specifically permitted by the Constitution. In this view, democracy is a method of selecting who exercises the power
of government, but not a method for determining what those powers are. The more modern view, Holcombe (2002)
explains, envisions democratic governments as furthering the public interest, where the public interest is revealed through a
democratic political process.
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step as given, and examines how rules can be interpreted and enforced in a way that does not favor
the elites (who interpret and enforce the rules) over the masses.
One might ask whether this framework, which depicts the elite as controlling the political process
for their benefit, overstates their influence over public policy. There is an extensive literature written by
authors ranging from the political right to the political left who make just this observation. Nader (2014)
argues that objections to the coalition of economic and political elites are so widely recognized from
one end of the political spectrum to the other that they form an unstoppable coalition that will put an
end to the cronyism and corporatism that everyone observes.4 Stockman (2013, p. 52) says, “Trying
to improve capitalism, modern economic policy has thus fatally overloaded the state with missions
and mandates far beyond its capacity to fulfill. The result is crony capitalism—a freakish deformation
that fatally corrupts free markets and democracy”. Bartels (2008) refers to this situation as the new
gilded age. Gilens (2012) cites growing inequality in political power that is creating an increasingly
divided society.
The idea that the political process is run by the elite for their benefit is well-supported in the
academic literature. Even if that literature overstates the power of the elite to benefit themselves at
the expense of the masses, there is still good reason to design an institutional framework in which the
ability of some to use it to benefit themselves at the expense of others is limited. How can constitutional
constraints on government power be enforced, when those who enforce them have an incentive to use
their enforcement powers to benefit themselves?
4. Democracy
One mechanism for enabling the 99 percent to exercise oversight over the 1 percent is democracy.
Democratic elections allow citizens to select who exercises the power of government, and create a process
whereby citizens can peacefully replace those with political power if they are unsatisfied with their
performance. Downs (1957) develops a model in which competition for elected office results in the election
of candidates who run on the platform most preferred by the median voter. Holcombe (1989) explains that
this model has often been used to conclude that governments do what the median voter most prefers.
Beyond the median voter model, voting models in public choice generally conclude that the
collective choice of a group is determined by aggregating the votes of the individuals in the group.
The implication is that the policy outcomes implemented by government are those chosen by the
voters. Even in models showing perverse outcomes, such as McKelvey’s (1976) demonstration that
that, in general, there is no stable equilibrium in majority rule voting, the conclusion, Riker (1980)
explains, is that political processes are unstable. This potential instability has been widely recognized
since the beginnings of the subdiscipline of public choice, and Arrow (1963) begins his well-known
book with an example of a cyclical majority. Yet Tullock (1982) observes that political outcomes appear
to be much more stable than economic outcomes, so if economists can argue that equilibrium models
are descriptive of market outcomes, surely the concept of equilibrium outcomes applies more to
government than to markets.
One explanation for the apparent stability of political outcomes, given in the previous section,
is that voters do not choose those outcomes. Public policy is chosen by an elite few—the 1 percent—not
the electorate. The elite are a small group who are able to bargain with each other to produce public
policies that are most favorable to themselves because, following Coase (1960), transaction costs are
low within that elite group. When transaction costs are low, political exchange produces a stable
outcome for the same reason market exchange produces a stable outcome. Voters do not decide public
policy outcomes. The elite negotiate among themselves to produce outcomes most valuable to them.
4 Nader may be overly optimistic on the success of this coalition, because while there is widespread agreement that the elite
control the political process, there is not agreement on the remedy. Those on the left tend to favor more government control,
while those on the right see the problem as being caused by government and argue for less government interference in
economic affairs.
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Just as with externalities in markets, the masses are in a high transaction cost group and are unable to
bargain to prevent costs from being imposed on them.
Public choice theory offers many reasons to question whether voters really do exercise any
effective control over the politicians they elect. One reason, given by Downs himself, is that it would
be so rare for any election outcome (except with a very small number of voters) to be determined by a
single vote that individual voters have no incentive to become informed. They are rationally ignorant
because they realize their one vote will have no effect. Uninformed voters are not in a position to
exercise control over those who they elect. Elections have symbolic value to elected officials by making
it appear that what they do has been chosen by the electorate, Edelman (1964) observes, but all this
does is give those who hold political power even more discretion to act to further their own interests
rather than in the interests of those who elected them. Elected officials can claim that they are carrying
out the will of the people, as revealed through the democratic political process.
Even those who are very interested in following politics will be unable to effectively monitor
those who they elect. For one thing, being a politician is a full-time job, so anyone really interested in
monitoring elected representatives would have to devote full time to it. Because there are many elected
representatives, there would not be enough time to monitor all of them. Furthermore, the people
who participate in political decision-making specialize in it, and have an understanding beyond what
outsiders could hope to achieve. Just as citizens would not expect to have as much medical knowledge
as a doctor, or as much knowledge about the operation of an automobile as an auto mechanic, it is
unrealistic to expect citizens to have sufficient knowledge to monitor those who specialize in politics.
While there is a market and individual choice for those who are looking for medical services or
auto repair services, there is no similar market for politicians. Those who exercise political power
claim a monopoly over it, and while they can be challenged in elections, challengers are only making
claims about what they would do if elected, so their claims cannot be verified as with incumbents who
are actually practicing politics. Voters cannot observe their actual performance until after they have
been elected, and few people think that campaign promises are as credible as, for example, automobile
advertisements. Voters do not have reliable information, and even when such information is available,
they have an incentive to remain rationally ignorant.
Because the general public has little incentive to organize to further their political interests,
Olson (1965) explains that concentrated interests are able to effectively organize to provide political
benefits to themselves by imposing costs on the masses. Public policy tends to favor special
interests—the 1 percent—rather than working in the interest of the general public—the 99 percent.
A well-established body of public choice literature helps explain why democratic oversight is likely to
be an ineffective mechanism for enforcing constitutional constraints on government actions.
Public choice voting models nearly always assume that voters vote instrumentally; that is, they vote
as if their votes can affect an election’s outcome. But Downs’ (1957) rational ignorance hypothesis rests
on the conclusion that voters know their individual votes will not affect an election outcome, so they
have no incentive to become informed or to vote instrumentally. Citizens do vote in large numbers,
and Brennan and Lomasky (1993) conclude that because they know their individual votes will not affect
election outcomes, they tend to vote expressively rather than instrumentally. They vote for outcomes that
make them feel good rather than those that actually are in their individual interests, which Tullock (1971)
notes can result in outcomes antithetical to their interests. Caplan (2007) goes one step further to argue that
voters cast votes that are rationally irrational. They have no incentive to rethink any irrational public policy
beliefs they hold, because their individual opinions will have no effect on public policy.
Wittman (1989, 1995) challenges the assessment given above, arguing that there are many mechanisms
that direct public policy to follow the preferences of the voters. Political advertising and party
brand name identification help provide voters with information, and voters can join special interest
groups like the National Education Association and the National Rifle Association to have their
collective preferences represented. Wittman explicitly notes that there are counter-arguments to all his
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point. Indeed, he recognizes that he is presenting counter-arguments to generally-accepted models in
public choice.
The point in mentioning Wittman’s analysis is to note that while the arguments presented
above about the influence of concentrated interests, rationally ignorant voters, and expressive
voting are well-accepted in public choice, there are arguments going the other way. Despite any
counter-arguments, the public choice literature provides many reasons for thinking that democratic
oversight will not be an effective way to interpret and enforce constitutional rules. The essential point
is that constitutional rules are designed, interpreted, and enforced by an elite few—the 1 percent—and
the masses—the 99 percent—have essentially no say over them. One cannot expect the powerless
99 percent to police the activities of the elite. Public choice theory gives ample reasons why democratic
oversight will be an ineffective constraint.
5. Checks and Balances
One of the celebrated innovations embodied in the Constitution of the United States was a set
of checks and balances that enabled one branch of government to check and balance the power of
the others. James Madison, in Federalist No. 51 (1788), discusses the role of checks and balances,
and explicitly recognizes that the reason they are required is to counter the potential for elite control
of government to oppress the masses, saying “Ambition must be made to counter ambition . . . It
may be a reflection of human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of
government”. Constitutional rules will not be constraining unless those who interpret and enforce
them are also constrained, and if an elite few interpret and enforce the rules, any checks on the power
of those elites must come from other elites. The masses do not have the power to constrain elites, either
through democratic oversight or by other means.
Persson et al. (1997) note that a system of checks and balances requires a separation of powers
within the structure of government. But separation of powers is not the same as checks and balances,
and by itself can lead to outcomes worse for the masses. Brennan and Hamlin (1994) show that if
powers are merely separated, that can give those with some powers the ability to act unilaterally to
the detriment of all others. Separation of powers can create a common pool problem, where some can
use their (separate) powers for their benefit, imposing costs on others—others in different branches of
government, and others in the broader citizenry.
Checks and balances mean that along with a separation of powers, one branch of government
cannot act unilaterally without the agreement of another. But even this is not sufficient. The different
branches of government should be designed so that they have conflicting interests, but must reach
an agreement to take collective action. If their interests are all the same, they will act together to
accomplish their common ends rather than checking and balancing each other. With conflicting
interests, the interests of one branch can then check the interests of another. Persson et al. (1997)
provide an example of an executive branch that can propose a total budget and a legislative
branch that determines the components of the budget. By constraining the total size of the budget,
the executive branch can check the legislative branch’s ability to enlarge its individual components,
and by controlling its components, the legislative branch can check the executive branch’s appetite
for expenditures.
La Porta et al. (2004) note that an independent judiciary and constitutional review work
as a judicial check on the abuse of power by other branches of government. Different elements
of government can act as “veto players” who can prevent other elements from unilateral action.
Keefer (2002) looks at the effects of veto players on the ability of a central bank to undertake
independent monetary policy, and Beck et al. (2002) provide data on veto players in government.
This literature on veto players points to a productive way to view checks and balances, but veto players
are not necessarily the product of constitutional design.
For example, when a parliament contains members of many parties, a coalition of parties will
be required to take action, making the coalition members veto players. But, if a single party gains a
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majority of seats, it eliminates other parties as veto players, even though the constitutional design
remains unchanged. Ideally, a system of checks and balances will be built into the constitutional
structure rather than be the result of political factionalization. Durable checks and balances are a part
of the institutional structure within which government operates.
The system of checks and balances works on the principle that the individual branches of
government guard their powers from being usurped by other branches. The key feature here is
that some elites check and balance the power of others. If the masses have a minimal ability to check
the power of government, the only way checks and balances can be effective is if institutions separate
elites into groups with competing interests that have veto power over the actions of each other.
The United States Constitution embodies this idea by establishing executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of government that can check and balance each other. As Madison said, ambition
must be made to counter ambition. Actions taken by one branch require the cooperation of the others,
and as originally conceived, the House of Representatives and Senate were designed as a part of this
system. House members were elected by citizens and Senators were chosen by their state governments,
with the idea that for legislation to pass, it had to be approved by the representatives of the people in the
House and the representatives of the state governments in the Senate, as described by Zywicki (1997).
This check was nullified in 1913 by the 17th Amendment to the Constitution, which required direct
election of Senators. While Tarabar and Hall (2015) note that it appeared to have little immediate effect,
the fact that its supporters pursued the difficult process of amending the Constitution indicates that
they expected this weakening of checks and balances to make a difference. By eliminating this element
of competing interests, the elite were able to remove one point of conflict that could act as a check on
their abuse of power.
The US Constitution took some inspiration from British government, where the power of the
crown was checked and balanced by the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Courts also had
a place in checking the powers of the crown and Parliament. A comparison of British and American
checks and balances shows that the functional division of power may play a minor role when compared
to designing a system in which one group of elites has the ability to check and balance the power of
others. Congleton (2012) describes the evolution of liberal political institutions in Europe over the last
several hundred years, The key point is that over time institutions evolved to create political systems in
which there was a division of power, and in which no branch of government could act independently
without the cooperation of others.
With regard to contemporary American politics, Mann and Ornstein (2012) argue that
constitutional checks and balances have eroded substantially since the nation’s founding, and especially
beginning in the twentieth century with increasing authority moving into the executive branch of
government.5 More generally, Acemoglu et al. (2013) argue that checks and balances have been eroded
because the economic elite are better organized and are better able to influence politicians absent those
checks and balances internal to the operation of government.
6. Other Checks and Balances
The checks and balances discussed above apply to a single government that is designed so that
its various branches can check and balance each other. Madison, in Federalist No. 51 (1788) says “In
the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between
two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people”. An additional
check is a federal system of government in which the state governments check the power of the
federal government and the federal government checks the power of the states. This check was
5 Mann and Ornstein (2012) attribute much of the breakdown of checks and balances to the increase in partisan extremism,
especially with reference to the Republican party, but that is beside the point for present purposes.
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clearly embodied in the original Constitution of the United States by specifying that Senators would
be chosen by their state governments, so for any legislation to be approved by both Houses to
become law, it would have to meet with the approval of the representatives of the state governments,
as Ostrom (1971) explains. This check was eliminated by the passage of the 17th Amendment in 1913,
which specified that Senators be elected by a direct vote of the citizens.6
Intergovernmental competition can also provide a check on the powers of competing governments,
Tiebout (1956) explains, pushing governments to respond to the demands of their citizens, yielding
another benefit of a federal system. Decentralized political systems allow more local control, another
possible check on the power of government. Local elites still control local government, but there is less
distance, socially as well as geographically, between local elites and the general public. Local control,
intergovernmental competition, and the ability of one level of government to check another are
mechanisms that a federal system provides to check and balance the power of the elites who hold
political power.
A free press is another mechanism that checks the power of government, which was
recognized by the American Founders and embodied in the First Amendment to the Constitution.
Coyne and Leeson (2009) note the impact of a free press on institutions, both reinforcing institutions
that provide general benefits and undermining institutions that allow elites to abuse their power.
This is a check that rests outside of government, but that can be enabled or inhibited by government
control of the media.
7. Conclusions
The important role constitutional constraints on government play in protecting the rights and
well-being of citizens has been well-recognized for centuries. Hume [1777] (1987, Essay VI) says
“Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system of government,
and fixing the several checks and controuls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a
knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest . . . Without this, they say,
we shall in vain boast of the advantages of any constitution, and shall find, in the end, that we have
no security for our liberties or possessions, except the good-will of our rulers; that is, we shall have
no security at all”. Constitutional political economy has focused heavily on designing rules that give
those who hold political power the incentive to act in the public interest, but given those rules, they
can only be effective if they are effectively enforced.
Checks and balances are a requirement for enforcement, because an elite few write, interpret,
and enforce the rules. The 99 percent cannot regulate a process that is run by the 1 percent. The role of
checks and balances is to have subsets of the 1 percent check and balance the power of others in that
elite group.
The twenty-first century ideology of Progressive Democracy has weakened the constitutional
constraints on government, because it justifies government policies that benefit some at the expense of
others, and because it legitimizes the actions of a democratic government by depicting those actions as
carrying out the will of the citizens, as revealed through a democratic political process. The ideology of
twenty-first century Progressive Democracy encourages the 99 percent to demand the government take
action to address a variety of issues, rarely recognizing that the 99 percent are transferring additional
power to the 1 percent who write, interpret, and enforce the rules. Then, the 99 percent are surprised
when the 1 percent uses their additional power for their own benefit, and in response the 99 percent
again demand that the government should do something, which transfers even more power to the
1 percent.
6 The Articles of Confederation, the original US constitution, designed a government with only one legislative body whose
members were chosen by the state governments, providing even more of a check on the power of the federal government.
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Democracy is an ineffective constraint on abuse of government power, because it is based on
the illusion that the 99 percent can exercise control over the 1 percent—the elite who actually design
and enforce public policy. Public choice theory explains that the 99 percent are rationally ignorant
(Downs 1957), that concentrated interests are able to use the political system for their benefit at the
expense of the masses (Olson 1965), that government regulation works for the benefit of those who are
regulated (Stigler 1971), and that the elite are able to design institutions to transfer power to themselves
and away from the masses (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008). One cannot expect the powerless to control
the powerful, even if the powerless well-outnumber the powerful.
The elite control government, so the most effective way to constrain government and enforce
constitutional rules is to design institutions that give some elites the power to check the power of
others. Checks and balances work to enforce constitutional rules through a separation of power, so that
no single elite group can act without the cooperation of others. Separation of powers is not enough.
Institutions must be designed so that elites have conflicting interests that give them the incentive to
protect their own power by checking abuse of power by other elites. Institutions must be designed so
that any abuse of power by one set of elites can be countered by the power of another set, and those
different sets of elites must have the incentive to counter, to protect their own power.
The arguments presented here rest on a foundation that depicts government as ruled by an elite
few, with the masses having essentially no power to design, interpret, and enforce the rules that
constrain government. A more democratic vision of government depicts government as controlled
through democratic processes that begin with elections in which the masses vote to elect the elite few
who are able to exercise the power of government. Thus, in evaluating these arguments, one should
consider which vision of government appears to be more descriptive of actual political institutions.
The constitutional political economy literature, tracing its origins back to Buchanan and Tullock (1962)
and Buchanan (1975), depicts a set of constitutional constraints designed by a process that requires
agreement among those who are subject to those constraints. Yeager (1985, 2001) argues that these
models of hypothetical collective agreement to some set of rules have the pernicious effect of making
government actions that are taken by an elite few and that are based on force appear as if they have been
somehow agreed to by citizens. Recognizing that all government action is backed by the threat of force for
noncompliance, and recognizing that an elite few are in a position where they can exercise government
power, there is good reason for constitutional political economy, as a subdiscipline, to focus more attention
on the types of institutions that can objectively interpret and enforce constitutional rules. It is not enough
to have good rules if those rules are not objectively interpreted and enforced. If the elite really do control
the state, there is good reason to think that democratic oversight will be ineffective and that checks and
balances are necessary to constrain those who hold the power of government from abusing that power.
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Abstract: In this paper electoral disproportionality is split into two types: (1) Forced or unavoidable,
due to the very nature of the apportionment problem; and (2) non-forced. While disproportionality
indexes proposed in the literature do not distinguish between such components, we design an index,
called “quota index”, just measuring avoidable disproportionality. Unlike the previous indexes, the
new one can be zero in real situations. Furthermore, this index presents an interesting interpretation
concerning transfers of seats. Properties of the quota index and relationships with some usual
disproportionality indexes are analyzed. Finally, an empirical approach is undertaken for different
countries and elections.
Keywords: electoral systems; proportionality; electoral quota; disproportionality indexes;
measurement; Spain; Sweden; Germany
1. Introduction
Electoral systems are mechanisms by which votes become seats in a parliament. In order to
reflect the overall distribution of voters’ preferences, some of these systems advocate for proportional
representation, so that political parties will receive percentages of seats corresponding to their
respective percentages of votes. Since a seat cannot be divided, it is impossible to assign exactly
the obtained vote shares in seat terms. This apportionment problem generates something known as
electoral disproportionality. Consequently, some parties are overrepresented while others become
underrepresented. Even more, disproportionality may increase, due to the existence of many districts
and electoral thresholds.
There is not an agreement about an instrument to determine such distortions generated during
the process of translating votes into seats and many efforts have been made to measure them.
Disproportionality indexes are usually employed to this aim and there exists a wide literature on
this approach.
A survey compilation of indexes resulting from the application of different techniques is presented
by Taagepera and Grofman (2003) (see also Taagepera 2007; Karpov 2008; Chessa and Fragnelli 2012;
Goldenberg and Fisher 2017). These authors also develop an interesting analysis of the properties
that they fulfill. From a computational point of view, Ocaña and Oñate (2011) presents a software
for calculating nine disproportionality indexes. On the other hand, Koppel and Diskin (2009) and
Boyssou et al. (2016) propose axiomatizations for some indexes measuring disproportionality. Finally,
relationships among some disproportionality indexes appear in Borisyuk et al. (2004) and Bolun (2012).
All the proposed indexes measure deviations (in some way) from exact proportionality, which is
not affordable in practice. Balinski and Young (2001, pp. 79–83) deals with a more realistic requirement
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concerning the apportionment problem: No party’s representation should deviate from its quota
(number of seats that should be received by the parties in exact proportionality) by more than one
unit. In other words, no party should get less than its quota rounded down, nor more than its quota
rounded up. This property is called “staying within the quota” or “verification of the quota rule”.
Taking into account that usually the quota is not an integer number, votes-seats disproportionality
could be non-forced (if the quota rule is not satisfied), or forced, otherwise.
This paper presents a new index that just measures non-forced disproportionality, avoiding that
inherent to the fact that exact proportionality is unfeasible, as pointed out. Remarkably, this index is
zero if and only if the quota condition is satisfied. Even more, from this index, it is possible to obtain
the minimum number of seats that would be necessary to transfer from some parties to others, so that
the distribution of parliament seats will satisfy the quota condition.
The paper has the following structure: Section 2 introduces the notation and basic concepts,
paying particular attention to the quota. Section 3 presents some of the most used disproportionality
indexes, namely: The maximum deviation, Loosemore-Hanby and Gallagher indexes. Section 4
introduces a new index, which will be called “quota index”. Section 5 shows the properties that the
last index verifies and some relationships with the previous disproportionality indexes. In Section 6
the aforementioned indexes are computed for different elections in Spain, Sweden and Germany,
and comparisons among them are established. In Section 7, some conclusions are presented. Finally,
technical proofs, electoral results and data resources are left in Appendices A–C, respectively.
2. Notation and Basic Concepts
Let V be the number of voters, n the number of parties and S the number of seats to be distributed;




Vi; on the other hand, (S1, S2, . . . , Sn) is the vector whose components are the seats assigned to




Si; finally, we denote by vi and si the proportion of votes and seats that party
i receives. Thus, vi = Vi/V and si = Si/S are the vote and seat shares, respectively, for each party i.
A party i is overrepresented when si > vi, and underrepresented when si < vi. Any of these
inequalities represents a distortion with respect to the voters’ real preferences.
The quota (or “fair share”) is the number of seats that the party i should receive in exact
proportionality after obtaining Vi votes. That is, the quota for party i results qi =
Vi
V S.








qi, if a party is underrepresented, at least another one will be overrepresented.
The lower quota is the closest integer number that does not exceed qi; it will be denoted by qi.
Likewise, the upper quota is the smallest integer number bigger than or equal to qi; it will be denoted
by qi. In other terms, the lower quota is obtained by rounding down qi, and the upper quota by
rounding up qi.
Usually, for each party, quotas are fractional numbers and hence qi = qi+ 1. Otherwise, if qi
is an integer number, then qi = qi. The interval whose extremes are lower and upper quotas will
be called quota interval.
An apportionment satisfies the quota rule if the number of seats Si assigned to each party
differs from its quota less than one, this is: |qi − Si| < 1, or equivalently, qi ≤ Si ≤ qi for each
i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
On the other hand we will say that a party is overrepresented with respect to the upper quota if
Si > qi; and is underrepresented with respect to the lower quota if Si < qi. Obviously, these are
more restrictive requirements for parties than being merely overrepresented or underrepresented.
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3. Some Indexes of Electoral Disproportionality and Their Relationship
The literature on indexes is devoted to measuring the quality of an electoral system, in some way.
One of the most important issues in this context is electoral disproportionality, which could be defined
as the deviation level of vote and seat shares of the participating parties in an election.
In order to determine electoral disproportionality various indexes have been proposed.
As aforementioned, compilations of these indexes have been made by different authors
(Taagepera and Grofman 2003; Karpov 2008). Among them, the maximum deviation index, the
Loosemore-Hanby index proposed by Loosemore and Hanby (1971) and the least squares index,
presented by Gallagher (1991), are some of the most frequently used ones.
3.1. Maximum Deviation Index
This index measures the maximum difference between vote and seat shares in absolute terms.




As it can be observed, the maximum deviation index only provides information of one party that
can be either the most underrepresented or overrepresented one, regardless of the deviation sizes of
the other parties.
3.2. Loosemore-Hanby Index
This index adds all the deviations generated during the allocation, meaning the sum of absolute








The sum of absolute values of the differences between the vote and seat shares for overrepresented
parties coincides with the same sum for underrepresented ones. Hence, the total sum appearing in
ILH is divided by two in order to obtain the seat share that has not been distributed in a completely
proportional way.
3.3. Gallagher Index
The least squares index is also known as Gallagher index, and it is defined as the square root










This index takes into account both big and small deviations in the proportion of assigned seats
and obtained votes. However, small differences have less influence than big differences. Consequently,
this index is less sensitive than the previous one to the appearance of small parties.
3.4. Relationship among Disproportionality Indexes
Obviously, ILH = IMD = IG = 0 if and only if there exists exact proportionality, i.e., the
percentage of votes equals that of seats for each party. Some further relations among these indexes
can be established. It is straightforward that ILH = IMD if and only if there exists either just one
overrepresented or just one underrepresented party. On the other hand, if there are at least two
overrepresented parties jointly with another two underrepresented ones, it is straightforward that
ILH > IMD.
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On the other hand, Borisyuk et al. (2004) proved that IG ≤ ILH . Besides, it is easy to check that
IG = ILH if and only if there is exactly one overrepresented party jointly with just one underrepresented
party. In both cases, also IMD reaches the same value.
Finally, taking into account the aforementioned relationships concerning the considered indexes
we can assert that, if there are at least two overrepresented parties jointly with another two
underrepresented ones, then ILH > max{IMD, IG}.
4. The Quota Index
All the aforementioned indexes measure deviations between vote and seat shares, and hence,
in an implicit way, they take into account the quota as a point of reference. For example, the

















Note that ILH = 0 if and only if Si = qi for all the parties (this is also true for the previously considered
indexes). However, as the seats are indivisible, this situation requires all qi to be integer numbers, and
this is extremely unlikely. Therefore, exact proportionality becomes almost impossible in real elections.
On the other hand, in terms of seat transference ILH can be understood as the proportion of
seats that we need to transfer from overrepresented parties to underrepresented ones in order to
achieve exact proportionality. However, this is merely a theoretical value because, again, such exact
proportionality would require the seats to be divided.
This is the reason why we have focused our attention not in exact apportionments, but in those
staying within the quota, which is a more plausible condition. These considerations do not mean that
we advocate for apportionment methods verifying the quota rule, as the largest remainders (a.k.a.
Hamilton) rule. That is, regardless of the used method, our aim is measuring post hoc deviations from
the quota interval.
If the quota qi is not an integer number for some party, depending on the value of Si, two kinds of
disproportionality can be considered. We will say that in an allocation of seats, there exists non-forced
disproportionality if some party does not verify the quota condition (i.e., it is overrepresented with
respect to the upper quota or underrepresented with respect to the lower quota). Otherwise, the quota
rule is satisfied for all the parties and we will talk about forced disproportionality, unavoidable due to
the nature of the apportionment problem. Such considerations are illustrated in Figure 1.
These ideas have been taken into account in our proposal, in which we only measure non-forced
disproportionality (i.e., beyond de quota interval): That is, only distances of overrepresented parties
from their upper quotas or underrepresented parties from their lower quotas are considered. In this




















The value of Iq is between zero and one. The zero value corresponds to any distribution that
verifies the quota rule, while the maximum disproportionality will be reached when all the seats are
assigned to parties with no votes. It is worth noting that, while Loosemore-Hanby and the other
aforementioned indexes are zero if and only if the apportionment is exact, Iq can be zero without this
requirement. But, obviously, Iq is also zero if there exists exact proportionality.
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Figure 1. Types of disproportionality taking into account the quota rule.
Moreover, our index has an interesting interpretation in transference terms: The quota index
Iq is the minimum proportion of seats in a parliament of S seats that we would need to transfer
from overrepresented parties with respect to the upper quota to others underrepresented (or from
overrepresented parties to others underrepresented with respect to the lower quota), for the quota rule
to be verified. And S·Iq will be exactly the minimum number of seats that would have to be transferred
from some parties to others for the distribution to verify the quota condition at a global level. This fact
will be illustrated in Section 6 concerning 2016 Spanish elections.
5. Quota Index Analysis and Relationships with Other Indexes
Karpov (2008), Taagepera and Grofman (2003) and Taagepera (2007) propose some reasonable
properties and analyze their fulfillment for several disproportionality indexes, the maximum deviation,
the Loosemore-Hanby index and the Gallagher indexes among them. In this section, after showing the
difference of perspectives between the above-mentioned indexes and the new one, we will test for Iq
the most relevant properties appearing in the literature.
In what follows, we will formulate the above-mentioned disproportionality indexes in terms of
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These expressions are intended to establish in an easy way their relationships with the quota
index. It will be also used in further computations.
5.1. Quota Index and Disproportionality Indexes: Difference of Scopes
In Section 4, disproportionality has been split into two types. As shown in the previous
expressions, traditional approaches to this issue measure the distances from quotas, and hence they
take into account both forced and non-forced disproportionality. On the other hand, the quota index
just measures distances to the quota interval, and therefore just consider non-forced disproportionality.
In other words, usual disproportionality indexes contemplate underrepresented on overrepresented
parties, while the quota index just considers those over the upper quota or below the lower quota.
The following example illustrates these aspects.
Example 1. Consider parties A and B, and let the number of seats to allocateS = 10. Suppose that SA = 8
and qA = 7.6 are the number of seats and the respective quota of the party A. Also consider that SB = 2 and
qB = 2.4 are the number of seats and the quota of the party B, respectively. Then, we obtain:
IMD = ILH = IG = 0.04.
However, as the quota rule is verified, Iq = 0. Notice that with these data all the appearing disproportionality
is forced (unavoidable).
5.2. Disproportionality Indexes Properties and Quota Index
Following Karpov (2008), some compelling properties are taken into account:
1. Anonymity: Any permutation of party labels does not change the value of the index.
2. Principle of transfers: If we transfer a seat from an overrepresented party to an underrepresented
one, then the value of the index should not increase.
3. Independence from split: Suppose there are many parties with equal vote and seat shares, and these
parties are grouped into one. Then, the value of the index calculated for all the parties in the
group should be equal to the value of the index for the group considered as a whole.
4. Scale invariance (homogeneity): The index should not depend on any proportional change in the
number of votes or seats
5. Zero normalization: This property is satisfied if, when vi = si for all i = 1, . . . , n, then the value of
the index is 0.
Next, we will check the fulfillment of the previous properties by Iq.
Proposition 1. The indexIq satisfies anonymity, principle of transfers and zero normalization.
(The proof can be found in Appendix A).
Now, Example 2 shows that Iq does not satisfy the property of independence from split.
Example 2. Suppose nine parties whose quotas and assigned seats appear in Table 1, where S = 6.
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Table 1. Electoral data for testing independence from split (before grouping).
Parties
Results A B C D E F G H I
qi 1.4 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Si 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Calculating separately Iq for all the appearing parties, we obtain:
Iq = max
{








Now, in Table 2, Iq is calculated for parties with equal percentage of seats and quotas as unique coalitions:
Table 2. Electoral data for testing independence from split (after grouping).
Parties Coalitions
Results A + B C + D + E F + G + H + I
qi 2.8 1.2 2














Table 3 shows the properties that IMD, ILH , IG and Iq satisfy or do not (Karpov (2008) and
Taagepera and Grofman (2003) for the three first indexes). A “+” sign means that the index satisfies
the property and “−” means that it does not. Occasionally, these signs may appear enclosed into
parentheses to point out that the corresponding property is or not satisfied under specific circumstances.










IMD + (+) − + +
ILH + (+) + + +
IG + (+) − + +
Iq + + − (−) +
Parentheses appearing in the column relative to the Principle of Transfers in Table 3 mean that
IMD, ILH and IG may violate the principle of transfers in some situations, as shown in Example 3.
Example 3. Consider parties A and B, and S = 10. Suppose that qA = 7.6, SA = 8, qB = 2.4 and SB = 2.
That is, A is overrepresented and B is underrepresented. In this situation:
IMD = ILH = IG = 0.04.
Now, if we transfer a seat from A to B :
IMD = ILH = IG = 0.06.
Note that, in this example, after the seat transference the overrepresented party becomes underrepresented,
and vice versa.
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However, it is easy to check that IMD, ILH and IG satisfy a weaker Principle of Transfers
establishing that, if a seat is transferred from an overrepresented party verifying Si − qi > 0.5 to
an underrepresented one that satisfies qi − Si > 0.5, then the value of these indexes should not increase.
In particular, this situation happens when a seat is transferred from an overrepresented party with
respect to the upper quota to an underrepresented one with respect to the lower quota. Concerning
different versions of the Principle of Transfers in electoral disproportionality and their connection with
the original Dalton’s Principle in more general inequality contexts, see Taagepera and Grofman (2003),
Van Puyenbroeck (2008) and Goldenberg and Fisher (2017).
On the other hand, the parentheses appearing in the column relative to Scale Invariance in Table 3
means that Iq violates this property just with proportional changes in the number of seats, but not in
the number of votes, as shown in Example 4.
Example 4. Consider again parties A and B, and S = 10. Suppose that qA = 7.6, SA = 8, qB = 2.4 and
SB = 2. Note that in this situation the quota rule is satisfied and hence Iq = 0. If we multiply by 10 the number
of seats, that is, S = 100, we obtain qA = 76, SA = 80, qB = 24 and SB = 20. Now, the quota rule is not
verified and Iq = 0.04.
However, this fact should not be considered as a drawback of the index because the first situation cannot be
improved by transferring seats in any way, while in the second situation if we transfer S ∗ Iq = 4 seats from
party A to B, the quota rule is verified. Even more, in this case the apportionment becomes exact.
Concerning this issue, Boyssou et al. (2016) assert that although the homogeneity with respect
the number of seats “seems rather reasonable for large parliaments, a good disproportionality index
should perhaps be sensitive to the size of the parliament, at least for small parliaments”.
Obviously, proportional changes in the number of votes (maintaining the number of seats to
allocate) do not affect the quota and consequently neither the value of Iq.
Some other properties can be considered for a disproportionality index
(Taagepera and Grofman 2003; Taagepera 2007), among them:
• Informationally complete (makes use of all si and vi)
• Uses data for all parties uniformly
• Does not depend on the number of parties
• Varies between 0 and 1 (or 100%)
As shown by the previous authors, these properties are satisfied by the disproportionality indexes
considered along this paper, except the first one by IMD. On the other hand, it is straightforward that
Iq also verifies all of them.
5.3. Relationships among Iq and Disproportionality Indexes
The relationships existing among different disproportionality indexes have been shown in various
ways (Borisyuk et al. 2004; Bolun 2012). In the present paper some relationships that the quota index
has with the disproportionality indexes appearing above will be analyzed.
Proposition 2. The value of the quota index is always minor than or equal to the Loosemore-Hanby index:
Iq ≤ ILH .
(The proof can be found in Appendix A).
Proposition 3. The values of the quota and the maximum deviation indexes verify the following inequality:
Iq ≥ IMD − 1S .
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(The proof can be found in Appendix A).
Obviously, Iq = ILH = IMD = IG = 0 if there exists exact proportionality. If not, other relations
can be established. It is obvious that Iq = ILH if and only if qi are integer numbers for all the
overrepresented parties and the maximum of the expression of Iq is reached for these ones, or qi are
integer numbers for all the underrepresented parties and the maximum is reached for them. As these
situations are extremely unlikely, in general Iq < ILH .
On the other hand, it is straightforward that Iq = IMD if and only if there exists either just
one overrepresented party with respect to the upper quota and, in addition, its quota is an integer
number or just one underrepresented party with respect to the lower quota and, in addition, its quota
is an integer.
Finally, it is easy to check that Iq = IG if there is just one overrepresented party whose quota is an
integer number and, in addition, there is exactly one underrepresented party. In both cases, also IMD
reaches the same value. Otherwise both inequalities might appear between Iq and IG. For example,
in any allocation verifying the quota with no exact proportionality, Iq = 0 < IG. But if the quota
condition is not satisfied, the inequality might be reversed and, in fact, Iq < IG is unlikely (see results
in Section 6).
5.4. Discussion about Indexes
It can be observed that, as appearing in Table 3, none of the indexes considered along the paper is
optimal. This situation is somehow analogous (in another context) to those in Social Choice theory,
where is well known that there do not exist perfect voting systems nor apportionment methods, as
proven by Arrow and Balinski-Young theorems, respectively.
In fact, it is possible to find examples where all the considered indexes present some weaknesses,
as will be shown in what follows.
In an electoral situation where there exist non integer quotas (in fact, this is the most usual case),
it is impossible to achieve exact proportionality, but it is always possible to find an apportionment





Si = S. In such a situation, there are several possibilities of seat distribution staying
within the quota, and this fact might be considered as a criticism, as shown in Example 5.
Example 5. Consider parties A and B, and let the number of seats to allocate S = 5. Suppose that qA = 2.4
and qB = 2.6. In this situation there are two possibilities of seat distribution staying within the quota: SA = 2,
SB = 3 and S′A = 3, S
′
B = 2. Hence, Iq = I
′
q = 0.
However, the second allocation is less compelling than the first one, because the most voted party obtains
the least representation. In other terms, there exists a lack of vote/seat monotonicity in the last apportionment.
Now, notice that for the first allocation, we have IMD = ILH = IG = 0.08, while for the second allocation,
I′MD = I′LH = I′G = 0.12. Consequently, these indexes point out the first allotment as better than the
second one.
Nonetheless, Example 6 illustrates that the lack of monotonicity might not be captured (even
more, it can be inversely reflected) when the usual disproportionality indexes are used.
Example 6. Suppose eight parties whose quotas and assigned seats (in two different apportionments) appear in
Table 4, where S = 10.
The first seat distribution is intentionally arbitrary (in fact, it cannot be obtained by any divisor or quotient
method). However, the second distribution is obtained by any divisor method in the parametric family (Balinski
and Ramírez 1999) between Webster (Sainte-Laguë) and Jefferson (D’Hondt).
After some computations, the obtained values for quota and maximum deviation indexes in both allotments
are Iq = I′q = 0 and IMD = I′MD = 0.09. The first apportionment presents two pair of parties, (A, B) and
(C, D), where, in each of them, the most voted is the least represented. However, in this example, unlike the
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previous one, Loosemore-Hanby and Gallagher do no detect this lack of monotonicity. Even worse, they work in
the opposite way to that expected: ILH = 0.16, I′LH = 0.17 and IG = 0.094, I′G = 0.099.
Table 4. Electoral data for testing indexes suitability.
Results A B C D E F G H
qi 4.2 4.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
Si 4 5 0 1 0 0 0 0
S
′
i 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
6. Implementation of the Quota Index in Some Countries and Elections
We first study in depth the case of Spain along the last 25 years, paying special attention to the
transfer analysis in the 2016 elections, as well as to the overall correlation of the disproportionality
indexes previously calculated.
Afterwards, we merely calculate the considered indexes for another two countries, Sweden and
Germany, jointly with some comments on the results.
As a caveat, we note that slight (and hence negligible) differences might appear in the results, due
to the treatment (grouped or not) of small parties without representation.
All electoral data resources appear in Appendix C.
6.1. Spain (1993–2016)
In Spain there exists a party list proportional representation system. The Spanish Chamber of
Deputies has 350 members chosen in 52 districts. An exclusion threshold of 3% of the valid votes in
each district is applied. All these elements have not been modified from 1977. Disproportionality
partially occurs in Spain because population/representation shares are not balanced among districts.
Furthermore, due to the small size of districts, some parties whose votes are scattered all over the
country may obtain significantly fewer seats than other parties with a similar number of votes, if
geographically concentrated. Other causes of disproportionality in Spain are the use of the D’Hondt
rule, intended to favor larger parties.
Table 5 shows the values of maximum deviation, Loosemore-Hanby, Gallagher and the quota
indexes for the eight most recent elections in Spain.
Table 5. Disproportionality indexes for recent Spanish elections (in percentage).
Index 1993 1996 2000 2004 2008 2011 2015 2016
ILH 12.01 8.07 8.58 7.95 8.08 11.29 10.51 7.80
Iq 11.42 7.10 8.00 7.42 7.42 10.57 9.71 7.14
IG 6.81 5.32 5.60 4.63 4.50 6.91 5.92 5.23
IMD 6.33 5.39 7.04 3.97 3.92 7.89 6.21 5.86
S = 350
In all analyzed elections, ILH is bigger than Iq (as theoretically proven), while IG is the smallest
(hence, in particular, Iq > IG in all the cases). Remarkably, the quota rule never is globally satisfied,
given that always Iq = 0.
Focusing our attention in 2016, it can be observed that all the obtained values have decreased
from those corresponding to the previous elections. An important fact that can partially explain this
issue is that IU, a left-wing party, traditionally penalized by vote dispersion, formed a coalition with
the emergent party Podemos.
Following with the last Spanish elections, it is worth noting that ILH = 7.8% and S·ILH = 27.3.
This value corresponds to the number of seats to be transferred from some parties to others in order to
achieve exact proportionality. This is a theoretical value because seats cannot be divided. On the other
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hand, Iq = 7.14%, and hence S·Iq = 25, which means that this is the minimum number of seats to be
transferred for the apportionment to verify the quota. This is a feasible goal. Concretely, in order to
achieve this aim, 20 seats belonging to PP and 5 more seats from PSOE should be transferred to C’s
(14), PACMA (4) and Podemos-IU-EQUO (2). The remaining 5 seats should be moved, one by one, to
any other unrepresented party (see Appendix B for details).
Despite the fact that Iq solely measures non-forced disproportionality and the remaining indexes
are disproportionality ones, in what follows a correlation analysis among them is undertaken in order
to explore their relationships. Table 6 shows the results coming from data appearing in Table 5.
Table 6. Correlation among indexes for elections in Spain.
Indexes ILH Iq IG IMD
ILH 1
Iq 0.9990 1
IG 0.8991 0.9033 1
IMD 0.7051 0.7110 0.9311 1
The highest correlation value appears between ILH and Iq. This fact relies on the formal expression
of Iq which is somehow inspired by that of ILH , although the first one only measures avoidable
(beyond the quota interval) disproportionality. Hence, both indexes have different interpretations, as
aforementioned. On the other hand, IMD and ILH have the smallest correlation.
6.2. Other Countries
As aforementioned, we next calculate the considered disproportionality indexes for another two
countries, Sweden (proportional system) and Germany (mixed-member system).
6.2.1. Sweden (1998–2014)
Sweden is ranked in the third position worldwide according to the 2017 democratic index
developed by The Economist Intelligence Unit (www.eiu.com). The Swedish Parliament (Riksdag)
is composed of 349 seats elected under a proportional system. 310 of them belong to fixed constituency
seats and the remaining 39 are adjustment seats. Any particular party must receive at least 4% of the
national votes to be assigned a seat. Fixed seats are allocated among the parties using a method known
as the adjusted odd numbers method (or modified Sainte-Laguë).
The purpose of the 39 adjustment seats is to make sure that the distribution of seats among the
parties over the whole country should be as proportional in relation to the number of votes as possible.
The whole country is viewed as it was a single constituency and is then compared with the distribution
of votes in the 29 constituencies. The adjustment seats are allocated first according to party and then
according to the constituency (see www.riksdagen.se for details).
Table 7 shows the values of the ILH , Iq, IG and IMD indices in all the Swedish Riksdag elections
held from 1998 to 2014.
Table 7. Disproportionality indexes for recent Swedish elections (in percentage).
Index 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
ILH 2.52 2.92 6.67 2.07 4.04
Iq 1.72 2.01 5.44 1.72 3.15
IG 1.27 1.58 3.17 1.25 2.64
IMD 1.12 1.44 2.67 1.42 3.13
S = 349
It can be observed, as in the previously studied case, that Iq is always between IG and ILH .
Notice also that now the obtained results are lower than those for Spain. In fact, the Swedish electoral
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system produces a high proportionality unless one or several political parties have a percentage of
votes just a little below the electoral threshold (4%). Concretely, this situation happened in 2006 and
2014 because the Sweden Democrats and the Feminist Initiative parties obtained 2.9% and 3.1% of the
national votes, respectively.
6.2.2. Germany (1976–2017)
Germany’s electoral system is a combination of “first-past-the-post” election of constituency
candidates (first votes) and proportional representation on the basis of votes for the parties’ States
(Länder) lists (second votes). Hence, it is a mixed-member electoral system.
Concretely, half of the Members of the German Parliament (Bundestag) are elected directly from
Germany’s 299 constituencies, the other half via party lists in Germany’s sixteen Länder. Accordingly,
each voter casts two votes in the elections to the German Bundestag. The first vote, allowing voters
to elect their local representatives to the Bundestag, decides which candidates are sent to Parliament
from the constituencies. The second vote is cast for a party list. The 598 seats are distributed among
the parties that have gained more than 5% of the second votes or at least three constituency seats. Each
party receives the minimum between the number of seats obtained on the basis of the first votes and
those corresponding to the second votes. The Sainte-Laguë/Schepers method is used to convert the
votes into seats
In some circumstances, Parliament’s size may increase during the process of allocating the seats,
due to what are known as “overhang seats” and additional “balance seats” in order to maintain
proportionality (see www.bundestag.de for further details).
Table 8 shows the values of the ILH , Iq, IG and IMD indices in the German Bundestag elections
held from 1976 to the most recent in 2017.
Table 8. Disproportionality indexes for recent German elections (in percentage).
Size Index 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 2013 2017
ILH 8.05 3.61 4.72 8.45 4.33 6.01 15.69 5.00
Iq 7.40 3.27 4.19 8.33 3.75 5.63 15.21 4.51
IG 4.62 2.22 2.75 6.15 2.28 3.14 7.83 1.95
IMD 3.85 2.15 3.11 7.98 2.05 3.92 6.29 1.45
S 662 672 669 672 614 622 631 709
Notice that, again, the values of Iq are always between those of IG and ILH . Paying attention to
the historical sequence of data, the magnitude of the results obtained in 2013 is shocking. This high
disproportionality arose because, in this year, parties that did not overcome the electoral threshold
represented approximately 16% of the votes.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, the quota index (Iq) has been introduced and analyzed. It is worth mentioning that
this index is zero if and only if the quota rule is satisfied by all the parties, i.e., when only forced (i.e.,
unavoidable) disproportionality arises.
Remarkably, in our approach, Iq = 0 can occur even if the apportionment is not exact (in fact,
exact proportionality is almost impossible, due to the very nature of the apportionment problem).
Moreover, Iq corresponds to the minimum percentage of seats that is necessary to transfer among
parties for the quota rule to be verified. From this value it is possible to obtain the minimum number
of seats (being an integer number) that it would be necessary to transfer from some parties to others,
so that the seat distribution of the parliament will satisfy the quota condition.
After an electoral process, it is usual for the main party to be overrepresented. If the
underrepresentation is distributed among all the other parties and none of them stays below its
lower quota, then Iq will represent the surplus of the winning party calculated from its upper quota.
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Notice also that, contrary to other well-known disproportionality indexes, the existence of many small
parties with a quota less than the unit and without seat representation do not increase the value of Iq.
We have proven that the quota index verifies some compelling properties appearing in the
literature. In particular, it is worth noting that Iq gain an advantage over some of the most relevant
disproportionality indexes (maximum deviation, Loosemore-Hanby and Gallagher) when the principle
of transfers is considered. On the other hand, we have checked that the quota index is not homogenous
with respect to the number of seats, although it has been justified that this fact can make sense in
our context.
Finally, quantitative relationships have been established among the quota and the aforementioned
disproportionality indexes and all of them have been calculated for several elections in Spain,
Sweden and Germany. The obtained results show that there exists a high correlation among the
Loosemore-Hanby and quota indexes, but a major argument to use the last one is its interpretability in
terms of seat transfer.
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Appendix A. Proofs of the Propositions
Proposition 1. The index Iq satisfies anonymity, principle of transfers and zero normalization.
Proof:
• Anonymity











this property is immediate since it relies on commutative property for real numbers.
• Principle of transfers
Consider Sh and qh, number of seats assigned and quota for an overrepresented party h,
respectively. Let Sj and qj be the number of seats assigned and the quota for an underrepresented
party j, respectively. When a seat is transferred from h to j, the following cases can happen:
(1) If party h continues being overrepresented, then
Sh − qh > (Sh − 1)− qh ≥ 0.
(2) If party h becomes underrepresented, then
qh − (Sh − 1) = 0.
In such scenarios we can find any of these situations:
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(a) If party j continues being underrepresented, then
⌊
qj
⌋− Sj > ⌊qj⌋− (Sj + 1) ≥ 0.






Taking this into account, if a seat is transferred from an overrepresented party to an
underrepresented one Iq does not increase its value in any of the arguments of the maximum appearing
in its expression.
• Zero normalization






V S = Si. Furthermore, we know that qi =
Vi
V S,
because qi = Si. Given that the number of assigned seats Si is an integer number and qi = Si, qi is also




= qi = qi. Therefore:
































Proposition 2. The value of the quota index is always minor than or equal to the Loosemore-Hanby index:
Iq ≤ ILH .









On one hand, given that the sum of the terms corresponding to overrepresented parties is equal
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Thus, the maximum of the two terms appearing in the definition of Iq is less than or equal to ILH .

Proposition 3. The value of the quota indexes and the maximum deviation verify the following inequality:
Iq ≥ IMD − 1S .







we consider two cases:
(a) If max
i=1,..., n
|Si − qi| is reached for underrepresented party u, then max
i=1,...,n






(qi − Si) ≥ qu − Su ≥ (qu − Su)− 1,
where the last inequality takes into account that qu ≥ qu − 1. Dividing both extreme members

















,Iq ≥ IMD − 1S
(b) If max
i=1,...,n
|Si − qi|, is reached for a party o that is overrepresented, then max
i=1,...,n






(Si − qi) ≥ So − qo ≥ (So − qo)− 1,
where the last inequality takes into account that qo + 1 ≥ qo. Dividing both extreme members


















In consequence, Iq ≥ IMD − 1S . 
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Appendix B.
Table A1. Spanish Electoral Results (2016).
Parties Votes Quotas Seats
PP 7906.185 116.48 137
PSOE 5424.709 79.92 85
PODEMOS-IU-EQUO 3201.170 47.16 45
C’s 3123.769 46.02 32
ECP 848.526 12.50 12
PODEMOS-COMPROMÍS-EUPV 655.895 9.66 9
ERC-CATSÍ 629.294 9.27 9
CDC 481.839 7.10 8
PODEMOS-EN MAREA-ANOVA-EU 344.143 5.07 5
EAJ-PNV 286.215 4.22 5
EH Bildu 184.092 2.71 2
CCa-PNC 78.080 1.15 1
PACMA 284.848 4.20






































Total 23,756.674 350 350
Source: Ministry of Interior (Spain).
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Abstract: This paper presents an extension of the two-period Samaritan’s Dilemma in order to
analyze the potential for foreign aid to promote freedom. An example is the United States’ recent
opening towards Cuba. It is shown that a donor nation’s dual concern for economic reforms and
greater freedoms can exacerbate the Samaritan’s Dilemma, even when economic aid is coupled with
targets for freedom. By contrast, a policy that is focused on freedom alone can potentially resolve
the Samaritan’s Dilemma. Such a policy requires the donor to temper the degree of altruism that
motivates its provision of economic aid to the recipient nation.
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1. Introduction
Donor nations may seek to attain multiple goals when providing foreign aid to a recipient nation.
For example, if the recipient nation is a dictatorship, then the donor may be interested in fostering both
economic growth and political freedoms. By contrast, the recipient dictatorship might not be interested
in achieving both goals, particularly if political freedoms would lead to a reduction in power. In such a
situation, what is a donor nation to do?
Cuba is a motivating example of this phenomenon. In the first 30 years of communist rule it was a
USSR satellite in that Cuba’s economy critically depended on Soviet aid (Morris 2007). Given the effects
of the United States (U.S.) embargo that resulted from Cuba’s nationalization of U.S. oil refineries,
it was impossible for Cuba to sustain its economy without receiving external support (Pérez 2002).
With the demise of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s primary source of aid dried up and it looked for new
partners to economically and financially support the communist regime. Subsequently, Hugo Chavez’s
Venezuela became the main provider of aid to Cuba (Amegashie et al. 2013). Yet, under the combination
of falling oil prices and the death of Chavez, Venezuela could no longer afford to support Cuba (Piccone
and Trinkunas 2014). Brazil, under the Lula and Rousseff administrations, then became Cuba’s new
life-line.1 Over time, the Brazilian government was plagued by corruption and also committed itself to
vast expenditures associated with its hosting of The World Cup and Rio Olympics. Finally, during
Rousseff’s presidency, the Brazilian economy entered into the nadir of a recession (Economist 2016),
at which point it could no longer maintain its support of Cuba.
This history of aid to Cuba characterizes the regime as parasitic in the sense of Buchanan’s
(Buchanan 1975) Samaritan’s Dilemma. That is, sponsors directed international aid to Cuba primarily
1 For the Brazilian foreign policies see Dauvergne and Farias (2012).
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for the purpose of maintaining Cuba’s communist regime, and, knowing this, Cuba has had no
incentive to conduct meaningful economic reform. Cuba’s leaders were well-aware that aid would not
be withdrawn in the absence of reform because the maintenance of Cuba’s communist system was
of first-order importance to its donors. This is consistent with Gibson et al.’s (2005) characterization
of the Samaritan’s Dilemma as being a motivational problem, rather one than stemming from the
asymmetry or absence of information. Moreover, Gibson et al. (2005) recognize that the dynamics of
the Samaritan’s Dilemma are such that not only is meaningful reform unlikely, but also aid recipients
may actually lose skills and motivation over time (p. 39).
Such behavior is not limited to Cuba. For example, North Korea and other dictatorial clientele
states do the same; they have an incentive to avoid reforming their own economies in order to extract
rents from the rest of the world in the form of foreign aid. Although not framed within the context of
the Samaritan’s Dilemma, Bapat (2011) notes that donors of anti-terrorism aid face a similar situation.
Specifically, it is the existence of terrorism in the recipient nation that prompts the need for aid.
This then begs the question as to the incentive for true counterterror efforts within the recipient nation
if counterterror success leads to less aid.
What happens if, in addition to economic performance, the donor is also interested in promoting
freedom? For example, as outlined above, without the help of the Soviet Union, Venezuela, or Brazil
the Cuban regime had no obvious source of aid. Within this vacuum, the Obama administration saw a
clear opportunity to engage Cuba and reestablish diplomatic and commercial relations with it. For the
Obama administration, opening its relationship with Cuba was seen as an opportunity to renew its
leadership in the Americas “and promote more effective change that supports the Cuban people
and our national security interests” [https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cuba].
In particular,
“A critical focus of these actions will include continued strong support for improved
human rights conditions and democratic reforms in Cuba. The promotion of democracy
supports universal human rights by empowering civil society and a person’s right to speak
freely, peacefully assemble, and associate, and by supporting the ability of people to freely
determine their future. The U.S. efforts are aimed at promoting the independence of the Cuban
people so they do not need to rely on the Cuban state”.
[https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cuba, emphasis added]
In sum, the aim of the Obama administration’s policy was to improve Cuba’s economic
performance, and, at the same time, increase the freedom of its people so that they do not have
to rely on the Cuban state.2 Indeed, promoting freedom is often used as a justifying rationale for
foreign aid. For freedom promotion to work, it would appear that, at a minimum, the donor must
resolve the Samaritan’s Dilemma. Moreover, we show how changes to this policy under the Trump
administration will have the effect of testing the administration’s resolve.
The issues here are quite general and extend beyond U.S.-Cuba relations. Consequently, this
paper introduces an explicitly dynamic model as a context for analyzing the possible outcomes of
a change in donor-recipient relations that emphasizes both increased economic performance and
freedoms. In particular, we ask whether a focus on resolving the Samaritan’s Dilemma with respect
to the aid-income relationship is enough to successfully increase freedoms as well. That is, is a focus
on the Samaritan’s Dilemma an example of Kerr’s (Kerr 1975) classic trap of rewarding A while
hoping for B? Here, ‘A’ is rewarding recipient economic reform with increased aid, consistent with
resolving the Samaritan’s Dilemma. The ‘B’ is the donor’s objective of increased freedoms for the
recipient population.
2 The evolution of this policy under the Trump administration is addressed below.
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Within this context, we consider three different types of policies and two policymaking
environments. The policies are (i) an aid policy that is targeted on recipient economic performance;
(ii) a policy that couples aid with freedom and (iii) a freedom target that affects the recipient’s economic
performance indirectly via entrepreneurial reforms. The two policy environments are Stackelberg
(leader-follower) and Nash. The Stackelberg environment with the recipient treated as the leader is
most closely associated with the Samaritan’s Dilemma within two-period models (Pedersen 2001;
Dijkstra 2007); hence, it serves as a benchmark. Within this environment, we show that a policy that is
designed to avoid Kerr’s (1975) trap by coupling aid with freedom neither resolves the Samaritan’s
Dilemma nor does it foster freedom. This leads us to consider Nash interaction between donor and
recipient because Nash behavior involves sufficient donor commitment to resolve the two-period
Samaritan’s Dilemma (Gintis 2009). However, this turns out to be a classic case of rewarding A while
hoping for B. Specifically, in a Nash environment, the policy of coupling aid with freedom resolves the
Samaritan’s Dilemma, but it does not commensurately increase freedoms within the recipient nation.
Our final consideration, Nash play (representing donor commitment) and an explicitly freedom-based
policy, succeeds at resolving both the Samaritan’s Dilemma and increasing freedoms. To be successful;
however, such a policy requires the donor to temper its altruistic motivation for supporting the
recipient. This is especially true if the recipient is willing to test the donor’s resolve.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a literature review. Section 3
introduces a baseline dynamic version of a Samaritan’s Dilemma between a donor and recipient.
Section 4 considers several policies designed to resolve the Samaritan’s Dilemma, and shows that in all
cases, the recipient is able to accept donor aid and maintain its restrictions on freedoms. In Section 5 we
analyze the effect of the donor pre-committing to a freedom-based target, and show how this causes
meaningful reform within the recipient. Concluding remarks appear in Section 6.
2. Literature Review
Many countries engage in foreign aid and yet the literature on the efficacy of aid is equivocal.
For example, Easterly (2003) disputes that aid promotes growth. By contrast, Dalgaard et al. (2004)
show that aid increases long-run productivity. Boone (1996) finds that foreign aid has little impact
reducing poverty, or increasing investment; its main effect is to increase the size of government. Tavares
(2003) shows that foreign aid reduces corruption. Goldsmith (2001) finds a small, positive relationship
between foreign aid and democracy or freedom in Africa. Conversely, Knack (2004) does not find any
empirical evidence that aid promotes democracy for a sample of recipient nations over 1975–2000.
Power and Ryan (2006) analyze recipient nations over a 30-year time span (1970–2000) and find no
significant effect of foreign aid on economic freedom. Regarding the equivocal relationship between
aid and freedom, it is our contention that such observations can be partially explained by mixed results
on the part of donors to resolve the Samaritan’s Dilemma.
Indeed, The Elusive Quest for Growth (Easterly 2002) raised awareness of the importance of
accounting for economic and political incentives when it comes to development aid. Much earlier,
Buchanan (1975) similarly observed that suitable incentives and institutions for both donors and
recipients are necessary in order to be able to successfully institute aid-based reforms. Buchanan called
such a situation the Samaritan’s Dilemma, where a donor that is motivated by altruism (the proverbial
Samaritan) might have to restrict the extent of their altruism in order to provide the necessary incentives
for a recipient nation to conduct reform. For example, suppose that, as an altruist, a donor’s aid to a
recipient nation is negatively related to the recipient’s GDP. Then, if the recipient nation’s economy
fares poorly—owing to the absence of economic reforms—the recipient nation may receive more aid
than it would have under reforms that produced better economic outcomes. Buchanan (1975) calls
such recipient behavior parasitic. Moreover, Buchanan (1975) sees the issue in terms of being as much
of a problem of the donor’s behavior as that of the recipient.
In particular, when a donor is altruistic, the donor’s utility places positive weight on the recipient’s
utility. Aid has a direct cost in that it subtracts from the donor’s income but it also constitutes an
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altruistic benefit for the donor because it increases the recipient’s utility. Hence, if the recipient
underachieves economically an altruistic donor finds it in its interest to augment the recipient’s income
via aid. In addition, in Buchanan’s (1975) active Samaritan’s Dilemma, the donor’s utility is not
only a function of the amount of aid given to the recipient but it is also a function of the recipient’s
actions. Typically, this means that the donor prefers that the recipient conduct economic reforms
rather than exhibit parasitic behavior. In this paper, we put a twist on the donor’s preferences over the
recipient’s actions. Specifically, donor aid policy is motivated by both a concern for recipient economic
performance and also as a means for promoting freedom. Consequently, an altruistic donor prefers
that aid results in actions by the recipient that ultimately lead to increased freedoms.
In order to avoid the counterproductive incentive structure between the lack of reform and the
provision of aid, the donor nation may have to tie its hands and act against its altruistic interests.
Whether or not the donor should abandon its altruistic tendencies, thereby temporarily penalizing both
itself and the recipient, is the Samaritan’s Dilemma. In making such a commitment, the donor must
weigh the utility of the recipient in both the short and long run. Yet, the dynamic asymmetries present
between donor and recipient are absent from Buchanan’s (1975) model because it is a static game in
strategic form. Consequently, a literature has emerged that examines the dynamic means for tying the
hands of altruistic donors and aligning the incentives for the recipient with those of the donor.
Within a dynamic context the Samaritan’s Dilemma typically arises when the recipient acts as a
Stackelberg leader, thereby capitalizing on the donor’s altruism to its full extent (Bruce and Waldman
1990). The Stackelberg relation applies because recipients know that the greater the need that an
altruistic donor observes, the more aid the donor will give. To summarize Pedersen (2001, p. 698):
upon observing a low level of recipient income, it is in the donor’s interest to increase aid, which is
exactly what the recipient anticipated the donor to do. This is because if the donor does not give extra
aid it will lower the recipient’s utility, and, by the donor’s altruism, the utility of the donor itself. The
recipient’s understanding of this incentive structure allows for it to behave like a Stackelberg leader in
that it anticipates the donor’s likely response.
The solution therefore requires the donor to commit to not giving extra aid if the recipient
underperforms economically. Gintis (2009) demonstrates that if the donor is able to commit to Nash
play with the recipient, then the Samaritan’s Dilemma may be resolved. It is also well-established
that the two-period passive version of Buchanan’s Samaritan’s Dilemma can be resolved if the donor
acts as a leader in the Stackelberg sense (e.g., Dijkstra 2007).3 Another resolution is provided by
Lagerlöf (2004), where the donor has incomplete information regarding the recipient’s preferences
over the aid-augmented term in the recipient’s utility. As is often the case, the introduction of
incomplete information increases the set of equilibria. In particular, equilibrium exists where the
recipient truthfully signals its need for aid. In an alternative environment, where the donor has
asymmetric information regarding the recipient’s degree of reform, Svensson (2000) shows that a
second-best solution can be achieved when the donor delegates its aid decision to an agent that is
less altruistic than the donor. This is consistent with Buchanan’s (1975) intuition that resolving the
Samaritan’s Dilemma requires the donor to tie its hands against its altruistic interests.
In terms of the literature reviewed above, there are two defining aspects of our analysis. First, the
recipient is engaged in an active Samaritan’s Dilemma with the donor, owing to the donor’s concerns
for freedoms that extend beyond its altruistic motivation for providing aid. That is, the donor is
concerned with both the recipient’s welfare and actions. Second, it is a complete information analysis.
This is in keeping with donor’s understanding of the recipient as a dictatorship with well-defined
preferences for remaining in power. In addition, it is consistent with the treatment of the Samaritan’s
3 In the passive Samaritan’s Dilemma the donor’s payoffs are only dependent on the amount of aid the donor gives and
are not dependent on the recipient’s actions. Recall that we are instead examining the active version of the Samaritan’s
Dilemma, in which the recipient’s actions also matter to the donor. In particular, the expansion of freedoms to augment
recipient nation income matters to the donor nation.
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Dilemma in the foreign aid literature as being a motivational problem for donor and recipient alike,
rather than stemming from asymmetric information (Gibson et al. 2005). The corresponding model is
presented in the following section.
3. The Model
Our framework is based on an explicitly dynamic version of the Samaritan’s Dilemma.
This two-period baseline model allows for us to begin by formally addressing Buchanan’s (1975)
assertion that the resolution of the Samaritan’s Dilemma may require a commitment that is costly to
an altruistic aid donor in order to convince the aid recipient that it is in the recipient’s best interest to
undertake reform. Moreover, the two-period horizon captures the inability of elected governments to
commit to longer-term criteria for aid.
In expressing the model, the upper-case symbols U and V are used to denote the donor and
recipient’s two-period utility functions, respectively. The first-period components of the donor’s and
recipient’s utilities are denoted as u and v, respectively, with the second-period component of the
recipient’s utility being denoted as v̂. We do not specify a second-period component of the donor’s
utility because, by the definition of altruism, the donor’s second-period utility will be a function of the
recipient’s utility, V.
The two-period utility function of the recipient’s leadership, V, is defined to be consistent with
that of a dictatorship.4 In the first period, prior to receiving donor aid, the recipient’s welfare depends
positively on the state of its economy, as measured by its GDP, y, and negatively on the freedom, F, of
its people. The greater the freedom, the lower the dictator’s utility. These considerations are captured
by the following partial derivatives of the first-period utility function, v(y, F) :
vy > 0, vyy < 0, vF < 0, vFF < 0, vyF > 0. (1)
For example, the cross-partial derivative vyF > 0 reflects the following phenomena. Aid is a
second-period decision for the donor Hence, one way that the recipient can augment its first period
income in the absence of aid is by increasing freedoms that lead to increased entrepreneurship. In the
Cuban example, when the Soviet Union fell, its aid and trade subsidization policies with Cuba ended
as well. In order to make up the output gap, Cuba responded by legalizing microenterprises in various
sectors during 1993–1995 (Ritter 1998). The tradeoff that is involved for a dictatorship considering
such freedoms in the first period is captured by vF < 0, vFF < 0, implying that the dictatorship dislikes
freedom; and, vyF > 0, implying that entrepreneurial freedom is good for growth. The short-term use
of entrepreneurial freedoms to augment growth is a hallmark of dictatorships.5
In the second period, aid from the donor is now possible. Aid/help from the donor is denoted by
H, which adds to the recipient’s second-period income; i.e., y + H. The recipient’s second-period utility,
v̂(y + H, F), is characterized by the following set of partial derivatives:
v̂1 > 0, v̂11 < 0, v̂F < 0, v̂FF < 0, v̂1F = 0, (2)
where v̂1 denotes the partial derivative of the recipient’s second-period utility function, v̂, with respect
to its first argument, y + H. The possibility of aid in the second period means that freedom loses its
income-augmenting appeal in the recipient’s second-period utility function; which is captured by
4 In the case of a totalitarian dictatorship, such as the Castros’, ideas, interests and institutions are molded by the state and
influence society. The opposite is true of a liberal state (Moravcsik 1997).
5 The best historical example of this type of behavior, typical of communist dictatorships, is Russia’s NEP [New Economic
Policy—1921–1928], created by Lenin, which allowed for some market freedom during the 1920’s, permitting the recuperation
of the Soviet economy after the failed policies of war communism 1918–1921 (Radzinsky 1996). Then, by the end of the
decade, in spite or because of its success, NEP was reversed in its tracks in favor of the collectivization of agriculture and the
big push of state-led industrialization (Conquest 1991; Medvedev 1972).
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v̂1F = 0. That is, in the second period the recipient behaves strategically by substituting aid for reform,
as is the case in the Samaritan’s Dilemma. The inconsistent way that the recipient views freedom when
aid is not present (in the first period) versus how it views freedom when aid is a possibility (in the
second period) is a characteristic of dictatorial behavior [see footnote 5].
The recipient’s utility function for both periods is
V(y, F, H) = v(y, F) + δv̂(y + H, F), (3)
where δ > 0 is the recipient’s discount factor. Being a dictatorship, the recipient’s control variable is its
income, y. To wit, in choosing y the recipient is effectively determining its degree of economic reform.
Moreover, given the relationship between entrepreneurial freedom and y, in selecting y the recipient
imputes a corresponding level of F. Measures that have been used to monitor F are discussed below.
The donor acts as an altruistic agent, in that it wants to improve the well-being of the recipient’s
people via income-augmenting aid to the recipient at a material cost to itself. Specifically, aid/help (H)
comes out of the donor’s GDP, Y. The donor’s two-period utility function is
U(Y, H, y, F) = u(Y − H) + αV(y, F, H), (4)
where α > 0 is the donor’s degree of altruism. The presence of altruism in this form is a defining
characteristic of the Samaritan’s Dilemma. The donor’s first-period utility function is increasing
and concave in its own net income, Y–H. That is, u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. As an altruist, the donor’s
second-period utility is the α-weighted utility of the recipient. In particular, given that αv̂1 > 0, if y
is low, then an altruistic donor sees it as in its interest to augment the low y with aid, H. Hence, the
potential for the Samaritan’s Dilemma is present.
Given these utility functions, the interaction between the recipient and donor hinges upon two
relationships. The first is dH/dy; i.e., the effect that the recipient’s economic performance has on
donor aid. A parasitic relationship exists when dH/dy < 0. Lower recipient economic performance
leads to a lower value of y, which in turn induces the donor to give greater aid. This in keeping
with the Samaritan’s Dilemma approach to foreign aid. As an extension to this approach, note
that one determinant of y is F. When freedoms increase this facilitates entrepreneurial behavior that
spurs growth. Such freedoms reduce dictatorial power, however. It follows that if the dictatorship
infringes on F this limits y. The dictator’s cost of reducing economic-enhancing freedom is offset when
dH/dy < 0 because aid can potentially make up the difference. This exacerbates the Samaritan’s
Dilemma. Moreover, this characterization of strategic interaction between recipient and donor captures
the observed equivocal relationship between aid and freedom. Indeed, in resolving the Samaritan’s
Dilemma by creating an aid policy that leads to dH/dy > 0, the question remains as to how this will
ultimately affect freedom. Kerr’s (1975) trap is a potentiality. Only when the interaction between the
donor and the recipient results in dH/dF > 0 is the donor aid policy in alignment with its desire to
promote freedom for the recipient’s people. We now turn to three aid policies that address this issue.
4. Aid without Commitment
In the Samaritan’s Dilemma, if the donor is unable to commit to a policy of no aid when the
recipient does not undertake economic reform, then the donor’s altruism causes the donor to react
optimally to the economic situation that is produced by the recipient’s reforms or lack thereof. In terms
of the model, this means that, if the donor cannot commit to an aid level that is independent of the
recipient’s economic situation, then altruism leads the donor to make its aid policy contingent on the
recipient’s economic situation. Expressed in terms of the choice variables, this means that the donor
observes the recipient’s choice of y and then the donor sets its choice of H. That is, the donor’s policy
is its best reply function. The donor’s inability to commit is therefore indicative of a leader-follower
relationship where the recipient is the leader and the donor is the follower. In this section we consider
two cases that can arise in the absence of donor commitment. The difference between the two cases
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is whether the donor selects aid, H, in reaction to the recipient’s choice of y (Case A); or, if the donor
instead couples aid, H, with freedom, F. Case A is the classic Samaritan’s Dilemma and Case B is a new
wrinkle that recognizes the donor’s ultimate rationale for engaging the recipient: increasing freedoms.
Case A: No Donor Link between Aid and Reform
The donor’s choice variable is aid, H (help). In Case A, the donor selects aid in reaction to the
current economic situation in the recipient nation, y. Solving the model backwards, for a given y the
donor maximizes (4) with respect to H. The donor’s first order condition is
−u′(Y − H) + αδv̂1(y + H, F) = 0 ⇒ H = H(α, y, Y), (5)
which characterizes the donor’s best reply function.
The result is a parasitic relationship, as the impact of y on H is negative [all comparative static








Equation (6) describes a counterproductive incentive at play. When the recipient underperforms
economically, this induces the donor to give more aid. This is a classic parasitic relationship in the
sense of Buchanan (1975) Samaritan’s Dilemma. A failing recipient economy leads to increased aid.
Hence, this is our starting point for donor-recipient relations.
Given donor aid policy (the donor’s best reply function), H(α, Y, y), the recipient maximizes (3)
with respect to y, yielding
vy(y, F) + δv̂1(y + H, F)(1 + Hy) = 0 ⇒ y∗A = y(α, F, H). (7)
Equation (7) determines the optimal value of the recipient’s income for Case A: y∗A. Note that the





vyy + δ(1 + Hy)
2v̂11
> 0. (8)
By Equation (8), a dictatorship’s restrictions on freedom allows a parasite to underperform
with respect to income, thereby further facilitating the parasitic relationship. This exacerbates the
Samaritan’s Dilemma.
Inserting y∗A into Equation (5) yields the donor’s optimal aid for Case A, H
∗
A :
H∗A = H(α, y
∗
A, Y) = H(α, y
∗
A(α, F, Y), Y). (9)
Now, one can assess the impact of donor aid on the freedom on the recipient’s people [taking into









That is, although freedom has a positive impact on income, dy∗A/dF > 0, this is offset by the
parasitic donor-recipient relationship, dH∗A/dy
∗
A < 0. Increased freedoms that might be necessary
for augmenting a regime’s income are instead neglected, because the resulting decrease in income
causes the altruistic donor to be more generous. Consequently, the recipient does not reform either
economically or in the dimension of freedom for its people. As expected, this case is consistent with
the Samaritan’s Dilemma.
Figure 1 illustrates the inner workings of Case A. First, the top left graph depicts Equation (6): the
negative relation between donor aid, H, and the recipient’s income, y. If the recipient’s income falls
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from y0 to y1, donor aid is increased from H0 to H1. This is the Samaritan’s Dilemma: the recipient
finds it in its interest to underperform economically in order to extract more aid. Second, the bottom
left graph uses a 45◦ line in (y, y) space to transform the measurement of y, which is on the horizontal
axis of the top left graph, to the measurement of y on the vertical axis of (F, y) space in the bottom
right graph of Figure 1. Third, the bottom right graph depicts the relationship given in Equation (8):
the positive relationship between freedom and the recipient’s income. When the recipient makes its
choice of income y1 instead of y0 it does not need the entrepreneurial freedoms, F0, associated with y0.
Instead, it imputes that the freedoms necessary for y1 are those that are given by F1. Fourth, the top
right graph depicts Equation (10): the impact of donor aid on the freedom of the recipient’s people.
It captures the tradeoff between these two variables, in which a decrease in freedoms from F0 to F1
leads to an increase in donor aid from H0 to H1. Figure 1 presents the two main tradeoffs identified
within this paper: the Samaritan’s Dilemma, which captures the tradeoff between income and aid;
and, the resulting tradeoff between freedom and aid, which, to the best of our knowledge, has gone
unidentified until now.
Figure 1. Case A: No Donor Link between Aid and Reform.
Case B: The Donor Couples Aid to Reform
Of course, both outcomes of Case A: (i) the recipient’s parasitic ability to receive aid when it
engages in less reform; and, (ii) the negative relationship between freedom and aid; run against the
donor’s goodwill and intentions. As an alternative, the donor can use aid to augment the recipient’s
income, but do so in a way that couples aid to freedom.
A coupled donor aid policy is expressed as the product FH, where H is again the donor’s choice
variable. This implies that rather than aid augmenting the recipient’s income through the term y +
48
Economies 2018, 6, 53
H, it does so through the term y + FH. From an operational perspective, the term FH can be directly
estimated if F is a freedom index that lies along the [0, 1] interval, where 0 represents no freedom and 1
the freedom level the donor is targeting. Such freedom scores allow for the monitoring of changes in
freedom in the recipient nations, and have been used in empirical work on the composition and efficacy
of aid (Amegashie et al. 2013; Power and Ryan 2006; Medvedev 1972). Therefore, the recipient’s and
donor’s utility functions are, respectively,
V(y, F, H) = v(y, F) + δv̂(y + FH); (11)
U(Y, H, y, F) = u(Y − FH) + αV(y, F, H). (12)
Throughout this section, we retain the leader-follower structure consistent with an altruistic donor
that makes its aid policy contingent upon the recipient’s income. Consequently, the donor takes y as
given and maximizes (12) with respect to aid, H, yielding the following best reply function:
−u′(Y − FH)F + αδv̂1(y + FH)F = 0 ⇒ H = H(α, y, Y, F). (13)








Once again, it is in the recipient’s interest to underperform economically, thereby receiving
more aid.















As the absolute value of εHF is equal to one, |εHF| = 1, the donor’s best reply function is of unit
elasticity, i.e., the marginal impact of freedom on aid is equal to the average impact.
The recipient takes the donor’s best reply in (13) into account and selects a level of reform that
determines y. Effectively, the recipient maximizes (11) with respect to y given (13), yielding
vy(y, F) + δv̂1[y + FH(α, y, Y, F)](1 + FHy) = 0 ⇒ y∗B = y(α, Y, F). (16)
Equation (16) determines the optimal recipient income in Case B: y∗B. The impact of freedom on




−vyF − δv̂11(FHF + H)(1 + FHy)− δv̂1Hy
[vyy + δv̂11(1 + FHy)
2]
(17)
Substituting (16) into (13) yields the optimal donor aid for Case B: H∗B = H(α, y∗B, Y, F), which
allows for an assessment of the impact of donor aid on the freedom when aid is coupled with freedom.
Note that now there exists both a direct and an indirect impact of F on H∗B. Policy FH results in the
direct channel between F and H∗B. The indirect channel between F and H∗B occurs by combining of the


















−vyF − δv̂11(FHF + H)(1 + FHy)− δv̂1Hy
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Given a positive effect of entrepreneurial freedom on growth, ∂y/∂F > 0, by Equations (14) and
(15), one must conclude that ∂H∗B/∂F < 0.
In both cases addressed in this section, a parasitic relationship exists between donor aid and
recipient economic reform. Moreover, aid is a negative function of freedom in that the dictatorship uses
restrictions on freedoms to inhibit growth, thereby exacerbating the Samaritan’s Dilemma. Notably,
this occurs even when the donor follows a policy that couples aid and freedom. The desired result is
not obtained, and this is due to the structure of the game in which the donor does not commit to an aid
level, but instead follows a policy in which aid is a best reply to the recipient’s income level.
5. The Donor Pre-Commits Its Aid to the Recipient
In this section, we allow for the donor to commit to a particular aid strategy, rather than reacting
to the prevailing economic situation in the recipient. Instead of a leader-follower relationship, in which
the recipient takes the donor’s best reply function as given, the two countries engage in Nash behavior,
implying that in equilibrium the donor’s aid policy is a best reply to the recipient’s economic policy
and vice-versa. In other words, each country creates the conditions under which the other sets its
policy. We therefore analyze two aid strategies for the donor. In the first (Case C), the donor follows
the aid-freedom coupling policy FH. In the second (Case D), the donor specifies aid as an increasing
function of freedom in the recipient nation.
Case C: The Freedom-Aid Coupling Policy
Here, the donor again couples its aid to freedom; i.e., policy FH, but aid no longer moves in
tandem with the recipient’s income, y. The two are instead co-determined as part of a Nash equilibrium.
Given policy FH, the donor’s utility is as expressed in Equation (12) and the recipient’s is as expressed
in Equation (11). The first order conditions for the donor (with respect to H) and the recipient (with
respect to y) are
− u′(Y − FH)F + αδv̂1(y + FH)F = 0; (19)
vy(y, F) + δv̂1[y + FH] = 0. (20)
When y and H are determined simultaneously, as is the case in Equations (19) and (20), by
definition, there is no longer a parasitic relationship between the recipient and donor. Changing the
game from a Stackelberg game in which the recipient is the leader, to a Nash game in which recipient
income and donor aid are co-determined, eliminates the recipient’s parasitism, thereby resolving the
Samaritan’s dilemma.




αδv̂11vyF − (Hu′′ [vyy + δv̂11] + αδHv̂11vyy)
Δ
< 0. (21)
where Δ = [u′′ F + αδFv̂11][vyy + δv̂11]− αδ2F(v̂11)2 = [vyy + δv̂11]u′′ F + αδFv̂11vyy > 0.
Unfortunately, the tradeoff between freedom and aid persists, as ∂H∗C/∂F < 0. In Case C, the
donor has fallen into Kerr’s (1975) trap in that it has committed to a policy that couples aid with
freedom, thereby resolving the Samaritan’s Dilemma, but the ultimate goal of establishing a positive
relationship between freedom and aid is not achieved. Per Equation (21), there is a tradeoff between
freedom and aid. Therefore, the ability to pre-commit eliminates the recipient’s parasitism, thereby
resolving the Samaritan’s Dilemma. At the same time, pre-commitment to aid coupled with freedom
does not remove the tradeoff between freedom and aid.
Figure 2 illustrates Case C. The donor’s best reply function is given by Equation (19), denoted as
D. The recipient’s best reply function is given by Equation (20), denoted as R. Strategies H and y are
strategic substitutes for both the donor and recipient, as depicted by their downward-sloping best reply
functions in (y, H) space. Indeed, the fact that aid and income are strategic substitutes lies at the heart
of the Samaritan’s Dilemma, because when the recipient can act as a Stackelberg leader, the recipient
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maximizes its utility function along the donor’s negatively-sloped best reply function, implying that
the recipient can substitute aid for income, as occurs in Cases A and B. In a Nash environment, the
equilibrium instead takes place at the intersection of the best reply functions.
Figure 2. Case C. The impact of freedom.
An increase in recipient freedom from F to F′ shifts both best reply functions outward from the
origin and the equilibrium changes from the original point (y*, H*) to (y′, H′). Consequently, there is a
tradeoff between F and H; i.e., optimal donor aid falls when the recipient’s freedom increases.
Case D: The Donor Explicitly Targets Freedom
In this case the donor’s aid is based on the following policy:
H = H(F) = hF, h > 0. (22)
Under this policy, the donor aims at directly influencing freedom in the recipient, treating F as its
strategy. Aid is no longer a policy itself but is instead the result of the policy that makes the donor’s aid
an increasing function of freedom in the recipient nation. Differently from the other cases, where the
donor attempts to influence freedom indirectly through aid, in Case D, aid is explicitly tied to freedom.
In other words, the donor recognizes the potential for Kerr’s (1975) trap if it rewards economic reform
with aid and hopes that freedom will be bolstered as well. Instead, the donor targets freedom directly.
The utility functions of the recipient and donor are, respectively:
V(y, F, H) = v(y, F) + δv̂(y + hF); (23)
U(Y, H, y, F) = u(Y − hF) + αV(y, F, H). (24)
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The first order conditions for a Nash equilibrium are
vy(y, F) + δv̂1(y + hF) = 0; (25)
− hu′(Y − hF) + αδhv̂1(y + hF) = 0, (26)
where in (25) the recipient maximizes its payoff with respect to its income, y, and in (26) the donor
maximizes its payoff with respect to freedom, F.
For Case D, Equations (25) and (26) jointly determine the optimal levels of freedom, F∗D, and
income, y∗D. With F∗D one can calculate optimal aid, through Equation (22), to obtain H∗D. In this case,
the donor designs and enforces an aid policy which increases aid to the recipient only when freedom
in the recipient increases. By definition, then, aid is an increasing function of freedom. It is clear
that committing to the hF policy obtains the ultimate goal of the donor’s aid policy. By targeting F
instead of H the donor reduces the recipient’s incentive to underperform economically via restrictions
on freedom.
Interestingly, this creates a potential dilemma for a recipient dictatorship. As a dictatorship, the
recipient may likely reject the freedom targets set by the donor. Absent any viable alternative donor,
a rejecting recipient faces two alternatives. First, it could allow for growth-enhancing freedoms in
order to reform itself out of the parasitic/clientele existence it has been sustaining via the Samaritan’s
Dilemma. But, this is tantamount to acquiescing to what the donor wanted in the first place. Second,
the recipient could test the donor’s resolve. For example, citing a need for U.S.-Cuban relations to be
more closely tied with economic freedoms for the Cuban people, the Trump administration decided to
rescind several Obama administration foreign-aid initiatives. Consequently, Cuba’s government “has
stopped allowing self-employed entrepreneurs to form company-like cooperatives” (Economist 2017).
Again, like freedom scores, it is possible for donors to observe the evolution of such policies.
Recipient efforts at testing a freedom-targeting donor’s resolve are captured by our model.
Specifically, in the previous cases, altruism, α, is positively correlated with aid, H, and freedom, F (not












< 0 ⇔ Δ < 0 (28)
One of Buchanan’s (1975) primary points about the relationship between incentives and aid
is that a donor may have to restrict the extent of their altruism to temper a recipient’s incentive to
underperform in order to receive more aid. This is captured by the two equations above. If the donor
can reduce the way in which altruism enters into the aid decision, thereby lowering α, then both aid
and freedom increase and the Kerr’s (1975) trap is averted. Hence, the donor must be prepared to
demonstrate resolve.
An even more convincing example of the need to reduce altruism in the aid decision is given by a
fully cooperative model in which both donor and recipient are coordinated by an agreement in which
they aim at maximizing the sum of their payoffs:
Max
y,F
V(y, F, H) + U(Y, H, y, F) = u(Y − hF) + (1 + α)V(y, F, H); i.e.
Max
y,F
u(Y − hF) + (1 + α)[v(y, F) + δv̂(y + hF)] (29)
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The impact of altruism in this fully cooperative case is negative for reasonable conditions [less
restrictive than the one underlying (27) and (28)] (see calculations in the Appendix A):
dFcoop
dα = Δ
−1{vyy(vF + hδv̂1)− vy(vFy + hδv̂11)}(1 + α)−1 < 0
⇔ Δ > 0 and vyy(vF + hδv̂1) < vy(vFy + hδv̂11)
(30)
In Equation (30), note that, in contrast with (27) and (28), the denominator Δ, must be
positive, Δ > 0, because it corresponds to the optimal second order condition of the maximization in
Equation (29). According to (30), the marginal impact of altruism is negative on the optimal choice of
freedom of the cooperative solution. This is because, in the cooperative solution, the joint externality
between donor and recipient is internalized; namely, the penchant for the recipient to reduce income
owing to the presence of the Samaritan’s Dilemma. The effects of this externality are further decreased
via a reduction in the donor’s altruism.
Surprisingly, neither the cooperative solution, nor its comparative statics relative to the donor’s
level of altruism, have been characterized in prior treatments of the Samaritan’s Dilemma. By doing
so, we verify Buchanan’s (1975) intuition that the donor needs to temper its altruism if it is to fully
resolve the Samaritan’s Dilemma.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a two-period game based on the Samaritan’s dilemma to analyze the
relationship between a foreign aid donor nation and a dictatorial recipient. Our model extends
past analyses in that the donor nation is interested in fostering both economic growth and freedom
within the recipient nation. This is consistent with many nations’ underlying objectives for foreign
aid. It is also consistent with the existing empirical literature, in which the observed relationship
between aid and freedom is equivocal. This indeterminacy is often attributed to the existence of a
Samaritan’s Dilemma between donor and recipient. We show that it is further exacerbated by the
donor’s concern for freedom. Specifically, resolving the Samaritan’s Dilemma can come at the cost of
economic freedoms in the recipient nation.
In particular, prescriptions for resolving the Samaritan’s Dilemma typically involve donor
commitment to aid policies that force the recipient into a relationship where aid and economic
performance are co-determined (in the Nash sense). Yet, we show that a focus on resolving the
Samaritan’s Dilemma represents a potential trap for the donor in that it need not ultimately foster
recipient nation freedoms. An example of such a trap is an aid-freedom coupling policy. Within a
Nash framework, the coupling policy resolves the Samaritan’s Dilemma but recipient freedoms do not
commensurately increase.
Finally, we examine an alternative policy that avoids this trap because the donor provides aid in
direct proportion to increases in freedom. Given that the donor pre-commits, the Samaritan’s Dilemma
does not arise, and because aid increases with freedom, the donor achieves its dual goals of increasing
economic performance and freedom in the recipient nation. Yet, the policy is not as simple as it may
seem because the optimal commitment requires the donor to reduce its altruistic motivations for
helping the recipient and replace them with a commitment to freedom targets. This may be difficult for
altruistic policymakers, especially if the recipient is willing to test the donor’s resolve. In the absence
of such a policy, what this paper has identified is a fundamental tradeoff for a donor nation in terms
of resolving the Samaritan’s Dilemma versus promoting freedom. As such, this tradeoff should be
recognized and accounted for in empirical analyses of the performance of foreign aid.
Author Contributions: J.R.F., model and research question; D.A., model and literature review.
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Appendix A. Derivations
Case A:
Total differentiation of Equation (5) yields
− u′′ (dY − dH) + dαδv̂1(y + H, F) + αδv̂11(dy + dH) = 0. (A1)
Therefore we obtain an expression for dH :
dH =
u′′ dY − δv̂1dα − αδv̂11dy
u′′ + αδv̂11
, (A2)
from which Equation (6) is derived.
Total differentiation of Equation (7) yields
[
recall that v̂yF = 0
]
:
vyydy + vyFdF + δv̂11(dy + dH)(1 + Hy) + δv̂1Hyαdα = 0. (A3)
Substituting (A2) into (A3):
vyydy + vyFdF + δ(1 + Hy)v̂11
(
dy +
u′′ dY − δv̂1dα − αδv̂11dy
u′′ + αδv̂11
)
+ δv̂1Hyαdα = 0. (A4)
From (A4) we obtain an expression for dy :
dy =










Note that the definition of Hy in Equation (6) implies that the denominator of (A5) reduces to
vyy + δ(1 + Hy)
2v̂11 < 0. From (A5) we derive Equation (8).
Case B:
Total differentiation of Equation (13) yields
− u′′ (dY − HdF − FdH) + αδv̂11(dy + HdF + FdH) + δv̂1dα = 0. (A6)
From (A6) we obtain the following expression for dH :
dH =
u′′ dY − (u′′ + αδv̂11)HdF − αδv̂11dy − δv̂1dα
[u′′ + αδv̂11]F
. (A7)
From (A7) we derive Equations (14) and (15).
Total differentiation of (16) yields
vyydy + vyFdF + δv̂11[dy + F(Hαdα + Hydy + HYdY + HFdF) + HdF](1 + FHy)
+δv̂1(HydF + FdHy) = 0.
(A8)
dy =
[−vyFdF − δv̂11[F(Hαdα + HYdY + HFdF) + HdF](1 + FHy)− δv̂1(HydF + FdHy)]
[vyy + δv̂11(1 + FHy)
2]
(A9)
From (A9) and (15) we derive Equation (17).
Case C:
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Total differentiation of Equations (19) and (20):
− u′′ (dY − HdF − FdH) + αδv̂11(dy + HdF + FdH) + δv̂1dα = 0; (A10)
vyydy + vyFdF + δv̂11[dy + FdH + HdF] = 0. (A11)
Rearranging (A10) and (A11) in matrix form:
[
u′′ F + αδFv̂11 αδv̂11





















−[vyF + δHv̂11][u′′ F + αδFv̂11] + δFv̂11(Hu′′ + αδHv̂11)
Δ
=
−vyF[u′′ F + αδFv̂11]
Δ
> 0 (A15)
Equation (A14) is Equation (21) in the text.
Case D:
Total differentiation of Equations (25) and (26):
vyydy + vyFdF + δv̂11(dy + hdF) = 0; (A16)
− hu′′ (dY − hdF) + αδhv̂11(dy + hdF) + δhv̂11dα = 0. (A17)
Rearranging (A16) and (A17) in matrix form:
[
vyF + hδv̂11 vyy + δv̂11








hu′′ dY − δhv̂11dα
]
(A18)










−hu′′ [vyy + δv̂11]
Δ




















u(Y − hF) + (1 + α)[v(y, F) + δv̂(y + hF)] (A24)
The first order conditions for a maximum are:
− hu′(Y − hF) + (1 + α)[vF(y, F) + hδv̂1(y + hF) = 0 (A25)
(1 + α)[vy(y, F) + δv̂1(y + hF) = 0 (A26)
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Total differentiation yields:
[
vyF + hδv̂11 vyy + δv̂11
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Abstract: After more than half a year of elections (yielding three voting stages and nine voting rounds),
the 2017 Rector election at Ghent University (Belgium) resulted in a victory for the duo leading all
nine voting rounds, and in a resounding defeat for the electoral system. Significant regulation
changes were needed in order to break the institutional deadlock in which Ghent University found
itself. In this paper, we follow the timeline of the election and dissect what went wrong in the
election planning.
Keywords: election; rector; Ghent University; majority decision; majority judgment
1. Some Preliminary Notions on Majority Decisions
Since Rousseau published his acclaimed book ‘Du Contrat Social’ (Rousseau 1762), countless
discussions on the (non)existence of the ‘general will’ built up the field of social choice, whose main goal
is to identify what is best for this general will. Associated with the search for what is best, a collective
will often find itself with the need of reaching a collective decision by calling an election. Although
very early election systems can be traced back to Ancient Greece (and even to some small bands of
primitive hunter-gatherers), it is considered that the fundaments for election systems were established
after the stimulating discussion between Borda (1781) and Condorcet (1785) about the appropriate
election system for new members of the French Academy of Sciences. It is a couple of centuries later
that Arrow points out his despairing impossibility theorem Arrow (1963): in case there are more than
three candidates, there is no election system that satisfies some basic and deeply-expected properties.
Fortunately, things become easier when selecting among only two candidates.
Simple majority decision is one of the most widespread and studied methods for selecting among
two candidates (Fishburn 1970; Inada 1969; May 1952; Sen 1966). A candidate is said to defeat another
candidate by simple majority if the number of voters who prefer the former candidate to the latter
one is greater than the number of voters who prefer the latter candidate to the former one. In the
two-candidate setting, it assures that a winner will be proclaimed letting aside the scenario of a tie
(which is impossible when the number of voters is odd and unlikely when the number of voters is
large). In case more than two candidates are considered, the method of simple majority might result in
the famous voting paradox in which a majority cycle could arise (Condorcet 1785).
A closely related concept is that of absolute majority (Fishburn 1973), where a candidate is said to
defeat another candidate by absolute majority if the number of voters who prefer the former candidate
to the latter one is greater than half of the number of voters. Note that, in case no abstention is
allowed, both simple majority and absolute majority coincide. However, when voters are allowed to
abstain from voting, the proclamation of a winner by absolute majority is no longer assured even in a
two-candidate election.
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Although simple and absolute majority probably are the most common examples of majority
decisions, other types of majorities have also called the attention of social choice theorists. The strongest
type of majority is that of unanimous majority (Fishburn 1973). A candidate is said to defeat another
candidate by unanimous majority if every voter prefers the former candidate to the latter one. Note that
the proclamation of a winner is rarely assured under the unanimous majority decision. In between the
notions of absolute majority and unanimous majority lie the so-called qualified majorities (Ferejohn and
Grether 1974). Qualified majorities require the proportion of voters who prefer the former candidate
to the latter one to be greater than or equal to a certain quota α (where α ∈ ]0.5, 1]), fixed before the
election. Note that any α < r+12r (where r is the number of voters) corresponds to absolute majority
and α = 1 corresponds to unanimous majority. Finally, the last type of majorities discussed here is
that of majorities based on difference of votes (García-Lapresta and Llamazares 2001; Llamazares
2006). This type of majorities lies in between the notions of simple majority and unanimous majority,
and requires the difference between the number of voters who prefer the former candidate to the latter
one and the number of voters who prefer the latter candidate to the former one to be greater than or
equal to a fixed threshold t ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Note that t = 1 corresponds to simple majority and t = r
corresponds to unanimous majority.
2. The Context of the 2017 Rector Election at Ghent University
Ghent University was founded on 9 October 1817, physician Jean-Charles Van Rotterdam being
the first Rector of the institution. In the year of its 200-year anniversary, a new Rector election took
place. The election was ruled by the regulations issued by the Board of Governors on 10 February 2017
(as an amend of the special decree dated 26 June 1991 relating to Ghent University and the University
Centre of Antwerp). In the following, we summarize the most important aspects of the considered
regulations (originally written in Dutch).
As stated in Articles 7 and 8 of stated regulations, the candidatures had to be listed as a duo, i.e.,
one candidate for the position of Rector and one candidate for the position of Vice-Rector. It was a
requirement for the duo to be a gender-balanced pair of full professors at Ghent University that could
not reach the age of 66 years during the course of their (potential) four-year mandate.
The electoral college consisted of four groups of voters (Article 4): professional staff (ZAP),
assistant academic staff (AAP), administrative and technical staff (ATP) and students (STU).
All members of the electoral college had to be invited to vote via a link to the election application on
the intranet sent to their personal Ghent University e-mail address. The personal link mentioned could
only be accessed during the election period. A voter could decide whether to vote for one of the duos
or to vote ‘blanco’. It comes without saying that all votes were strictly confidential.
The percentage of votes for each of the duos had to be computed in each category of the electoral
college. Then, the percentages of votes had to be aggregated by applying the following weights for
the different categories (Article 12): 0.67 for ZAP, 0.085 for AAP, 0.085 for ATP and 0.16 for STU.
After computing the aggregated percentage for each duo, the duo reaching a (weighted) two-thirds
majority of the votes had to be proclaimed the winner (Article 13). Note that a two-thirds weighted
majority was a requirement regardless of how many duos presented their candidature. If no duo
reached the required two-thirds weighted majority, then a second voting round had to be organised.
The regulations clearly stated that up to five voting rounds had to be conducted until a duo reached a
two-thirds weighted majority. In case the fifth round concluded without a winning duo, Article 16
stated that the voting rounds were terminated, and that the election procedure had to be restarted.
Talking in terms of majority decisions, we can see that the considered method requiring a
two-thirds (weighted) majority is a weighted version of what some call supermajority, i.e., a qualified
majority with α = 23 . Note that a problem the chosen election system needs to face is the increasing
difficulty of reaching the chosen quota α = 23 as the number of candidates increases. Fortunately, as
will be discussed later, the number of candidatures turned out to be only two in each of the voting
rounds. Nevertheless, as we will also discuss later, the changes in the regulations solved this potential
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problem by considering the common plurality with runoff in which the two candidates with the most
votes are compared by simple majority in a second voting round (Richelson 1980).
3. A Failure Foretold
3.1. First Voting Stage
On 17 March, the candidatures for the 2017 Rector election were officially announced. The announced
duos were Rik Van de Walle and Mieke Van Herreweghe (RM) and Guido Van Huylenbroeck and
Sarah De Saeger (GS).
The planned schedule for the first voting stage was the following:
(i) First voting round: From Wednesday 19 April (9:00 a.m.) to Friday 21 April (12:00 p.m.).
(ii) Second voting round (if necessary): From Wednesday 26 April (9:00 a.m.) to Friday 28 April
(12:00 p.m.).
(iii) Third voting round (if necessary): From Wednesday 3 May (9:00 a.m.) to Friday 5 May
(12:00 p.m.).
(iv) Fourth voting round (if necessary): From Monday 8 May (9:00 a.m.) to Tuesday 9 May
(12:00 p.m.).
(v) Fifth voting round (if necessary): From Thursday 11 May (9:00 a.m.) to Friday 12 May
(12:00·p.m.).
After the first-voting-round counting on Friday 21 April, no duo reached the fixed two-thirds
weighted majority. Although there was a significant difference in support between both duos (57.76%
of the votes for RM opposed to 36.20% of the votes for GS), the leading duo actually was considerably
far from the fixed quota.
The second voting round surely was meant to be a critical moment in the first voting stage.
The difference in support between both duos in the first voting round hinted that GS would probably
be unable to reach a two-thirds weighted majority. It was unsure whether sufficient voters would switch
their votes deciding to support the leading duo in order to avoid an election deadlock. The results of
the second voting round were not promising. The percentage of abstentions decreased (from 6.05%
to 4.44%) and the turnout significantly increased (from 11,084 to 13,922), but the support for RM
only increased up to 59.62%. After the second round, three more voting rounds were conducted
(all first-cycle voting results are provided in Table 11) but the support for RM no longer increased
beyond that of the second voting round while the abstentions kept increasing round after round.
Table 1. Results of the first voting stage.
Round Turnout RM GS Blanco
First 11,084 57.76% 36.20% 6.05%
Second 13,922 59.62% 35.94% 4.44%
Third 14,445 58.18% 35.95% 5.86%
Fourth 12,021 58.69% 34.11% 7.19%
Fifth 14,544 58.10% 32.57% 9.32%
Although foreseen after the results of the third voting round and the questionable choice of
voting system, the first voting stage ended with the fifth voting round not yielding a duo carrying the
required support. Together with the results of the first voting stage, a brief statement appeared on
the election website: “New candidates can present themselves from Monday 29 May (9:00 a.m.) until
1 For more details, we refer to the News Bulletin of Ghent University (2017), 21 April 2017, 28 April 2017, 5 May 2017, 9 May
2017 and 12 May 2017.
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Wednesday 31 May (12:00 p.m.)” (News Bulletin of Ghent University 2017, 12 May 2017). Despite
RM clearly being ahead their adversary, no duo could be proclaimed Rector and Vice-Rector with the
then-current regulations.
3.2. Second Voting Stage
It was not until 31 May that the duos for the second voting stage were officially announced.
Leading duo RM appeared as the only candidate. At the same time, some controversial modifications
in the Rectoral team structure were announced:
“After lengthy deliberations and starting from reciprocal trust that has been built up step by step,
we have arrived at a common programme that contains the most important elements of our original
programmes and that we can all fully embrace. We are convinced that the implementation of this
programme would be very beneficial to our university and to the UGhentians” (News Bulletin of
Ghent University 2017, 31 May 2017).
“The explicit desire—expressed by us and by many other people—to bring visions together, to let
us all come together and to realise an ambitious project has led to the question of expanding the
rectoral team. We make a plea for the possibility to appoint extra vice-rectors at our university (which
by the way has long been possible at other Flemish universities), who would become full members of
the rectoral team, together with the elected rector and vice-rector” (News Bulletin of Ghent University
2017, 31 May 2017).
In particular, the proposal was to appoint five Vice-Rectors instead of one2, former
Rector/Vice-Rector candidates Guido Van Huylenbroeck and Sarah De Saeger being two of the
proposed Vice-Rectors. Quoting a message by GS privately sent to the corporate e-mail address of the
electorate, “A request to the board of governors and the parlement has been formulated to create the
possibility (also in a decree) to appoint extra vice-rectors. If, against all expectations, this proves to be
impossible, Rik and Mieke have engaged themselves to take us on board of their rectoral team be it
with other titles.”
The planned schedule for the second voting stage was the following:
(i) First voting round: From Monday 19 June (8:00 a.m.) to Tuesday 20 June (8:00 a.m.).
(ii) Second voting round (if necessary): From Wednesday 21 June (8:00 a.m.) to Thursday 22 June
(8:00 a.m.).
(iii) Third voting round (if necessary): From Friday 23 June (8:00 a.m.) to Saturday 24 June (8:00 a.m.).
(iv) Fourth voting round (if necessary): From Monday 26 June (8:00 a.m.) to Tuesday 27 June
(8:00 a.m.).
(v) Fifth voting round (if necessary): From Wednesday 28 June (8:00 a.m.) to Thursday 29 June
(8:00 a.m.).
The result of the first-voting-round counting on Tuesday 20 June was indeed surprising: RM
remained at 58.62% of the votes, 41.38% of the votes being abstentions. Not even an increasing turnout
(from 8560 to 10,391) and support (from 58.62% to 60.34%) in the second voting round prevented RM
to announce their withdrawal before the start of the third voting round (all second-cycle voting results
are provided in Table 23). The same day of the withdrawal announcement, an official announcement
appeared on the election website: “The Board of Governors of Ghent University will now establish the
further course of the elections” (News Bulletin of Ghent University 2017, 22 June 2017).
2 Ultimately, the proposal of appointing five Vice-Rectors was not presented to the Board of Governors of Ghent University.
3 For more details, we refer to the News Bulletin of Ghent University (2017), 20 June 2017 and 22 June 2017.
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Table 2. Results of the second voting stage.
Round Turnout RM Blanco
First 8560 58.62% 41.38%
Second 10, 391 60.34% 39.66%
One could conjecture that the problem in this voting stage was not the election system itself;
instead, the popular exasperation towards the new proposal of Rectoral team was to be blamed.
Anyway, the 2017 Rector election at Ghent University reached a deadlock starting 22 June.
3.3. Third Voting Stage
On 16 August, it was announced that “new elections for a rector and vice-rector will be held in
September. The Board of Governors has adapted the election regulations” (News Bulletin of Ghent
University 2017, 16 August 2017). Mainly, the new regulations stopped counting abstentions towards
the majority decision, reduced the number of voting rounds in the voting stage, and reduced the
required quota to a (strict)4 one-half weighted majority in the last voting round of the voting stage.
More precisely, the new regulations distinguish three cases: (a) there were more than two duos as
candidates; (b) there were two duos as candidates; (c) there was only one duo as a candidate. In the
first case, the first voting round would be conducted as in the previous voting stages; in a potential
second round, only the two most voted duos would be compared and required to have a two-thirds
weighted majority (without counting abstentions); and, in a potential third round, the quota would
be reduced to a one-half weighted majority (without counting abstentions). In the second case, the
first voting round would be conducted as in the previous voting stages; and, in a potential second
round, the quota would be reduced to a one-half weighted majority (without counting abstentions).
In the third case, the votes would be either yes, no, or abstention, and it would be required to reach
a two-thirds weighted majority in the first round and a one-half weighted majority in the potential
second round (without counting abstentions).
The planned schedule for the third voting stage was the following:
(i) First voting round: From Monday 18 September (8:00 a.m.) to Tuesday 19 September (8:00 a.m.).
(ii) Second voting round (if necessary): From Thursday 21 September (8:00 a.m.) to Friday 22 September
(8:00 a.m.).
(iii) Third voting round (if necessary): From Monday 25 September (8:00 a.m.) to Tuesday 26 September
(8:00 a.m.).
On 25 August, the candidatures for the last voting stage were announced. The announced duos
were the already-acquainted RM and the new duo Karin Raeymaeckers and Patrick De Baets (KP).
Adding a little bit more of drama to the elections, the day of the counting of the first voting
round, Sas van Rouveroij—chairman of the election commission—announced the cancellation of the
voting round: “Today, the proverbial Murphy’s law has hit. [...] A technical failure has caused the
election email of Karin and Patrick not to be sent to all intended recipients. The principle of equality is
particularly important in this—all students and staff are entitled to the same communication—hence
this unanimous decision of the electoral commission, in which all ranks are represented” (News
Bulletin of Ghent University 2017, 19 September 2017). Apparently, due to a technical defect, the
campaign message of RM reached 61,187 voters while the campaign message of KP reached only
13,507 voters. A new schedule was announced:
4 Note that two candidates can potentially tie if the requirement is to reach a one-half weighted majority, so the requirement is
to reach a strict one-half weighted majority, i.e., an α-weighted majority with α > 0.5 (and not α ≥ 0.5). Interestingly, in the
election regulations, the technically-incorrect term “majority of half the votes plus one” is used: for an odd number of votes,
say 2n + 1 with n being a natural number, a strict one-half majority means more than n + 1 votes, while half of the votes
plus one means more than 2n+12 + 1 votes (or, equivalently, more than n + 2 votes).
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(i) First voting round: From Thursday 21 September (8:00 a.m.) to Friday 22 September (8:00 a.m.).
(ii) Second voting round (if necessary): From Monday 25 September (8:00 a.m.) to Tuesday 26
September (8:00 a.m.).
The first recount yielded no duo carrying a two-thirds weighted majority, but RM presented a
comfortable lead (60.25% against 39.75%). Interestingly, it was the first time in the whole election that
RM did not win in all the categories of the electoral college: KP carried 51.58% of the student vote in
opposition to the 48.42% carried by RM.
This same day at 3:00 p.m. it was announced that KP had decided to withdraw their candidature,
and that there would be only one candidate in the second voting round. It was also reminded that
“Votes cast for the one team that is left shall be either yes, no or abstention”. Finally, on Tuesday 26
September, RM obtained the required one-half weighted majority in the last round of the voting stage,
thus being elected as the new Rector and Vice-Rector. All third-cycle voting results are provided in
Tables 3 and 45.
Table 3. Results of the third voting stage (with abstentions).
Round Turnout RM KP No Blanco
First 8171 57.40% 37.81% - 4.79%
Second 7945 67.95% - 26.75% 5.30%
Table 4. Results of the third voting stage (without abstentions).
Round Turnout RM KP No
First 7710 60.25% 39.75% -
Second 7515 71.74% - 28.26%
4. A Further Analysis of the Voting System
In the eighteenth century, Rousseau (1762) already encouraged the use of qualified majorities
or majorities based on difference of votes for important decisions: “The more the deliberations
are important and serious, the more the opinion that carries should approach unanimity.” Mostly,
these deliberations are linked to a unipolar decision, i.e., one votes for or against a unique given
option. For instance, ‘do you agree with duo x being appointed as Rector and Vice-Rector?’. In these
cases, the fact that the candidate’s proclamation is not supported by the chosen majority decision is
understood as a defeat of the candidate.
In case there are two candidates, the deliberations are linked to a bipolar decision, i.e., one votes
for either one or another option among two given ones. For instance, ‘do you prefer duo x or duo y
being appointed as Rector and Vice-Rector?’. These differences between the semantics of a unipolar
decision and a bipolar decision are illustrated in Figure 1. In a bipolar decision, the proclamation of a
winner may turn cumbersome if one requires a (moderately) large quota/threshold. Naturally, it holds
that the larger the quota/threshold, the higher the chance of the election procedure reaching a deadlock.
Furthermore, one could note that the fact that a certain duo reaches a large quota/threshold does not
mean that the duo is seen by the electorate as a good option for the Rectorship— neither does it mean
that the other duo is not. Only relative information on how both candidates are positioned w.r.t. each
other is available. Of course, the use of a moderately-large quota/threshold might be justified in order
to add some stability that may prevent the outcome to be susceptible to small changes in the votes (for
instance, the result of a simple majority decision could ultimately depend on just one undecided voter).
Unfortunately, the use of a large quota/threshold inevitably leads to a reduced decisive spectrum
5 For more details, we refer to the News Bulletin of Ghent University (2017), 22 September 2017 and 26 September 2017.
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of election results. In national elections, this problem is normally avoided by allowing for coalitions
between parties, but, obviously, this solution is simply not possible in a Rector election.
A potential solution for avoiding an electoral deadlock could be to fix a small (but non-negligible)
quota/threshold. This will result in a ‘guarantee’ of a winner being selected after some voting
rounds, while not electing a candidate that has just one more vote than its adversary. Subsequently,
the proclamation (or not) of this winner could confront a (for instance) two-thirds majority voting
procedure since it is now indeed a unipolar decision. In Figure 2, we illustrate an example of this
two-stage procedure in which a 52%-majority (without counting abstentions) is required at the first
stage and the winning candidate is then confronted to a two-thirds majority voting at the second stage.
In the general setting in which there are more than two candidates, only the first stage is to be adapted
by considering a ranking rule for elections with more than two candidates, e.g., the plurality rule

















































Figure 1. (a) representation of a two-thirds majority requirement for a unipolar decision concerning
one candidate in which the proportion of votes for the unique candidate is coloured in green and the
proportion of votes against the candidate and abstentions is coloured in white and grey, respectively;
(b) representation of a two-thirds majority requirement for a bipolar decision concerning two candidates
in which the proportion of votes for one candidate is coloured in red, the proportion of votes for the
other candidate is coloured in green and the proportion of abstentions is coloured in white (right).
A more elegant solution would require to totally reformulate the semantics of the election
in an approval-voting fashion (Brams and Fishburn 1983). Instead of ‘which candidate do you
prefer?’, the question to be asked would now be ‘which candidates do you approve?’. The bipolar
question would then turn into two (or more, depending on the number of candidates) unipolar
questions. However, quoting Balinski and Laraki (2014) on approval voting, “why limit the judgment
to accept/not accept or pass/fail?” In the following section, we propose a potential procedure for the
next Rector elections: Balinski and Laraki’s Majority Judgment (Balinski and Laraki 2007, 2010).
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Figure 2. Two-stage procedure in which (a) a 52%-majority is required (no abstentions considered) at
the first stage and, subsequently, (b) the winning candidate confronts a two-thirds majority voting
procedure at the second stage.
5. A Proposal for Upcoming Elections
Social choice theory is a field full of paradoxes (Nurmi 1999), probably Arrow’s and Condorcet’s
paradoxes being the two most famous ones. On the one hand, Arrow’s paradox states that, in an
election with at least three candidates, it is possible for a candidate to win, yet with the same set
of rank-order preferences a second candidate wins when a third candidate withdraws. A famous
interpretation of this paradox is often attributed to philosopher Sidney Morgenbesser (Hausman 2011):
“After finishing dinner, Sidney Morgenbesser decides to order dessert. The waitress tells him he has
two choices: apple pie and blueberry pie. Sidney orders the apple pie. After a few minutes the waitress
returns and says that they also have cherry pie at which point Morgenbesser says: In that case I’ll
have the blueberry pie”. Although this anecdote technically concerns individual decisions rather than
collective decisions, we could illustrate the point in a similar manner by considering three friends that
are offered apple pie and blueberry pie, initially vote and decide to order the apple pie and, after being
offered the cherry pie, decide to order the blueberry pie instead. As silly as this sounds, Arrow’s
impossibility theorem (Arrow 1963) proves that there is no natural method6 that avoids this paradox7,
leaving aside dictatorships.
On the other hand, Condorcet’s paradox states that, in an election with at least three candidates,
the transitivity of the voters’ preferences does not imply the transitivity of the majority rule. Coming
back to the example of the pies, one could understand this paradox with the following example. Alice’s
favourite pie is apple pie, but she sure does prefer blueberry pie to cherry pie. Bob has always liked
berries, thus, he would rather eat a blueberry pie, or, in case this is not possible, a cherry pie. A third
diner, Carol, has expressed her desire of enjoying a cherry pie, but she would actually be fine with
the house-special apple pie. Inconveniently, when choosing which desert to share, they realize that
6 Understanding ‘natural’ as a method satisfying Pareto Efficiency (also referred to as unanimity), i.e., if every voter prefers a
candidate to another candidate, then this also holds for the collective preference.
7 A method that avoids Arrow’s paradox for any set of rank-order preferences is said to satisfy Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives.
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they collectively prefer the apple pie to the blueberry pie, the blueberry pie to the cherry pie, and the
cherry pie to the apple pie. Thus, they forget about sharing, and just proceed to order one piece of
each. We conclude that, although each voter expresses transitive preferences, cycles might (and often
do!) appear in the collective preference.
Balinski and Laraki (2007) recently advocated for totally restructuring the form in which we
understand and perform voting systems: “[...] if Arrow’s and Condorcet’s paradoxes are to be avoided,
then the traditional model and paradigm must be abandoned. [...] Not only do rank-order inputs
not permit voters to express themselves as they wish, but they are the culprits that lead to all of the
impossibilities and incompatibilities” (Balinski and Laraki 2014). They proposed a method called
Majority Judgment Balinski and Laraki (2010) that proceeds as follows. First, a common language of
grades (labels in a linearly ordered scale) needs to be agreed upon. Afterwards, each of the voters
is required to evaluate each of the candidates independently according to this common language of
grades. Then, for each candidate x, the grades are ordered in an increasing manner. We denote by sxi
the i-th greatest grade assigned to candidate x. Subsequently, the majority value is computed for each
candidate x, i.e., the sequence
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if there is an odd number of voters r = 2t − 1, or






t−2, sxt+2, . . . , sx2t−2, sx1) ,
if there is an even number of voters r = 2t − 2. Finally, candidates are lexicographically ordered8
according to their majority values by ranking a candidate x ahead of a candidate y if the value at the
first position at which mx and my differ is greater in mx than in my. Note that two candidates can only
be tied if they have the same grades.
Example 1. Consider the list of grades used by OpinionWell poll during the French 2012 presidential
election (Balinski and Laraki 2014):
Outstanding  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Acceptable  Poor  To reject .
Consider that there are five voters and three candidates x, y and z. Candidate x received two times the
grade Outstanding and three times the grade Excellent; candidate y received one time the grade Outstanding,
three times the grade Excellent and one time the grade Very good; candidate z received two times the grade Very
Good and three times the grade Good.
The ordered grades assigned to each candidate are thus the following ones:
sx = (Outstanding, Outstanding, Excellent, Excellent, Excellent) ,
sy = (Outstanding, Excellent, Excellent, Excellent, Very good) ,
sz = (Very good, Very good, Good, Good, Good) .
8 Balinski and Laraki have proposed different tie-breaking methods in case two candidates x and y have the same sxt = s
y
t
(this value being referred to as the lower middlemost). The one considered here is the one proposed in Balinski and Laraki
(2014) that amounts to successively removing the lower middlemost in both sets of grades until one candidate has a strictly
greater lower middlemost than the other.
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Thus, the majority values for each candidate are the following ones:
mx = (Excellent, Excellent, Outstanding, Excellent, Outstanding) ,
my = (Excellent, Excellent, Excellent, Very good, Outstanding) ,
mz = (Good, Good, Very good, Good, Very good) .
Since x has a greater grade than y at the third position (first position at which mx and my differ) and a
greater grade than z at the first position (first position at which mx and mz differ), we conclude that candidate x
should be proclaimed the winner according to the method of Majority Judgment.
The number of advantages of this method over classical ones based on ranking is substantial.
From a practical point of view, the method of Majority Judgment is easy to understand for the
voters and, unlike many classical methods based on ranking, its implementation is computationally
friendly even for a large electorate. From a theoretical point of view, both Arrow’s and Condorcet’s
paradoxes are assured to be avoided, and among other properties, it is proved to be fairly resistant to
manipulation. Moreover, in case of elections with only two candidates, which was the actual case of
the Rector elections at Ghent University, provides a(n arguably) more natural outcome than the simple
majority rule since “the method of majority decision takes no account of intensities of preference, and it
is certainly arguable that what matters is not merely the number who prefer x to y and the number
who prefer y to x, but also by how much each prefers one alternative to the other” (Sen 1970). Indeed,
as suggested by Balinski and Laraki, in the next Rector elections at Ghent University, we might need to
judge, rather than vote.
6. Conclusions
One hundred and fifty-nine days passed from the first voting round of the Rector elections at
Ghent University to the last one, and we wonder whether this time lapse could have been greatly
reduced just by considering a more suitable electoral system. The requirement of the two-thirds
weighted majority proved to be too strong, while the ultimate restriction to a one-half weighted
majority seems to be an ‘ad hoc’ solution just trying to assure the end of the electoral deadlock. We
conjecture that the use of a two-stage voting procedure in which a candidate is selected in a first voting
stage subsequently being confronted to a two-thirds (weighted) majority voting in a second voting
stage probably would have reduced the election time lapse considerably (and would have reduced
voters’ fatigue towards the election). In addition, the use of Majority Judgment in future elections is
strongly encouraged by the authors.
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elected prior to the 103rd Congress that began in early 1991 and who served consecutively through
the 115th Congress, which ended in early 2019. Results from individual time-series estimations
suggest that political ideology is unstable over time for a sizable portion of the members of both major
political parties who serve in the U.S. Congress, while analysis of the pooled data suggests that, after
accounting for inertia in political ideology and individual legislator effects, Republican legislators
become more conservative over time. These results run somewhat counter to the finding in prior
studies that the political ideologies of lawmakers and other political elites are stable over time.
Keywords: political ideology; roll-call voting; public choice; public policy; United States Congress
JEL Classification: D70; D72
1. Introduction
The voting behavior of the electorate and the actions of elected officials are largely shaped
by core political values and political party affiliations. In the United States (U.S.), the Republican
Party is, as indicated in seminal studies by Carmines and Stanley (1990, 1992); Levine et al. (1997);
Abramowitz and Saunders (1998), generally associated with conservative political ideology, while the
Democratic Party tends to be associated with liberal political ideology. As Layman and Carsey (2000)
point out, the studies listed above demonstrate that, as an element of political partisanship, political
ideology has risen in importance relative to social structure and performance. Other studies in political
science have shown that voters associate specific issue ownership to political parties (Seeberg 2017),
that voters tend to vote for candidates from parties aligned with their own political ideologies
(Wright et al. 1985; Goren 2005), and that shifting political ideologies explains party-switching decisions
by incumbent lawmakers (Nokken and Poole 2004).
The psychology literature also addresses the political psychology of ideology formation.
For example, Jost et al. (2009) discuss the number and types of dimensions individuals employ
in formulating their political opinions. More specifically, these authors delve into what they refer to as
“elective affinities” between the situational and dispositional needs of individuals in terms of political
ideology, as well as the consequences of political ideology vis-à-vis voter attitudes and judgments
(Jost et al. 2009). Next, a more recent study by Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016) explores the genetics of
political ideology, and finds that measures of cognitive style (i.e., the need for cognition, the need for
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cognitive closure) account for distinct genetic variance in political ideology. Lastly, a new study by
Naumann et al. (2017) examines data from a sample of U.S.-born Mexican Americans and finds that
strength of Mexican identity, stronger integration acculturation attitudes, weaker assimilation attitudes,
and lower socioeconomic status are associated with exhibiting a more liberal political ideology.1
The current study extends the political science and political psychology literature on the political
ideology of lawmakers, particularly the studies by Nokken and Poole (2004) and Jost et al. (2009),
respectively, by addressing the following question: How stable is a legislator’s political ideology over
time? In doing so, we employ Nokken–Poole scores (Nokken and Poole 2004) of legislators’ political
ideology for members of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate who were elected
prior to the 103rd Congress that began in early 1991 and who served consecutively through the 115th
Congress, which ended in early 2019. Results from individual time-series estimations suggest that
political ideology is unstable over time for a sizable portion of the members of both major political
parties serving in the U.S. Congress. Additionally, analysis of the pooled data suggests that, after
accounting for inertia in political ideology and individual legislator effects, Republican legislators
become more conservative over time. These results, which run somewhat counter to the finding in prior
studies of stability in the political ideologies of lawmakers and other political elites by Jennings (1992)
and Jewitt and Goren (2016), not only have implications for how well legislators represent the interests
of their constituents in representative democracy, they also provide a rationale for new avenues of
empirical investigation in the public choice literature.
2. Prior Literature: A Brief Review
There is a body of emerging research that concerns “issue ownership” by local and national political
parties. Issue ownership is defined in these studies as a “reputation for policy and program interest,
produced by a history of attention, initiative and innovation towards problems which leads voters to
believe that one of the parties is more sincere and committed to do something (Petrocik 1996, p. 826).”
Overall, issue ownership is a key source of information used by voters in evaluating political parties
and the legislative behavior of elected officials. Recent research on issue ownership has explored
the concept of stability with regard to how voters attach issues to specific political parties over time.
For example, Seeberg (2017) analyzes voter perceptions of political parties located at both ends of
the ideology continuum (i.e., the liberal-conservative spectrum) for 17 countries across three decades
and concludes that issue ownership is not only stable (and similar) over time and across countries,
but it is also a “critical constant” in voting and party behavior. Other studies using large surveys to
track the partisan attitudes of respondents in the United States over time have also found stability in
the core political predispositions and partisan identities of the electorate (Sears and Funk 1999; and
Goren 2005).
In addition to research on issue ownership, prior academic research has also found significant
interstate variation in electorate political ideology. A seminal study by Wright et al. (1985) analyzes
76,000 responses to 51 separate CBS News and New York Times polls from 1974 through 1982 and
finds that “both partisan and ideological differences matter in the behavior of state electorates,
and that they are differentially important depending upon the nature of the choices offered to the
voters (Wright et al. 1985, p. 488).” Moreover, while significant interstate variations continue to exist,
the majority of more recent studies that explore the stability of state-level political ideology also show
intra-state variability over time (e.g., see Berry et al. 1998, 2007).2
1 Naumann et al. (2017) conclude that political campaigns should pay attention to differences in cultural identifications and
acculturation attitudes when targeting Latino constituents.
2 A study by Brace et al. (2004) finds that state political ideology does not change over time. However, Berry et al. (2007)
dismiss the findings of this study as being logically and methodologically flawed.
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As in the case of research on constituent ideology, there is large body of work, showing mixed results,
on the stability of the political ideology of elected officials.3 An important study by Jennings (1992)
employing survey data finds that political party elites exhibit significantly more stable political
preferences in terms of the traditional liberal-conservative dimension than do ordinary citizens,
including those among the most politically active among the electorate.4 An analysis of 16 million
individual roll call votes over two centuries in seminal research by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) shows
that over 80 percent of a legislator’s voting decisions can be attributed to a consistent ideological
position. On the other hand, Nokken and Poole (2004), using data on political party and roll call voting
behavior between 1795 and 1995, find significant shifts in party-switching roll-call voting behavior
during periods of high ideological polarization. More recent work by Lupton et al. (2015) contends
that the political ideologies of political leaders fit the traditional unidimensional framework, while
those of the general electorate are multidimensional.5 Results from survey data similar to those used
by Jennings (1992) comparing structural political ideologies of political leaders and those of the mass
public from 1980 to 2004 support their contention. Relatedly, Jewitt and Goren (2016) also use these
survey data to examine whether the political ideologies of more engaged members of the electorate,
whom they count as holding strong ideological identities, who are politically informed, and who
participate actively in public affairs, are similar in terms of structure and stability to those of political
elites. In doing so they conclude that, in 1980, ideologically engaged citizens exhibited more stable
political ideologies than their less engaged counterparts, but less stable political ideologies than those
of political leaders. However, by 1992, stability in the political ideologies of engaged citizens reached
parity with that of political elites (Jewitt and Goren 2016).6
Our study extends this body of research by investigating stability of political ideology through
the voting behavior of long-serving members of the U.S. Congress. In doing so, we first present our
conceptual approach to voting behavior using the unidimensional policy space described in the public
choice literature (e.g., see Krehbiel 1998). After a discussion of our conceptual approach, we discuss
the data and statistical analyses that are the main focus of this study.
3. Political Ideology in the U.S. Congress: A Conceptual Approach
As a foundation of our empirical exploration into the stability of the political ideology of
long-serving federal legislators in the U.S., we assert that collective choice occurs through voting on
proposals that can be arranged along a unidimensional policy space. Following Krehbiel (1998, p. 21),
it “is convenient and intuitive to think of the policy space as a continuum on which liberal policies are
located on the left, moderate policies are located in the center, and conservative policies are located on
the right. Because the policy space is continuous, it is possible to consider policies at any point between
liberal and conservative extremes.” The policy space referred to above consists of the lawmakers’ ideal
points, where a given lawmaker’s ideal point represents that policy that provides the lawmaker with
greater benefits than all other policies (Krehbiel 1998, p. 22).7
3 Although the current study focuses on stability of political ideology in the U.S., recent research focusing on other countries
also abounds (e.g., Lee 2013; Leach 2015; Peña 2016; Harring and Sohlberg 2017; Melville 2018).
4 Bartle (2000) finds that the political ideologies of more aware voters are more stable over time than those of less aware voters.
5 Lupton et al. (2015) argue that political sophistication constrains the ideologies of political leaders to a single
ideological dimension.
6 This result runs counter to that in the earlier study by Jennings (1992).
7 This conceptualization of the political ideology of political actors is not without its critics. Seminal work by Converse (1964),
which indicates that only 2.5 percent of Americans qualify as political ideologues, argues for an absence of political
ideology across the American political landscape. On the other end of the spectrum lies an alternative stream of research
(e.g., Knoke 1979; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Abramowitz 1994; Carmines and Layman 1997) that considers political
ideology to be multidimensional, consisting of distinct attitudes toward social welfare, racial, and cultural issues (see
Layman and Carsey 2000). Despite these critiques, Jost et al. (2009) indicate that many of life’s domains are explained
along the type of left-right policy space described here, such as implicit and explicit preferences for tradition, conformity,
order, stability, traditional values, and hierarchy (versus those for progress, rebelliousness, chaos, flexibility, feminism,
and equality, respectively).
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Figure 1 presents a spatial model of policy preferences in the U.S. Senate, where each point on
the liberal-conservative continuum represents an ideal point for one of the 100 lawmakers in the U.S.
Senate.8 Here, the vertical line (see Figure 1) separates the most liberal lawmakers from the most
conservative lawmakers. Lastly, in order to provide additional exposition, two individual lawmakers,
m1 and m2, are highlighted in Figure 1. These two unnamed lawmakers represent pivotal lawmakers
in the sense that they represent the potential majority vote on any bill under consideration by the U.S.
Senate (Krehbiel 1998, p. 24).9 For example, when Republicans hold a majority in the U.S., as they do
in 2019, m1, represents the majority pivot in the sense that any bill emanating from the Republican
majority would have to win the favor of m1, and all the lawmakers to his or right on the policy space,
in order to win a majority of votes in that body (i.e., 51 votes).10 Similarly, in a U.S. Senate administered
by a Democratic majority, m2 represents the majority pivot along the policy space.11
 
Figure 1. Spatial model of policy preferences.
The unidimensional (i.e., liberal-conservative) political ideology scores maintained by
Boche et al. (2018) and Lewis et al. (2018) include the traditional NOMINATE measures developed
in Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 2000) that have been employed extensively in the political science
and public choice economics literature to construct the type of policy space presented in Figure 1.
However, these estimates assume that a legislator’s political ideology is static over the duration of his
or her legislative career (Boche et al. 2018). The Nokken–Poole estimates, on the other hand, assume
that each Congress is entirely separate in terms of a legislator’s political ideology. To compute these
scores, Nokken and Poole (2004) allow for movement of legislators along the unidimensional policy
space from Congress to Congress.12 As with the NOMINATE scores, the Nokken–Poole scores range
from −1 to +1, with Democrats generally falling along the 0 to −1 policy space (i.e., the left half of the
policy space in Figure 1), while Republicans typically occupy the 0 to +1 portion of the policy space
(i.e., the right half of the policy space in Figure 1).
If converted into percentages, the Nokken–Poole scores discussed above range from −100% to
+100%. Therefore, to facilitate efficient discussion of the Nokken–Poole scores, we follow the convention
in finance of quoting interest rates using the permyriad concept of a basis point, which is equal to
one-hundredth of one percent. Using this convention, the policy space in Figure 1 encompasses, using
Nokken–Poole scores, 20,000 basis points, with half of this total constituting each half of the policy
space. Thus, the maximum variation in political ideology for either Democrats or Republicans is
expected to be (about) 10,000 basis points. In this case, an increase in one’s Nokken–Poole score from
0.345 to 0.435, or 0.090, represents a movement of 900 basis points along the policy space. This would
represent a relatively conservative member of the legislative body becoming more conservative in the
absolute sense, and, if he or she moves to the right of another member of the legislative body, also
more conservative in the relative sense.
4. Political Ideology in the U.S. Congress: Data and Methodology
In order to gather enough information on the stability of the political ideology of federal legislators,
Nokken–Poole scores for members of the 115th U.S. Congress (i.e., 2017–2019) who were elected prior
8 Spatial models like that in Figure 1 follow that developed by Downs (1957), which is based on the work of Hotelling (1929).
9 This representation assumes that there are 50 Senators on each side of the vertical line in Figure 1.
10 Put differently, lawmaker m1 occupies the fifty-first point from the right end of the policy space in Figure 1.
11 In other words, lawmaker m2 occupies the fifty-first point from the left end of the policy space in Figure 1.
12 Nokken and Poole (2004) apply these scores in a comparison of legislators who switched political parties during their careers
to those who maintained political party membership.
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to 1991, and who held congressional seats without interruption over this period, are collected by the
authors. We divided the sample into several subsamples. The Early Cohorts subsample include members
of the U.S. Congress who were elected before 1976. Those elected from 1976 through 1980 are placed in
the Late 1970s Cohort, while those elected from 1981 through 1985 are included in the Early 1980s Cohort.
Lastly, those members of the U.S. Congress who were elected from 1986 through 1989 are placed in the
Late 1980s Cohort. In all cases, members of party leadership are omitted from the subsamples.
Table 1 presents the demographic data for members of the U.S. Congress who are included in these
subsamples. In each case, the member’s name, political party, home state, Congressional Chamber
and year elected are provided. As indicated near the top of Table 1, the Early Cohorts subsample
includes three legislators, two Democrats and one Republican. Only two legislators, both Republicans,
are included in the Late 1970s Cohort, while seven legislators are listed in the Early 1980s Cohort.
Among these, three are Democrats and four are Republicans. Lastly, the Late 1980s Cohort is the largest
of the four cohorts, with 14 members. Eight of these are Democrats, and six are Republicans.
Table 1. Demographics of congressional subsamples.
Name Political Party-State Congressional Chamber Year Elected
Early Cohorts
Conyers, John D-MI House 1965
Leahy, Patrick D-VT Senate 1975
Young, Donald R-AK House 1973
Late 1970s Cohort
Cochran, Thad R-MS Senate 1979
Hatch, Orrin R-UT Senate 1977
Early 1980s Cohort
Barton, Joe R-TX House 1985
Grassley, Charles R-IA Senate 1981
Kaptur, Marcy D-OH House 1983
Levin, Sander D-MI House 1983
Rogers, Hal R-KY House 1981
Smith, Christopher R-NJ House 1981
Visclosky, Peter D-IN House 1985
Late 1980s Cohort
DeFazio, Peter D-OR House 1987
Duncan, John Jr. R-TN House 1989
Engel, Eliot D-NY House 1989
Lewis, John D-GA House 1987
Lowey, Nita D-NY House 1989
McCain, John R-AZ Senate 1987
Neal, Richard D-MA House 1989
Pallone, Frank Jr. D-NJ House 1989
Rohrabacher, Dana R-CA House 1989
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana R-FL House 1989
Serrano, José D-NY House 1989
Slaughter, Louise D-NY House 1987
Upton, Frederick R-MI House 1987
Smith, Lamar R-TX House 1987
Given the relatively small size of the U.S. Senate, the number of long-serving legislators in the
U.S. Senate is, as expected, smaller than that for the U.S. House of Representatives. In terms of the
information contained in Table 1, only five of the 26 legislators across the four cohorts are members
of the U.S. Senate. The remaining 21 legislators are members of the U.S. House of Representatives.
As such, our empirical approach, which is explained below, provides a clearer picture of the stability of
political ideology in this latter-mentioned branch of the U.S. Congress.
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Our empirical investigation of stability of political ideology of lawmakers is two-pronged.
First, we investigate political instability at the individual level by collecting both the largest and
smallest Nokken–Poole scores over each U.S. Representative’s legislative career, referred to here as
NPL and NPS, respectively, and compute,
|NPL −NPS|, (1)
for each Representative. Here, (1) captures the absolute deviation in political ideology (over time) for
each lawmaker, where smaller (larger) values represent greater stability (instability) of political ideology.
An alternative approach to investigating stability of political ideology of lawmakers relies on
regression analysis employing a legislator’s Nokken–Poole scores. This entails estimation by Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) of the specification below,
IDEOLt = a0 + b1TRENDt + b2IDEOLt−2 + et, (2)
where the dependent variable, IDEOLt, is a given legislator’s Nokken–Poole score in year t. This variable
is explained by TRENDt, which is an indicator of the number of Congressional sessions served by a
given legislator by year t, and IDEOLt−2, which is the lagged value (by one Congressional session,
or two years) of IDEOLt.13 The number of observations, n, in each case is determined by the length of
each U.S. Representative’s legislative career, which is measured in Congressional sessions.
One expects that a legislator’s political ideology during a given Congressional session will exhibit
a positive relationship to his or her political ideology during the previous Congressional session. If so,
the coefficient estimate attached to IDEOLt−2 will be positively-signed and statistically significant.
Next, and more importantly, failure to reject the null hypothesis that b1, the coefficient estimate attached
to TRENDt, is equal to 0 would, in this case, support a finding of stability in one’s political ideology
from Congressional session to Congressional session. Of course, rejection of this null hypothesis
would support a finding of instability in political ideology, with the sign of the estimate attached to
b1 indicating whether the member of Congress is becoming more liberal or more conservative from
one Congressional session to the next. Here, a positively-signed coefficient estimate describes a trend
toward greater conservatism, while a negatively-signed coefficient estimate describes a trend toward
greater liberalism.
5. Political Ideology in the U.S. Congress: Empirical Results and Discussion
This section of the study presents the results of our empirical analyses of the Nokken–Poole
data on legislator ideology in the U.S. Congress. Following this presentation, we (1) highlight the
importance to economists and political scientists of our findings regarding the stability of ideology,
and (2) discuss some of the limitations relating to the data employed on political ideology in our study.
5.1. Empirical Results
Our empirical analysis of the stability of political ideology of lawmakers begins with the four
cohorts from the U.S. House of Representatives sample. As indicated near the top of Table 2,
the Early Cohorts subsample includes two legislators, one Democrat and one Republican. In both
13 For example, if t is equal to 1995, and the legislator under consideration is Frank Pallone (see Table 1), then IDEOLt is equal
to −0.246, which represents Pallone’s Nokken–Poole score for the Congressional session ending in 1995. This particular
Congressional session was also Pallone’s third session as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives. As such, TRENDt
is equal to 3 in this case. The second regressor, IDEOLt−2, is in this case equal to −0.149, which is Pallone’s Nokken–Poole
political ideology score from the previous Congressional session, which ended in 1993. It is worth noting here that Pallone
was more liberal in his voting patterns during the Congressional session ending in 1995 than he was during the preceding
Congressional session. More specifically, his Nokken–Poole score fell by 970 basis points from one session to the next in
this case.
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cases, a noteworthy degree of instability of political ideology, as measured by (1) above, is exhibited.
For example, the value of (1) for John Conyers, a Democrat from Michigan, is 0.423, meaning that
variation in his political ideology over the course of his legislative career spans 4230 basis points.
In the case of Donald Young, a Republican from Alaska, variation in exhibited political ideology spans
2470 basis points (from low to high) along the policy space. A graphical representation of the instability
in political ideology in each of these two cases is presented in Figure 2. There, and throughout this
study, the Republican’s time series is depicted in red, while the time series representing his or her
Democratic counterpart is depicted in blue.
Table 2. Political ideology in the U.S. House of Representatives.
Name |NPL−NPS| TRENDt p-Value n AC
Early Cohorts
Conyers, John 0.423 0.008* 0.004 26 no
Young, Donald 0.247 0.003 0.101 22 no
Late 1970s Cohort
Early 1980s Cohort
Barton, Joe 0.107 −0.003 † 0.052 16 no
Kaptur, Marcy 0.188 −0.004 † 0.090 17 no
Levin, Sander 0.099 −0.002 † 0.073 17 no
Rogers, Hal 0.173 0.3 × 10−3 0.426 18 no
Smith, Christopher 0.249 0.008 ‡ 0.027 18 no
Visclosky, Peter 0.199 −0.003 0.148 16 no
Late 1980s Cohort
DeFazio, Peter 0.355 0.005 0.201 15 no
Duncan, John Jr. 0.776 0.032 ‡ 0.013 14 no
Engel, Eliot 0.185 0.002 0.300 14 no
Lewis, John 0.144 −0.3 × 10−3 0.458 15 yes
Lowey, Nita 0.084 −0.001 0.235 14 no
Neal, Richard 0.125 −0.003 † 0.075 14 yes
Pallone, Frank Jr. 0.484 −0.013 † 0.066 14 no
Rohrabacher, Dana 0.229 −0.005 * 0.008 14 no
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana 0.129 −0.005 0.349 14 no
Serrano, José 0.141 −0.005 0.225 14 no
Slaughter, Louise 0.319 −0.001 0.395 15 no
Upton, Frederick 0.202 0.002 0.280 15 no
Smith, Lamar 0.231 0.006† 0.052 15 no
Notes: One-tailed p-values reported above. *(‡)[†] denote the 0.01(0.05)[0.10] level of significance. AC = autocorrelation.
The null hypothesis of “no autocorrelation” is tested using the Durbin t test statistic.
 
Figure 2. Early Cohorts, U.S. House of Representatives.
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Next, the remaining portions of Table 2 present data on political ideology from the other, larger
cohorts in the U.S. House of Representatives. In terms of the widest ranges, Christopher Smith,
a Republican from New Jersey is first among the Early 1980s Cohort, with an ideology range of 2490 basis
points, while Sander Levin, a Democrat from Michigan, exhibits the narrowest, although nontrivial
(at 990 basis points), range along the policy space. Again, the size of each of the ideology ranges in this
cohort points toward instability in political ideology. Figure 3 presents the Nokken–Poole time series
for Smith and Peter Visclosky, a Democrat from Indiana, who exhibits the widest Nokken–Poole range
among those Democrats in the Early-1980s Cohort of the U.S. House of Representatives. Visclosky’s
political ideology exhibits a range of 1990 basis points along the policy space.
 
Figure 3. Early-1980s cohort examples, U.S. House of Representatives.
The Nokken–Poole ranges from the Late 1980s Cohort span from a low of 840 basis points (absolute
value), which is nontrivial, to a high of 7760 basis points, which is quite remarkable. This latter
range belongs to John Duncan, a Republican from Tennessee, while the former belongs to Nita
Lowey, a Democrat from New York. While Duncan exhibits the least stable political ideology among
Republicans in the Late-1980s Cohort for the U.S. House of Representatives, that position among
Democrats belongs to Frank Pallone of New Jersey, whose political ideology swings 4840 basis points
(absolute value) along the policy space in Figure 1. Figure 4 presents the Nokken–Poole time series for
both Duncan and Pallone.
 
Figure 4. Late-1980s cohort examples, U.S. House of Representatives.
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A comparison of Visclosky, from the Early 1980s Cohort, and Pallone, from the Late 1980s Cohort,
illustrates some of the issues explored in this study. First, these two time series are good examples
of how political ideology exhibits instability in the absolute sense. As stated previously, the political
ideologies of these two Democratic Senators swing 1880 and 4840 basis points, respectively, across the
policy space in Figure 1. If the time period of their voting activity is restricted to 1997 through 2001,
Visclosky’s political ideology again exhibits sizable instability in the absolute sense, as it changes by
1820 basis points. On the other hand, Pallone’s political ideology is relatively stable in the absolute sense
over that same time period, as it swings by only 20 basis points along the policy space. However, Pallone
lies to the left of Visclosky along the policy space at the beginning of this brief period (i.e., 1997),
whereas Visclosky lies to the left of Pallone by the end of the period (i.e., 2001). Thus, in this case a
sizable shift in political ideology in the absolute sense led to a rearrangement of legislators along the
policy space in Figure 1. Did Visclosky’s constituents in Indiana anticipate such a sizable absolute shift
in his political ideology over this brief period? More importantly, did these same constituents expect
their congressman to move to the left of a Democratic legislator from New Jersey over this brief period
of time, as occurred in this particular situation?14
The remaining portion of Table 2 presents statistical tests of the stability of political ideology
among long-serving members of the U.S. House of Representatives. These tests estimate (by OLS) the
specification in Equation (2) above. Estimates of b1 for each legislator listed in Table 2 are presented
under the column heading “TRENDt” in Table 2. The two columns to the right contain significance
levels for each estimate and the number of observations in each case, respectively.15 Overall, the results
indicate that Democrats tend to become more liberal in their political ideology with the passage of
time, while Republicans tend to become more conservative. Of the 12 long-serving Democrats listed
in Table 2, nine (i.e., 75 percent) become more liberal, while three (i.e., 25 percent) became more
conservative.16 Of the nine long-serving Republicans listed in Table 2, six (i.e., about 67 percent)
became more conservative, and three (i.e., about 33 percent) became more liberal over time. In terms of
only the statistically significant coefficients, three of the five Republicans (i.e., 60 percent) became more
conservative over time, while two (i.e., 40 percent) became more liberal. For Democrats, four of five
(i.e., 80 percent) became more liberal, while one (i.e., 20 percent) became more conservative.17
In eight of the 10 cases where instability in political ideology is statistically significant,
the legislator’s political ideology changes, in one direction or the other, from 20 to 80 basis points
per Congressional session.18 This is noteworthy given that it indicates that over the course of
a 20-year legislative career (i.e., 10 Congressional sessions), the political ideology of many U.S.
Representatives swings, in one direction or the other, up to 800 basis points. Even more remarkable
are the coefficient estimates for Duncan and Pallone, which indicate movements in political ideology
of 320 and 130 basis points per Congressional session, respectively. As such, movements in political
ideology cover 1600 and 650 basis points, respectively, over just five consecutive Congressional sessions
(i.e., 10 years) served.
14 U.S. President Donald Trump (R-NY) captured 57.2 percent of the popular vote in Indiana during the 2016 presidential
election. His opponent, Hillary Clinton (D-NY), won 37.9 percent of the popular vote in Indiana. In New Jersey, on the
other hand, Trump garnered only 41.8 percent of the popular vote, whereas Clinton carried the state with 55 percent of the
popular vote. This result, among others, indicates that voters in Indiana prefer more conservative policies than do their
counterparts in New Jersey.
15 Given the presence of the lagged value of a legislator’s Nokken–Poole score, the SAS statistical package recommends use of
the Durbin t test statistic to test for autocorrelation.
16 Autocorrelation is a problem in two of the nine cases of increasing liberalism among the long-serving Democrats in the U.S.
House of Representatives.
17 Autocorrelation is a problem in one of the four cases of a statistically significant increase in liberalism among the long-serving
Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives.
18 Again, autocorrelation is a problem in one of these eight cases of a statistically significant trend among the long-serving
lawmakers in the U.S. House of Representatives.
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Table 3 presents the empirical results for members of the U.S. Senate. As indicated near the
top of Table 3, the Early Cohorts subsample includes only one Senator—Patrick Leahy, a Democrat
from Vermont. In his case, a noteworthy degree of instability of political ideology is exhibited by his
Nokken–Poole range of 2540 basis points (absolute value). A graphical representation of the instability
in Leahy’s political ideology is presented in Figure 5.
Table 3. Political ideology in the U.S. Senate.
Name |NPL−NPS| TRENDt p-Value n AC
Early Cohorts
Leahy, Patrick 0.254 −0.005 ‡ 0.038 21 yes
Late 1970s Cohort
Cochran, Thad 0.156 0.006 * 0.001 19 no
Hatch, Orrin 0.239 −0.003 0.173 20 no
Early 1980s Cohort
Grassley, Charles 0.390 0.015 * 0.001 18 no
Late 1980s Cohort
McCain, John 0.289 0.003 0.258 15 yes
Notes: One-tailed p-values reported above. *(‡) denote the 0.01(0.05) level of significance. AC = autocorrelation.
The null hypothesis of “no autocorrelation” is tested using the Durbin t test statistic.
 
Figure 5. Early cohort example, U.S. Senate.
As with Table 2, the remaining portions of Table 3 present data on political ideology from the
other cohorts in the U.S. Senate. In terms of the widest range, Charles Grassley, a Republican from
Iowa who represents the Early 1980s Cohort, exhibits a political ideology range, using Nokken–Poole
scores, of 3900 basis points. Next, Orrin Hatch, a Republican from Utah, leads the Late 1970s Cohort
with a political ideology range of 2390 basis points, while the late John McCain, a Republican who
represented Arizona, leads the Late 1980s Cohort with a political ideology range of 2890 basis points.
Graphical representations of the instability of the political ideology of these three U.S. Senators are,
beginning with the Late 1970s Cohort and proceeding to the Late 1980s Cohort, presented in Figures 6–8.
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Figure 6. Late-1970s cohort example, U.S. Senate.
Figure 7. Early-1980s cohort example, U.S. Senate.
Figure 8. Late-1980s cohort example, U.S. Senate.
The remaining portion of Table 3 also presents statistical tests of the stability of political ideology
among long-serving members of the U.S. Senate. These tests follow those discussed above for
long-serving members of the U.S. House of Representatives. Overall, the results indicate that of the
four long-serving Republicans listed in Table 3, three became more conservative and one became
79
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more liberal over time.19 In terms of only the statistically significant coefficients, each of the two
Republicans exhibiting instability in their political ideology became more conservative over time.
Additionally, in one of the two cases where the legislator becomes more conservative, the legislator’s
political ideology changes by 60 basis points per Congressional session. Again, this is noteworthy
given that it indicates that over the course of a 20-year legislative career (i.e., 10 Congressional sessions),
the political ideologies of some U.S. Senators swing, in one direction or the other, up to 600 basis points.
Even more remarkable, however, is the coefficient estimate for Grassley, which indicates a movement
in political ideology of 150 basis points per Congressional session. At this rate, movement in one’s
political ideology would cover 1500 basis points over just five consecutive Congressional sessions (i.e.,
10 years) served.
To provide a more general examination of the stability of political ideology of elected officials,
Table 4 presents estimations of Equation (2) above using various pooled subsamples. The first two sets
of results employ data from long-serving members of the U.S. House of Representatives from each of
the two major political parties. As indicated there, both models are jointly significant and produce an
R2 of 0.811 or greater. The first model suggests that the typical Democrat enters the U.S. House with a
Nokken–Poole score of −0.272, which is 2720 basis points to the left of center on the policy space in
Figure 1. After that, he or she becomes more conservative over time, in this case at a rate of 10 basis
points per Congressional session. However, this tendency or trend is not statistically significant at
usual levels. Lastly, and as expected, past political ideology is positively and statistically significantly
related to current political ideology.
Table 4. OLS results—pooled subsamples.





















Legislator Effects yes yes yes
n 191 146 72
F-statistic 58.40 * 123.4 * 9.15 *
R2 0.811 0.901 0.410
Notes: The numbers in parentheses above are t-values. *(‡)[†] denote the 0.01(0.05)[0.10] level of significance.
The second set of results cover the long-serving Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives.
As suggested by these results, the typical Republican enters the U.S. House of Representatives with a
Nokken–Poole score of 0.090, which is 900 basis points to the right of center on the policy space in
Figure 1. After that, he or she becomes more conservative over time, in this case at a rate of 20 basis
points per Congressional session, a result that is statistically significant. Lastly, and again as expected,
past political ideology is positively and statistically significantly related to current political ideology.
The final set of results presented in Table 4 employ data from long-serving Republicans in the
U.S. Senate. As indicated in Table 4, this model is jointly significant and produces an R2 of 0.410.
In terms of the long-serving Republicans in the U.S. Senate, the results in Table 4 suggest that the typical
19 Autocorrelation is a problem in one of the three cases of increasing conservatism among the long-serving Republicans in the
U.S. Senate.
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Republican enters the U.S. Senate with a Nokken–Poole score of 0.144, which is 1440 basis points to the
right of center on the policy space in Figure 1. After that, he or she becomes more conservative over
time, in this case at a rate of 30 basis points per Congressional session, a result that is again statistically
significant.20 The significance of the instability of legislators’ political ideology over time in this and
the previous case calls into question the alignment of Republicans’ political ideologies to those of
their constituencies.
5.2. Relevance and Limitations of the Findings
The main finding in our study—that the political ideology of federal legislators exhibits some
instability over time—contributes to the economics literature in a number of ways. Among these,
it extends seminal studies wherein economists examine the economics of information and its links to
advertising, search and signaling (Stigler 1961; Darby and Karni 1973; Spence 1973; Nelson 1970, 1974).
According to this foundational work, and the empirical studies that have emerged since, the quantity,
quality and form of advertising and information provision are functions of goods (and buyer)
characteristics, as well as relative prices (Ekelund et al. 1995; Mixon et al. 2009).21 Nelson (1970, 1974)
first suggested an analytical classification of goods with search and experience characteristics, wherein
search (experience) goods are those for which judgments about the goods’ attributes can (cannot) be
made (at low cost) prior to purchase.22 In the case of experience goods, such judgments are possible
only after purchase. As such, goods and services can be placed on a continuum much like that presented
above in Figure 1, although one where “search characteristics” and “experience characteristics” replace
the “Liberal” and “Conservative” political ideology tags, respectively, at the two ends of the continuum.
The notion that the “legislative services” provided by representatives to their constituents lie
somewhere along a search-experience characteristics continuum, using the categories in Nelson’s (1974)
analytical classification of goods and services, has been put forth in prior economics studies.
As Mixon et al. (2009, p. 84) indicate, one point of view (e.g., Nelson 1976) holds that political services
are more like search goods, given that candidates’ records are available to the public, and thus a
candidate’s actual performance can be compared with his or her advertised performance. Another point
of view asserts that political services are more like experience goods, given that it is difficult for voters
to draw inferences about the future behavior of candidates (Telser 1976) and that that the costs of
investigating candidates’ political records can be high (Ferguson 1976).23 The findings of this study,
that the political ideologies of legislators exhibits instability over time, certainly reinforces the argument
by Telser (1976) that it is difficult for voters to draw inferences about the future behavior of candidates
for political office.
In terms of the relevance of our findings to political scientists, there is a line of argument in
the political science literature that relates to the discussion above regarding goods/services typology.
As noted in Mixon et al. (2005), Boudreaux (1996) points out that the plethora of issues facing voters,
combined with the fact that voting opportunities (e.g., elections for national office) are, at best,
infrequently presented to voters suggests that decisions made by voters in the political realm are
likely to be relatively uninformed. As such, and contrary to Wittman (1995), these decisions are
unlikely to promote efficient policies or outcomes.24 Boudreaux’s (1996) arguments are based in part
20 As in the previous models, past political ideology is positively and statistically significantly related to current political ideology.
21 Foundational empirical studies in this stream of the economics literature include Laband (1986, 1989, 1991),
Ekelund et al. (1995) and Mixon (1995).
22 Darby and Karni (1973) suggest a third classification of goods—credence goods—for which judgments about the good’s
attributes are prohibitively costly even after purchase.
23 For examples of prior empirical work on this topic, see Crain and Goff (1988), Mixon (2002),
Mixon and Upadhyaya (2002, 2003), Mixon et al. (2003a), Mixon et al. (2003b) and Mixon et al. (2009).
24 Boudreaux (1996, pp. 117–18) points out that the typical national election involves perhaps thousands of highly aggregated
issues—from abortion to school choice. Moreover, each voter has a maximum of nine national ballots to cast during a
six-year span, suggesting that political decisions by voters, as opposed to market decisions by households/consumers,
are invariably cluttered with “romance pollution” (see also Brennan and Lomasky 1993).
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on Downs (1957), who asserts that if the voter does not pursue politics as a hobby, he or she will be
badly informed. The phenomenon described above, which Downs (1957) termed “rational ignorance,”
leads voters to seek low-cost informational cues in choosing from among political candidates.25 Within
a framework asserting that political information is costly to acquire, seminal work by Kramer (1971)
argues that voters support the incumbent if his or her recent political performance has been satisfactory
on the basis of some relatively simple standard (e.g., real GDP growth).
Another research stream, based on early research by Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983), suggests
that, ceteris paribus, voters prefer local candidates to more distant candidates in political contests.
As Faith and Tollison (1983) point out, the advantage to voters of home grown candidates stems from
the human capital advantage that local candidates have in the form of information about the political
conditions/desires that exist in the home district.26 In addition to this advantage, Kjar and Laband (2002)
add that because it is costly to “fire” a representative for poor performance, voters will prefer local
candidates with longstanding ties to the district. These candidates implicitly put more specific human
and/or other types of capital at risk as a type of performance bond (Telser 1980; Klein and Leffler 1981;
Shapiro 1983) than do candidates with lesser ties to a district (Kjar and Laband 2002, p. 144).27 As in the
case of how the findings in this study are situated within the academic literature on the economics of
information, the suggestion from our results that the political ideologies of legislators exhibits instability
over time creates difficulties for voters with regard to attempts to employ low-cost information cues,
such as geographical proximity, at the polls. For example, our finding that a Democratic representative
from Indiana became more liberal, over time, than his colleague from New Jersey likely caused some
consternation among the Indiana electorate. A similar pattern in state-level politics in Indiana would
devalue the practice of localism (in voting) in that state.
Although the findings presented in this study have particular relevance to both the economics and
political science branches of the academic literature, our work is not without limitations, particularly in
its use of political ideology scores. Our use of Nokken and Poole (2004) scores as a measure of political
ideology follows what Jackson and Kingdon (1992, p. 805) refer to as the typical approach by economists
to the study of legislators and legislatures, wherein the framing and passing of legislation is posed as
a competition between a legislator’s political ideology and the economic interests of his or her local
constituency. Jackson and Kingdon (1992, p. 806) assert that commonly-used measures of ideological
preferences, such as ADA scores or other compilations of roll call votes (e.g., Nokken–Poole scores),
lead to a statistical bias that overestimates the influence of personal ideology and underestimates
the relationship with other variables.28 More specifically, they argue that the votes that constitute a
political ideology score are affected by a number of systematic factors, such as interest group pressures,
presidential agendas, committee activities, the persuasions of party leaders, and the consequences of
the agenda-setting process (Jackson and Kingdon 1992, p. 813).
Jackson and Kingdon (1992, p. 815) support the use of ideological measures that are constructed
independently of roll call votes in order to understand the impact of political ideology on the behavior
of elected officials. Using such measures requires studying political ideology directly, as in the case of
survey research and more intensive approaches (e.g., see Converse 1964; Inglehart 1988), or through
analyses of the contents of the writings and speeches of politicians. As Jackson and Kingdon (1992,
25 Cebula and Mixon (2012) point out that Downs’s (1957) work forms the foundation of scholarly research on voter participation
in the U.S. that focuses on whether or not the decision to vote, in general, is rational.
26 Faith and Tollison (1983) and Kjar and Laband (2002) also add that the search costs associated with detecting the merits of
home district candidates will generally be lower than those associated with discovery of the merits of more distant candidates.
27 In other words, voters understand and appreciate the implied efficiency of casting ballots in favor of candidates who
have much to lose locally from nonperformance in the legislative arena (Kjar and Laband 2002, p. 144). For a look at
some of the empirical research on presidential elections from this stream of literature, see Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983),
Rice and Macht (1987), Kjar and Laband (2002), Mixon and Tyrone (2004), Disarro et al. (2007), Mixon et al. (2008),
Kahane (2009) and Mixon (2013, 2018).
28 Jackson and Kingdon (1992, p. 813) assert that this issue is exacerbated in the case of a single dimension, as would occur
when using League of Conservation Voters scores of political ideology to analyze voting on strip mining legislation.
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p. 815) point out, there is a long tradition in political science of probing the beliefs, values and preferences
of politicians (e.g., see Miller and Stokes 1963; Fenno 1978, 1986; Aberbach et al. 1981; Kingdon 1989).
Acknowledgment of our study’s limitations, at least in the ways stated by Jackson and Kingdon (1992),
would point toward inclusion of regressors in our econometric model that capture the systematic
factors referred to above that influence political ideology scores, or, alternatively, use of survey data
and/or results from content analysis instead of traditional scores of political ideology. Perhaps future
research, which we discuss in greater depth in the final section of the study, could delve into these and
other issues.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research
Given that previous public choice studies have shown that voters tend to vote for candidates from
parties who are aligned with their own political ideologies, the present study addresses the important
question: How stable is a legislator’s political ideology over time? To address this particular question,
we employ numerical scores of legislators’ political ideology for long-serving members of the U.S.
House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. As indicated above, results from individual time-series
estimations suggest that political ideology is unstable over time for a sizable portion of the members
of both major political parties who serve in the U.S. Congress. These results run somewhat counter
to those in early work by Jennings (1992), and in more recent research by Jewitt and Goren (2016).
Additionally, analysis of the pooled data suggests that, after accounting for inertia in political ideology
and individual legislator effects, Republican legislators become more conservative over time.
Taken individually, these sets of results generate additional research questions for public choice
scholars to ponder. These begin with the recommendation that future research delve further into
the apparent differences in the instability of political ideology by major political party in the U.S.
Is the apparent difference between the instability in conservative political ideology and liberal political
ideology one of a statistically significant nature, as indicated here? Or, would additional empirical
analysis, using a larger data set than employed in this study, find a statistically significant degree of
instability in the political ideologies of Democrats in the U.S. Congress?
Taken together, the results presented in this paper point toward deeper scientific study of the
stability of political ideology in the legislative body. For example, future research could explore
the correlates of political ideology, beginning with the demographics of legislators who comprise a
particular legislative chamber. Panel data, using samples from the U.S. and elsewhere, might flesh out
the important explanatory variables, such as gender, age, prior education and experience, to name
a few, that shape political ideology and its stability. Moreover, empirical approaches that link the
ideologies of legislators to those of their constituencies could explore whether shifts in the ideologies
of legislators is aligned with shifts in electorate ideology, or whether a misalignment is occurring in
this process. If ideology misalignment is indeed occurring, then further exploration into the type
of echo chamber that a legislative body constitutes may point toward secondary constituencies that
influence the political ideologies of elected officials. This line of inquiry could follow Mixon et al. (2009)
by examining the role of campaign contributions plays in the importance of positioning along the
traditional unidimensional policy space discussed in the public choice literature.
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Abstract: What factors determine federal spending on environmental goods? Is severity of the
hazard the only metric of consideration, or do other factors play a vital role in explaining spending?
This paper seeks to answer this question and to identify disbursement patterns within the context of
the Abandoned Mine Land Fund (AMLF) program, a fund created as an aspect of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. We explore whether political factors, as well as environmental
and health factors, have an explanatory role in disbursement of AMLF monies. The political factors
examined include environmental interest group influence and legislator preferences and/or pressures
to fund sites in their home states or districts. The results found here suggest that there exists a mix
of public and private interests present in AMLF disbursement decisions during the overall span of
the program, and that political influences have gained strength in the decision-making calculus in
response to changes in the funding structure of the AMLF.
Keywords: public choice; public interest; seniority; mining; political economy
JEL Classification: D7; H5
1. Introduction
What are the determinants of federal spending on environmental goods? Is severity of the
environmental hazard the only metric of consideration, or do other factors play a vital role in explaining
how funding is disbursed? In this paper, we aim not only to provide answers to these questions,
but also to illuminate disbursement patterns of monies from the Abandoned Mine Land Fund (AMLF)
that go toward the reclamation of abandoned mine sites throughout the United States. Though the
program itself is small, this analytical setting is interesting because of the limited scope of program
objectives and the rigidly defined funding source (at least initially). This suggests that the execution of
abandoned mine reclamation projects facilitated by the fund should be difficult to influence politically.
Within this setting, we examine whether political factors, in addition to severity of abandoned mine site
hazard and general abandoned mine site characteristics, influence the distribution of AMLF monies.
This project contributes firstly to the economic analysis of government activity. Broadly, there are
two economic strands of thought regarding government action. The first is that government action is
motivated primarily by the public interest. Congruent with this perspective, money from the AMLF
would go toward sites that pose the most severe environmental risks to the general public. The other
perspective sees government action as being subject to the influences of interest groups and politician
self-interest. Orthogonal to the vision of a benevolent government, these concentrated interests are
seen as the driving influences of fund disbursement. López and Leighton (2013) provide a good
overview of both of these theories in their analysis of the role of ideas in political change.
Within the existing literature, little has been said specifically regarding the AMLF as an
environmental remediation program. However, work has been done with respect to other similarly
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intended programs such as Superfund that parallels the questions asked in this paper. Barnett (1985)
and Hird (1990, 1993, 1994) offer support for the public interest perspective with their findings that
Superfund monies and efforts are allocated toward remediating the most severe sites. The evidence in
these works, however, is not strong enough to reject the hypothesis that there are zero pork-spending
influences in Superfund allocations but does suggest that these influences are minor with respect to
total disbursements.
Nonetheless, McNeil et al. (1988) find evidence for the pork-spending hypothesis with respect
to tax implementation and subsequent spending. They found that evidence in EPA data that taxes
for Superfund were often collected in certain areas, but the bulk of spending occurred elsewhere.
Likewise, the theory of rationally self-interested politicians is likewise supported throughout other
works. Stroup (1996) and Yandle (1992) argue that Superfund monies are sought by politicians to
be brought back to their home constituencies. Tilton (1995) draws comparisons between Superfund
and the AML program under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) in the ways
each of these programs dealt with problems of past pollution and finds that AML fares better in terms
of assigning responsibility for the past pollution and mitigating future production cost uncertainty
associated with liability costs. Nonetheless, the scope of the analysis does not consider how political
factors or pure environmental or human well-being concerns affect the execution of either of these
pollution mitigation programs. The paper closest to ours in the Superfund literature is Stratmann
(1998), who uses a political economy model similar to ours to look at the geographic disbursement of
Superfund expenditures to separate out public interest and public choice influences.
We use this literature to inform our study of the Abandoned Mine Land Fund. In Section 2, we
provide an overview of the history of the AMLF. We then discuss our theoretical framework in Section 3
and follow that up with information on our data in Section 4. Section 5 presents our empirical results,
with Section 6 concluding.
2. History of the Abandoned Mine Land Fund
The AMLF was created as a part of SMCRA in 1977. Bamberger (1997) provides a nice overview of
the history of the AMLF through 1997. Yonk et al. (2017) have a more recent overview of the history of
SMCRA through a public choice lens. The overarching goal of SMCRA is to establish a federal standard
for environmentally responsible surface mining, and restoration of the lands after mining has ceased to
ensure mitigation of adverse environmental effects of this method of extraction. Due to lax enforcement
of state mining regulations prior to the passing of SMCRA, many smaller sites were subject to “blast
and grab” mining techniques where small, independent miners/mining operations, often referred
to as wildcatters, would use whatever least cost method was at their disposal to expose and extract
coal. Afterwards, they might simply leave the area thereafter with no attempt at reclamation. These
practices resulted in degradation of land and environmental quality. While small sites characterized
the abandoned mines, the prevalence of these sites was the main contributor to alarm.
Consistent with the broader goals of SMCRA, the objective of AMLF is to provide for a general
funding pool to be allocated towards reclamation efforts of already existing abandoned mine sites,
in addition to SMCRA’s efforts of enforcing reclamation on present and future mine sites. As delineated
within SMCRA, monies in AMLF may be used for purposes including, but not limited to, reclamation
and restoration of abandoned coal surface mines, processing and disposal areas, sealing and filling
of deep mine entries, land restoration to mitigate erosion and sedimentation, waterbed restoration,
construction and operation of water treatment plants, pollution mitigation for burning coal refuse
disposal, and control of coal mine subsidence.
The coffers of the AMLF are provided for via a fee levied on extracted coal as specified in section
403 of SMCRA:
All operators of coal mining operations subject to the provisions of this Act shall pay to the
Secretary of the Interior, for deposit in the fund, a reclamation fee of 35 cents per ton of coal
produced by surface coal mining and 15 cents per ton of coal produced by underground
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mining or 10 per centum of the value of the coal at the mine, as determined by the Secretary,
whichever is less, except that the reclamation fee for lignite coal shall be at a rate of 2 per
centum of the value of the coal at the mine, or 10 cents per ton, whichever is less.
These fees were initially slated to expire in 1992, but extensions have been passed by Congress to
maintain the collection of fees, thereby continuing the reclamation of abandoned mine sites.
Out of the monies collected from domestic coal production fees, 50% of those collections are
allocated to the states. The remaining half is allocated across three broad objectives and falls under
federal discretion and the control of the Secretary of the Interior. Ten percent of these funds are marked
for allocation into the Rural Abandoned Mine Program. Twenty percent of the funds are funneled into
a pool that is used for supplemental grants going toward remediation of more hazardous sites. The
remaining 20% can be described as a portmanteau pool where funds are used for emergency projects,
federal administrative costs, projects in states without approved reclamation plans, and the Small
Operator Assistance Program.
Currently, the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) has collected over $10.1 billion worth of fees toward
the AMLF. Out of that total, over $7.6 billion has been distributed. Furthermore, OSM estimates that
over $3 billion worth of high priority sites remain to be remediated. Back-of-the-envelope arithmetic
suggests that the mission of OSM with respect to reclaiming abandoned mines is nearing its twilight.
However, one should be careful to avoid the assumption that the volume and severity of abandoned
mine sites exists in a static state. Instead, these should be considered in a dynamic light for reasons
such as the potential future hazardous deterioration of presently stable underground mines.
In the nearly forty years since the passing of SMCRA and the creation of the AML reclamation
program, various changes to SMCRA itself have been implemented and the funding structure of AMLF
has likewise been altered. The first structural change relevant to this analysis is the enactment of the
Abandoned Mine Reclamation Act (AMRA) of 1990 that provided for the accruement of interest on
AMLF balances that were not appropriated. This marks the first codified instance in the lifespan of the
program that incentivizes any change in allocation patterns. Specifically, this act provides the incentive
to decrease general allocations and hold a balance in the AMLF from year to year in order to grow the
fund absent additional taxes collected or to mitigate cycles in funding due to cyclical coal production.
The next major restructuring of reclamation funding occurred with the passing of the SMCRA
Amendments Act of 2006. First, it incrementally reduces the taxes levied per ton of coal produced
through September 2021. However, this rate reduction is offset by requirement of “Treasury payments
to certified states and tribes in lieu of payments from AMLF.” A further stipulation, requiring future
AMLF allocations to be based upon historic coal production, also shifts the allocation patterns. The final
restructurings of the AML program relevant to this study are tucked away within the passages
of Public Law (PL) 112-141, the “Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act,” and PL
113-40, the “Helium Stewardship Act of 2013.” In short, minutia within these bills cap the amount of
money allocated to a given state or tribe out of the in-lieu Treasury funds established in the SMCRA
Amendments Act annually at $15M and $28M, respectively.
3. Theoretical Framework
This paper’s conceptual framework incorporates tenets of economic theories of regulation,
bureaucracy, and interest group influences in order to provide a more cohesive and comprehensive
explanation of the disbursement of AMLF monies. Within the economic theory of regulation, legislators
maximize their acquisition of support from among competing constituencies. Theoretically and
practically, this predicts that legislators do not adopt a corner solution with respect to helping one
constituency versus another. Instead, in equilibrium, individual legislators make support trade-offs at
the margin in order to attain the optimal amount of support. Within the context of AMLF decision
making by politicians, the relevant constituencies to consider are interest groups who may provide
financial electoral support and the general public responsible for vote counts. From this scenario,
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both the severity of environmental hazard posed by the abandoned mine site as well as the interest
group strength possess important explanatory power regarding AMLF disbursements.
The equilibrium framework of regulation and interest groups implies that bureaucrats are
politicians’ pawns in executing legislation (Becker 1983; Peltzman 1976). Therefore, it logically follows
that such models have no room for bureaucratic influence in policy decision-making. However, if the
bureau has significant enough autonomy in pursuing its own interests, as the Office of Surface Mining,
Reclamation and Enforcement generally does, the economic theory of bureaucracy must be introduced
into this analysis in order to more accurately explain the patterns of AMLF disbursement.
Within the economics of bureaucracy, there are also multiple competing explanations of the
autonomy and objectives of bureaucracies. One hypothesis suggests that bureaucrats pursue their own
interests within the organization, and those interests do not consistently align with the law’s intent
(Niskanen 1971). McCubbins et al. (1989) put forth a hypothesis where bureaucrats and politicians have
differing objectives, but that constraints such as budget appropriation, administrative rules, and oversight
can effectively curb purely bureaucratically interested actions. Weingast and Moran (1983) suggest an
even more constrained theory of bureaucratic action with their congressional control hypothesis.
Potentially more important than the theories of regulation and bureaucracy is the relationship
between legislators and the implementation of the regulations they are responsible for enacting.
Consistent with the public choice view that politicians act in their own self interest—substantively
meaning they take actions that are likely to increase their chances of job security by means of
re-election—politicians have a vested interest in securing funds for their respective states and/or
districts. Doing so increases local aspects such as environmental quality, real estate values, and potential
tourism revenues. Likewise, reclamation activities could be expected to provide positive employment
effects in the area. While the employment effects may only be relevant in the short run, they also
typically fall within the reelection timeframe, thereby further incentivizing politicians to secure this
virtually ‘free lunch’ money. As such, this interaction suggests that senior politicians will be more
effective in funneling AMLF allocations to their home regions.
From a policy perspective, it is important to know the extent to which political factors play
a role in the distribution of public funds. This is especially true when politics is not supposed to
play a role. If political influence can be identified, then perhaps a change can be made to political
institutions to remove politics from the process. For example, Garrett and Sobel (2003) find that
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) disaster expenditures are higher in states where
their members of Congress serve on FEMA oversight committees. A post 9-11 reorganization of FEMA,
however, removed this form of political influence according to Sobel et al. (2007). Similarly, Twight
(1989) highlights how politics prevented the military from closing or realigning any domestic military
bases from 1960 to 1988. Reforms in the late 1980s led to political factors no longer playing a role
(Beaulier et al. 2011). By looking at all the institutional changes in the AMLF program over time in one
paper, we provide insight into how institutional changes may have influenced the role of politics in
the allocation of funding.
Furthermore, the nature of AMLF disbursements with respect to whether it more adequately
can be described as a disguised welfare program, or general spending on environmental goods has
important implications for how we predict funds to be allocated.
4. Data and Model Estimation
As described in the preceding section, the explanatory factors of AMLF disbursement are many.
The theoretical underpinning suggests that funding of abandoned mine reclamation projects is a
function of hazard severity, and the characteristics of legislators, interest groups, and bureaucratic
agents. This general empirical model has been used to study agency dependency (Anderson and
Potoski 2016), federal transportation disbursements, (Bilotkach 2018), airport funding under the
Essential Air Service Act (Hall et al. 2015), federal disaster declarations and assistance (Husted and
Nickerson 2014), NIH funding (Batinti 2016), antitrust enforcement (Dove and Dove 2014), and even
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disbursement of the swine flu vaccine (Ryan 2014). Such an empirical model will be used to explain
and predict funding tendencies of projects that fall under the umbrella of AMLF reclamation objectives.
The empirical model to be estimated is an ordinary least squares model that includes state and
year fixed effects in order to account for unobserved variations in political and economic conditions
throughout the span of the data set.
For policymakers not familiar with the methodology employed in these analyses, the goal is to
estimate an empirical model that explains variation in AMLF funding. If done properly, we can isolate
the effect of specific factors holding constant other variables that might influence AMLF funding.
For example, a positive and statistically significant coefficient on whether a mine was an underground
mine strongly suggests that underground mines receive higher levels of AMLF funding because
policymakers believe they are more costly to remediate, other things being equal. Similarly, a positive
and statistically significant coefficient on any variables measuring political influence suggests that
political oversight of the AMLF influences the allocation of funds.
The equation we estimate is:
AMLF Disbursementsi,t = β0 + β1HAppSeni,t + β2SHAppSeni,t + β3GreenIndexi,t + β4Incomei,t
+ β5Privatei,t + β6Statei,t + β7Pri1i,t + β8Pri2i,t
+ β9Surfacei,t + β10Undergroundi,t + β11Bothi,t + β12Processingi,t
+ γi + δt + σi,t.
(1)
The primary dependent variable is the SMCRA-funded AMLF allocation towards reclamation
of abandoned mine sites throughout years spanning from 1984 through 2013. These are presented in
thousands of inflation-adjusted (1984) dollars. Additional regressions are estimated with the dependent
variable as a standardized measurement of SMCRA-funded AMLF allocation per unit of area on a
given site to address variation in the size of abandoned mine sites. The data is collected from the
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement’s Abandoned Mine Land Inventory System,
e-AMLIS. This database consists of an inventory of land and water impacted by past mining endeavors.
It is detailed to the extent of including information regarding location, type, and extent of damages
as well as reclamation costs. Data is provided by the states managing their own abandoned mine
problems or through the OSMRE office responsible for managing these cases where states do not bear
that responsibility. In this analysis, only reclamation sites that have been funded to some extent by
AMLF are included. However, there exist other abandoned mine sites within the database that have
simply not been allocated funding or they have been completely reclaimed through private efforts and
funding. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the entire sample.
Severity of the environmental hazard is measured by the priority status assigned to each
abandoned mine site, per problem type, by OSMRE. There are five tiers of priority assigned to
inventoried sites. Within this analysis, priority types are coded as dummy variables, so as to treat
each level of hazard independently without assuming a linear scale in the degree of hazard. The most
serious abandoned mine land problems are those that pose a threat to health, safety, and general
welfare of people. These are assigned either Priority 1 or Priority 2 status, and are the only problems
required by law to be inventoried. Within these top two priorities, there are seventeen different
problem types accounted for—noted without respect to severity. Those problems that have only
environmental impacts are classified as Priority 3 problems and are included in the inventory when
reclamation on these sites is funded, in some proportion, out of AMLF. Priority 4 and 5 sites consist
of lower severity coal related problems such as public facilities and development of public lands.
These lower priority reclamation projects have fewer records kept on them, are less likely to receive
AMLF monies, and are not included in this dataset. Intuitively, funding amounts are predicted to align
with priority levels; the higher the priority, the greater the funding allocated. (As pointed out by an
astute referee, this suggests that Priority 1 sites are more costly to reclaim. We are not aware of any
data on the cost of reclamation per site type. Our intuition here is driven by the fact that the difference
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between Priority 1 and Priority 2 sites is that Priority 1 sites are categorized as such because they pose
a higher threat to the health and safety of the general public. To us, this suggests higher costs related
to the urgency of the reclamation project, in addition to the difficulty of remedying health hazards.)
For purposes of this analysis, only Priority 1 and 2 sites are considered, and take a value of one if
applicable and zero otherwise.
Table 1. Summary statistics for database of abandoned mine land sites, 1984–2013.
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max
Private Ownership 35,528 66.822 46.192 0 100
State Ownership 34,021 4.062 18.455 0 100
House Appropriations Seniority 36,311 27.715 20.646 0 78
Senate Appropriations Seniority 36,311 7.407 9.653 0 51
Environmental Group Strength 36,314 7.132 2.694 3.400 13.10
Priority 1 36,314 0.208 0.406 0 1
Priority 2 36,314 0.590 0.492 0 1
Underground Site 36,314 0.397 0.489 0 1
Surface Site 36,314 0.345 0.475 0 1
Surface + UG Site 36,314 0.238 0.426 0 1
Processing Site 36,314 0.016 0.125 0 1
AMLF Allocation (1000) 36,314 108.793 352.075 0.0004 13,984
Per Capita (PC) Income (1000) 36,311 26.957 8.447 13.358 68.80
House Appropriations Member 36,311 0.882 0.323 0 1
Senate Appropriations Member 36,311 0.549 0.498 0 1
Along with priority designation, abandoned mine sites can be categorized by the type of
mining that occurred on site that now requires reclamation. Here, there are four different mine
site types accounted for in the e-AMLIS inventory—surface, underground, both, and processing.
Presumably, project sites where only processing mining operations occurred would be predicted to
receive larger AMLF allocations since the reclamation project is inherently more involved due to the
fact that reclamation activities would predominantly involve cleaning up the chemicals involved
in processing coal for use. Processing sites have a higher propensity for causing harm to general
health, safety, and human well-being. Surface mines are predicted to receive smaller allocations than
processing sites, but the largest allocations with respect to the other extraction sites. This is due to
the physical nature of the reclamation project itself. Reclamation of abandoned surface mine sites
would involve greater terrain restructuring, re-vegetation, and waterway cleaning and restoration.
Purely underground abandoned mine sites would be predicted to have the smallest allocations due
to the less involved nature of the reclamation project. In these cases, the reclamation process would
be primarily characterized by mineshaft reinforcement to prevent cave-ins, and mine entry sealing to
prevent, or at least reduce the risk of people entering abandoned deep mines. Finally, abandoned mine
sites where both surface and underground mining occurred are predicted to receive AMLF allocations
between the size of purely surface or underground sites receive since costs can be diffused across
reclamation of both kinds of operations. In theory, the size of distribution on sites where both surface
and underground mines occurred would be on a spectrum from pure surface to pure underground
with the amount being a weighted average of the proportional combination of mine types. However,
data to this extent of detail is unavailable. As such, the amounts predicted reflect an aggregated
average of proportion. All four categories are considered in this analysis. Like the priority sites,
the site characteristic variables are coded as dummy variables with a value of one corresponding to
the relevant sites and zero otherwise.
Additional site specifics are accounted for by ownership characteristics of the land where the
given abandoned mine site is located. By the e-AMLIS classifications, there are seven different possible
categories of landowners, not all of which hold exclusive ownership rights to the given land area.
The seven potential stakes are private, state, tribal, Bureau of Land Management, forest service,
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national park, and a catchall category of other federally owned lands. These ownership stakes are
provided as percentages. Among these ownership stakes, we would expect that proportion of private
ownership and size of AMLF disbursement will be inversely related. Conversely, higher proportions
of state-owned lands on abandoned mine sites are likely to receive the greater AMLF allocations.
The remaining five types of land ownership are not considered for purposes of this analysis due to the
fact that they make up a miniscule proportion of abandoned mine site ownership on any given site
and correspond to a relatively small number of mine sites in the data set. Nonetheless, each of these
would be expected to exhibit similar allocation patterns as state-owned lands since they also fall under
the broader category of publicly owned lands.
Characteristics of legislators are accounted for by seniority and membership on fiscally relevant
congressional committees. The main variables included are cumulative seniority of members on the
Senate Appropriations, and House Appropriations committees by year and by state. This data is
collected from the respective committee’s history websites. For all of these variables, a positive
relationship is expected between committee seniority and AMLF allocations. Relatively higher
positive relationships are expected for House Appropriations committee members’ seniority since they
represent a smaller constituency relative to senators.
Variables concerning interest group strength are collected from the 1991–1992 Green Index
(Hall and Kerr 1991). Specifically, this index considers membership per 1000 state residents in
environmental organizations, namely Greenpeace, the National Wildlife Federation, and the Sierra
Club in 1990. Ideally, this index would be more current, perhaps updated annually. Nonetheless,
this provides the most current and comprehensive measure of environmental interest group presence
across states. This variable is predicted to have a positive influence on the AMLF allocation through
the mechanism of these environmental interest groups pressuring representatives to secure funding
for reclamation sites in their respective states. If politicians are self-interested, they have an incentive
to respond to these vocal members of their constituency. Real state per capita income is included to
account for constituent demand for environmental goods.
In addition to the broad inspection of how these factors influence the allocation of AML funds
over the recorded lifespan of the program, each of the legal changes in the funding structure previously
mentioned are considered, period-by-period to examine the extent to which these changes alter the
respective public interest and political influences on AML reclamation funding.
The general predictions regarding these legal changes in the funding structure are simple and
intuitive. At the outset of the program, the expectation is that AMLF distribution patterns follow the
intentions of the program, to reclaim hazardous abandoned mine sites, without respect to outside
political sway. When AML funding expands from being a purely fee-based pool such as with the
passing of SMCRA ‘06, the political influences on allocation decisions will gain gravity. Likewise,
as Treasury payments to states and tribes are capped, as is the case with the passage of PL 112-141,
that same political influence on allocation decisions will at least wane, if not drop completely out of
the distribution calculus.
For purposes of this analysis, abandoned mine sites on Indian Reservation lands are omitted
due primarily to the inconsistencies associated with the political variables in question. Given that the
reservations are viewed as sovereign entities within United States territory, there exist no measures of
seniority within the House and Senate Appropriations committees or within the Green Index for these
territories. The lack of a complete set measures render introduction of analysis of AMLF distribution
patters on reservations problematic.
5. Empirical Results
Regression results are presented in Tables 2–6. In all tables, specifications (1) and (2) report
results with AMLF allocations in inflation-adjusted dollars as the dependent variable, while (3) and (4)
give these same results with respect to the funding-per-metric unit standardization as the dependent
variable. All results are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). Specifications (1) and (3) do
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not include state and year fixed effects, while specifications (2) and (4) do include state and year
fixed effects.
5.1. AMLF 1984–2013
Table 2 gives an overview of the AMLF distribution patterns over the entire scope of our data
set—consisting of 33,947 mine site observations in specifications (1) and (2) and 33,313 observations
in (3) and (4) over a nearly thirty-year span. Across all specifications, sites with a Priority 1
ranking are granted larger AMLF allocations. This can be seen in the positive and statistically
significant coefficient on the variable Priority 1 in specifications (1), (2), (3), and (4). This result
also holds with respect to site-only considerations for Priority 2 abandoned mine sites, though not in
funding-per-unit estimations.
Table 2. The determinants of receiving AMLF site funding, 1984–2013.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
House Appropriations Seniority 0.125 −1.208 *** 0.058 0.263 **
(0.092) (0.197) (0.053) (0.115)
Senate Appropriations Seniority 3.542 *** −0.290 1.146 *** 1.217 ***
(0.203) (0.356) (0.117) (0.206)
Environmental Group Strength 2.639 *** −29.644 * −3.006 *** −39.049 ***
(0.785) (16.630) (0.451) (10.894)
PC Income (1000) 0.376 −0.249 1.118 *** 1.373 *
(0.255) (1.383) (0.147) (0.804)
Private Ownership −0.197 *** −0.177 *** −0.028 0.023
(0.042) (0.051) (0.024) (0.030)
State Ownership 0.582 *** 0.440 *** 0.520 *** 0.571 ***
(0.106) (0.111) (0.061) (0.065)
Priority 1 48.108 *** 69.563 *** 38.658 *** 39.596 ***
(5.883) (6.266) (3.405) (3.646)
Priority 2 72.863 *** 80.359 *** 19.313 *** 17.515 ***
(4.700) (4.832) (2.717) (2.811)
Surface Site −10.978 28.915 −31.990 ** −4.532
(27.547) (27.872) (16.042) (16.322)
Underground (UG) Site −59.629 ** −20.963 −6.573 15.199
(27.449) (27.677) (15.987) (16.211)
Surface + UG Site 2.272 46.466 * −18.253 9.503
(27.609) (27.942) (16.078) (16.363)
Processing Site 43.544 89.884 *** −11.778 6.480
(30.910) (31.189) (17.959) (18.233)
Constant 31.794 687.050 *** 20.547 670.500 ***
(28.832) (167.982) (16.759) (108.005)
State and Year Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes
Observations 33,947 33,947 33,313 33,313
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.059 0.016 0.033
Residual Std. Error 332.785 327.470 189.952 188.332
F Statistic 82.279 *** 33.092 *** 46.128 *** 18.065 ***
Notes: Dependent variable in specification (1) and (2) is per site AMLF allocations in inflation-adjusted dollars,
while the dependent variable in specifications (3) and (4) is per site AMLF allocation per metric unit of the
mine site. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
Priority 2 sites are predicted to receive greater allocations in the site-only specifications. This may
be largely accounted for by the fact that Priority 2 abandoned mine sites make up nearly 60% of the full
data set, whereas Priority 1 sites make up only slightly more than 20% of the full data set. A snapshot
of the distributive patterns suggests that holding other considerations constant, including state and
year effects, an abandoned mine site with approved funding for reclamation is predicted to receive
roughly $69,600 if it is categorized as a Priority 1 site, and $80,400 if Priority 2. In specifications where
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funding is considered on a per-unit basis and the underlying state and year effects are accounted for,
sites with Priority 1 designation are predicted to receive $39,600 per unit of area to be reclaimed and
Priority 2 sites are predicted to receive $17,500 per unit of area.
Contrary to initial predictions, the type of mine site being reclaimed has little bearing on the
allocation received. Specification (2) suggests that an abandoned mine site will receive roughly
$46,500 more in AMLF allocation if it was a combination mine site, and $89,900 more if a processing
site. Specification (4) suggests that none of the site categories has an influence on monies received.
Those virtually anomalous instances aside, there is no sound evidence that the type of mine itself
abandoned factors into allocation decisions. It may instead be the case that mine site type is built into
the priority designations, thereby rendering these details largely irrelevant.
Ownership characteristics do suggest a substantive relationship across the span of the data
set. In all four specifications, percentages of state-owned lands displayed positive and statistically
significant coefficients. These coefficients range a short span from 0.440 to 0.582, and seem to have a
trivial influence on the AMLF allocations. However, one should bear in mind that, in such a case where
abandoned mines are located on 100% state-owned lands, these results suggest that total allocations
may be boosted by roughly $50,000 due to ownership stakes alone. For mines on privately owned
lands, a negative and significant relationship is suggested when considering funding on per-site basis.
By the same logic as before, a site on completely privately held land can expect to see an allocation
roughly $18,000 smaller.
The influence that the cumulative seniority of House Appropriations committee members in a
given state wields upon AMLF distributions is inconsistent, and weak across the twenty year span.
The coefficient from specification (2), −1.208, suggests that an additional year of cumulative seniority
decreases AMLF allocations by roughly $1200 to a given mine site, whereas the coefficient from
specification (4), 0.263, suggests instead that an additional year of seniority increases the reclamation
funding per metric unit on a mine site by roughly $260. While coefficients themselves are small,
their real-world significance comes in the aggregation, as examples may illustrate. Suppose a site
is granted AMLF monies in the given state and year where House Appropriations seniority is the
maximum value, 78 years of cumulative seniority. Per the specifications in column 2, this suggests that
a site would be granted around $95,000 less in funding. Taking a less extreme example, consider the
average seniority in the set, 25 years. These preliminary regression results suggest that, on average,
the seniority of the state’s members on the House Appropriations committee contributes to a $30,000
decrease in expected AMLF monies. In the case of the positive coefficient gleaned from specification
(4), the aggregated implications are again, quite substantial in their potential. By quick calculations,
this result suggests that AMLF allocations can be boosted, on average, by roughly $6,600 per unit of
area to be reclaimed at an abandoned mine site. The statistical significance is stronger on the negative
coefficient, but, given that significance is suggested in opposite directions, it remains ambiguous
whether this particular factor is influential, and in which direction if it is.
Unlike the similar measure for the House, the Senate Appropriations committee seniority is
suggested to be influential on the size of AMLF allocations. In all but specification (2), this variable
displays a positive, and statistically significant relationship on funding. Specifications (1), (3), and
(4) display coefficients of 3.542, 1.146, and 1.217, respectively. Following the same logic as explained
with the House variable, these estimates are more meaningful in their aggregates than their marginal
values. In a given state with the maximum Senate Appropriations committee seniority (49 years), this
influence potentially amounts to roughly $60,000–$175,000 boosts in allocations. While less striking
when considering average seniority, the figures are still meaningful with $10,000–$28,000 estimated
boosts per site-area-unit or sites broadly considered.
Interest group strength, as measured by the Green Index, exhibits strong evidence about the
direction of influence on AMLF allocations. Specifications (1) through (4) give statistically significant
estimates of 2.639, −29.644, −3.006, and −39.049 respectively. Considering the more explanatory
second specification, this suggests that, for each additional unit increase in this index, a given mine
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site is expected to receive nearly $30,000 less in AMLF allocation. Considering the fourth specification,
this estimate suggests that a one-unit increase on the Green Index for a given state leads to a nearly
$40,000 decrease in AMLF allocation per metric unit area of mine site being reclaimed. While initial
predictions consisted of the interest group variable having a positive influence on the amount of
funding, it may more likely be the case, in light of these results, that environmental interest groups
would actively dissuade their political representatives and the like from channeling federal money
going towards abandoned mine reclamation projects and instead attempting to assign responsibility to
other potentially responsible parties for bearing the burden of these costs.
Finally, the income variable provides some suggestion that the higher income states receive more
funding, ceteris paribus. In specifications (3) and (4), the coefficient estimate for per capita income
is positive and statistically significant. The overall trend suggests that, for each additional thousand
dollars of per capita income a state has, a reclamation site in that state is expected to receive nearly an
additional $1100 in AMLF allocation on a per-site basis, or nearly $1400 per unit area being reclaimed
when underlying conditions for states and years are controlled for.
5.2. AMLF Inception through the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Act of 1990
Table 3 gives an overview of the AMLF distribution patterns over the scope of the data set
spanning from its inception in 1977 to when the first major changes in the program were instituted,
with the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Act of 1990. This subset consists of 1251 mine site observations
in all four specifications.
Over this time span, the results subtly suggest that Priority 1 and Priority 2 sites are given larger
allocations. This can be seen in the positive and statistically significant coefficients on Priority 1
(specifications (2) and (3)) and Priority 2 (specifications (2) and (4)). The per-site estimates in
specification (2) suggest that Priority 1 sites receive allocations nearly $92,500 larger and that Priority
2 sites receive allocations slightly over $100,000 larger. Considering funding per unit reclaimed,
specification (3) suggests that Priority 1 areas receive roughly $43,500 more per unit of area reclaimed,
but the significance drops out upon the inclusion of fixed effects in (4). However, Priority 2 sites
are estimated to receive slightly more than $28,000 per unit area reclaimed by the estimations in (4).
Nonetheless, that such results are found only subject to certain regression specifications, suggests
that Priority designations alone have little influence over the amounts of funding allocated to specific
reclaimed abandoned mine sites.
Results here suggest that the type of mine site being reclaimed has bearing on the allocation
received only along a per-site basis. Specifications (1) and (2) suggest that abandoned mine sites will
receive smaller AMLF allocations across all four varieties of site. Considering specification (2) only,
sites are estimated to receive approximately $571,000, $646,000, $590,000, and $624,000 less per surface,
underground, combination, and processing sites, respectively. While the estimates found here seem
amiss, much of that is likely explained by the considerably large constant terms estimated across the
four specifications.
Ownership characteristics do not suggest a substantive relationship across the span of the data
set. In all four specifications, percentages of either privately-owned and state-owned lands displayed
no statistically significant coefficients.
The influence that the cumulative seniority of House Appropriations committee members in
a given state wields upon AMLF distributions is inconsistent across the span. The specification (1)
coefficient suggests that an additional year of cumulative seniority increases AMLF allocations by
roughly $1300 dollars to a given mine site, whereas specification (2) suggests instead that an additional
year of seniority decreases the reclamation funding per mine site by over $22,000. While the estimates
from (1) and (2) suggest ambiguity due to the opposing signs, intuition supports the notion that the
more accurate scenario is that seniority out of the House Appropriations committee has a negative
relationship with AMLF disbursements. This logic is supported by the stronger statistical significance
97
Economies 2019, 7, 3
found in the second specification, as well as the underlying fact that the included fixed effects account
for more unobservables across the states and years in question.
Table 3. The determinants of receiving AMLF site funding, 1984 to AMRA 1990.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
House Appropriations Seniority 1.286 ** −22.043 *** 0.205 3.122
(0.630) (5.269) (0.291) (2.434)
Senate Appropriations Seniority 11.943 *** 21.700 4.110 *** −29.318 ***
(2.061) (21.816) (0.952) (10.076)
Environmental Group Strength 32.068 *** −595.784 9.727 *** 981.853 ***
(7.693) (672.184) (3.555) (310.454)
PC Income (1000) −31.358 *** −28.958 −8.330 ** −3.004
(9.143) (70.858) (4.226) (32.727)
Private Ownership 0.123 0.502 0.319 −0.001
(0.545) (1.011) (0.252) (0.467)
State Ownership −7.970 17.618 0.533 18.726
(26.385) (31.478) (12.194) (14.539)
Priority 1 5.241 92.472 * 43.365 ** 35.098
(47.198) (50.601) (21.814) (23.370)
Priority 2 19.267 100.015 *** 22.103 28.074 *
(32.230) (34.934) (14.896) (16.135)
Surface Site −566.235 *** −571.213 *** −15.395 −11.594
(152.366) (151.885) (70.418) (70.150)
Underground Site −653.969 *** −645.920 *** −13.370 −6.135
(152.491) (151.002) (70.476) (69.742)
Surface + UG Site −566.665 *** −589.889 *** −21.545 −25.858
(153.624) (153.346) (71.000) (70.824)
Processing Site −570.970 *** −624.009 *** −27.180 −6.102
(179.303) (178.099) (82.868) (82.257)
Constant 963.014 *** 3501.752 95.627 −3159.686 ***
(205.085) (2630.303) (94.783) (1214.831)
State and Year Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes
Observations 1251 1251 1251 1251
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.110 0.029 0.069
Residual Std. Error 364.857 357.627 168.625 165.174
F Statistic 9.306 *** 5.184 *** 4.164 *** 3.496 ***
Notes: Dependent variable in specification (1) and (2) is per site AMLF allocations in inflation-adjusted dollars,
while the dependent variable in specifications (3) and (4) is per site AMLF allocation per metric unit of the
mine site. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
Like the similar measure for the House, Senate Appropriations committee seniority is suggested
to be questionably influential on the size of AMLF allocations. In specifications (1) and (3), this variable
displays a positive, and statistically significant relationship on funding, while (4) provides strong
evidence to the contrary. Following the same logic as explained with the House variable, intuition
suggests that the negative relationship found in (4) may be the best estimate, again due to the included
state and year fixed effects.
Again interest group strength, as measured by the Green Index, exhibits strong evidence about
the direction of influence on AMLF allocations. Only the second specification fails to give a statistically
significant coefficient estimate. The first, third, and fourth specifications give statistically significant
estimates of 32.068, 9.727, and 981.853, respectively. During this early time span in the existence of the
program, it seems that environmental groups within are a more powerful force in getting resources
allocated toward the reclamation of the environmental blights in their respective states.
Finally, the income variable mildly suggests that the allocation of AMLF monies to mine
reclamation is more akin to an environmental welfare program. In specifications (1) and (3),
the coefficient estimates for per capita income are negative and statistically significant. However,
once fixed effects are included, significance disappears and renders the effect null. Loosely though,
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we can infer that states with relatively poorer populations require more financial assistance in order to
address and reclaim their abandoned mine sites.
5.3. AMRA 1990 through SMCRA Amendments Act of 2006
In the span following the passage of the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Act of 1990 through the
SMCRA Amendments Act of 2006, another subset of the data is considered in order to examine the
changes in allocation influences in response to the legally changed structure of funding the program.
This subsection corresponds to 8825 site observations in the first two specifications, and 8644 in the
third and fourth. The results are presented in full in Table 4.
Table 4. The determinants of receiving AMLF site funding, AMRA 1990 to SMCRA 2006.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
House Appropriations Seniority 0.192 −1.080 *** 0.214 ** 0.587 ***
(0.166) (0.374) (0.096) (0.219)
Senate Appropriations Seniority 2.663 *** 1.039 0.793 *** 1.142 *
(0.374) (1.148) (0.216) (0.669)
Environmental Group Strength 4.893 *** −26.744 −2.918 *** −32.798 **
(1.598) (24.534) (0.926) (16.267)
PC Income (1000) −1.441 ** −6.276 0.969 ** 0.920
(0.684) (4.039) (0.397) (2.382)
Private Ownership −0.102 −0.208 ** −0.146 *** −0.161 ***
(0.090) (0.097) (0.052) (0.056)
State Ownership 0.411 ** 0.022 0.356 *** 0.327 ***
(0.181) (0.188) (0.105) (0.110)
Priority 1 31.535 *** 46.081 *** 21.874 *** 21.361 ***
(10.943) (12.049) (6.357) (7.045)
Priority 2 48.244 *** 59.555 *** 3.328 2.987
(8.719) (9.076) (5.063) (5.316)
Surface Site −16.452 61.068 −33.796 −6.548
(45.974) (47.303) (26.615) (27.616)
Underground Site −60.204 9.170 −16.711 0.641
(45.843) (47.032) (26.540) (27.459)
Surface + UG Site 4.356 87.575 * −30.271 −3.612
(46.174) (47.536) (26.731) (27.752)
Processing Site 20.138 111.172 ** −5.534 7.976
(52.061) (53.246) (30.134) (31.105)
Constant 81.696 610.762 ** 52.290 * 370.194 **
(50.677) (249.445) (29.316) (161.342)
State and Year Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes
Observations 8825 8825 8644 8644
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.047 0.009 0.017
Residual Std. Error 319.948 315.522 183.359 182.616
F Statistic 15.803 *** 9.306 *** 7.661 *** 3.904 ***
Notes: Dependent variable in specification (1) and (2) is per site AMLF allocations in inflation-adjusted dollars,
while the dependent variable in specifications (3) and (4) is per site AMLF allocation per metric unit of the
mine site. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
Within this subset, the first thing that becomes clear is that, unlike the previous subset analyzed,
little evidence is suggested that mine type is a significant determining factor in AMLF allocations.
Only for combination mines or processing sites in specification (2) is there any statistically significant
coefficient estimate produced by the regression results. On the per site basis, combination sites tend to
receive roughly $87,500 more federal monies for reclamation efforts, while processing sites see slightly
more than $111,000 additional funds. Certainly, the processing site estimates fall in line with initial
predictions. However, in this subset of the data, much like the overall trend of AMLF allocations,
mine type is a trivial detail in the funding considerations.
99
Economies 2019, 7, 3
Hazard severity in this regression setup displays exactly the same characteristics with respect to
statistical significance as it did in the overall dataset and results in Table 2. Priority 1 sites across all
four specifications display evidence of positive and statistically significant relationships to funding
amounts. Furthermore, the range in magnitude across the four specifications is roughly consistent.
Additionally, the coefficient estimates for Priority 2 sites provide evidence that, with respect to
site-only considerations, being deemed a Priority 2 status reclamation site is positively and statistically
significantly related to larger AMLF allocations. Similar to the results and rationale in Table 2,
the coefficient estimates on Priority 2 sites are larger in magnitude than that for Priority 1s, but are
likely explained by the proportion of Priority 2 sites in this subsection of the data—again corresponding
to roughly 60% Priority 2s and 20% Priority 1s.
Evidence for political influences in AMLF allocations reemerges in this timeframe. Across
specifications (2) through (4), the seniority measures for the House Appropriations committee members
display statistically significant relationships to AMLF distributions. Only for the House variable
in specification (2) is this variable estimated to have a negative relationship. Overall, both of these
variables positively influence AMLF allocations, with Senate Appropriations seniority being the stronger of
the two influences with estimations of 2.663, 0.793, and 1.142 in specifications (1), (3), and (4), respectively.
Significance is stronger, but magnitude smaller for House estimations in (1) through (4).
Furthermore, by this time period in the AML reclamation program, the significance of abandoned
mine land location comes back into play—much as it did in the overall program estimates. In all but
specification (2), a mine site is expected to receive greater funding allocations per percent proportion of
site on state owned lands. The corresponding estimates in (1), (3), and (4) are consistent in magnitude
at 0.411, 0.356, and 0.327 to suggest a stronger validity of the estimate. Likewise, across specifications
(2) through (4), a site being on privately owned lands is associated with lesser amounts of funding. At
any rate, evidence is strongly suggestive that abandoned mine sites on state owned lands are deemed
a higher priority, in terms of AMLF monies, for reclamation.
Lastly, these estimates provide evidence again that reclamation funds are positively related to a state’s
per capita income. In specifications (1) through (3), positive and statistically significant coefficients are
estimated for the relationship between state per capita income and the AMLF monies received.
Overall, the results in this subsection of the data suggest that a mix of hazard and political aspects
influence the allocation of money out of the AMLF to abandoned mine sites. Political influences are
stronger in this time span than overall, and during the time frames prior to amendments. Public interest
influences are weaker in this roughly fifteen year period than they are overall, but stronger than the
first seventeen years.
5.4. SMCRA Amendments Act of 2006 through PL 112-141
Passage of the SMCRA Amendments Act of 2006 marked the starkest change in funding composition
of the broader AMLF. In short, this act broadened the scope of funding sources from being strictly
coal-fee-funded to having a specific portion of its budget comprised of Treasury allocation. This time frame
covers a roughly six-year span from late-2006 to mid-2012, consisting of 1716 observations in specifications
(1) and (2) and 1687 in (3) and (4). Full results are presented in Table 5.
In this time frame, the strongest evidence for a public interest view of AMLF allocations is given
with the estimates to Priority 1 and 2 sites. In all four specifications, Priority 1 sites are estimated
to have positive and statistically significant relationships with the amount of funding granted to a
site or per unit area of a site with coefficients of 66.949, 137.052, 47.340, and 55.932 in specifications
(1) through (4), respectively. Paralleling the patterns in previous tables, Priority 2 sites have positive
and statistically significant coefficients estimated in all four specifications, at 87.625, 112.395, 37.363,
and 41.259, respectively. In the site-only considerations, the larger coefficients can be explained through
the greater prevalence of Priority 2 sites within the data set. However, the predictions that Priority
1 sites would receive larger allocations comes into alignment when the funding is considered on a
per-unit of area basis. This general result is borne throughout a number of alternate specifications.
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Table 5. The determinants of receiving AMLF site funding, SMCRA 2006 through PL 112-141 (2012).
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
House Appropriations Seniority −0.094 −0.225 0.137 0.055
(0.617) (1.364) (0.336) (0.740)
Senate Appropriations Seniority 1.537 0.504 0.885 −2.051
(1.004) (3.829) (0.549) (2.099)
Environmental Group Strength −11.290 −70.951 −4.466 30.513
(7.063) (52.871) (3.865) (29.995)
PC Income (1000) 3.938 30.345 2.450 39.929 ***
(3.484) (19.960) (1.907) (10.816)
Private Ownership 0.467 * 0.386 0.191 0.229
(0.258) (0.269) (0.141) (0.147)
State Ownership 2.332 *** 2.204 *** 0.137 0.222
(0.529) (0.571) (0.290) (0.310)
Priority 1 66.949 ** 137.052 *** 47.340 *** 55.932 ***
(28.808) (33.300) (15.756) (18.010)
Priority 2 87.625 *** 112.395 *** 37.363 *** 41.259 ***
(23.888) (24.887) (13.061) (13.468)
Surface Site 53.727 105.381 −32.629 −34.226
(98.572) (99.636) (54.980) (55.094)
Underground Site 20.915 19.310 19.339 5.504
(97.638) (96.958) (54.467) (53.678)
Surface + UG Site 79.253 120.324 −9.716 −11.065
(98.433) (98.645) (54.891) (54.545)
Processing Site 28.951 11.698 −12.473 −30.226
(128.855) (131.763) (72.379) (73.575)
Constant −121.942 −428.162 −64.696 −2091.367 ***
(151.155) (1219.813) (83.294) (666.602)
State and Year Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes
Observations 1716 1716 1687 1687
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.048 0.014 0.054
Residual Std. Error 384.271 379.079 207.701 203.468
F Statistic 4.107 *** 3.088 *** 2.979 *** 3.332 ***
Notes: Dependent variable in specification (1) and (2) is per site AMLF allocations in inflation-adjusted dollars,
while the dependent variable in specifications (3) and (4) is per site AMLF allocation per metric unit of the
mine site. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
None of the other political or economic variables bear consistent evidence of influencing allocation
decisions throughout the main and alternative specifications in this shorter time period. Thus,
it suggests that despite the changes to the funding structure of the program, the AML program
hones its integrity.
5.5. PL 112-141 through PL 113-40
The final subsection of the dataset analyzed consists of the span between the passages of laws
that capped the Treasury in-lieu payments to states for abandoned mine site reclamation projects.
This specific set covers a roughly 18-month period from the July 2012 enactment of PL 112-141 to
the enactment of PL 113-40 in the beginning of January 2014. There are 832 observations analyzed in
specifications (1) and (2), and 816 in (3) and (4) in Table 6.
Within this 18-month time span, regression results suggest that the allocation pattern of AMLF
monies maintains the originally intended purpose of the program as evidenced by the positive and
statistically significant coefficient estimates given for Priority 1 and 2 sites across all specifications
except (1) for Priority 1. In (2) and (4), where state and year fixed effects are taken into account,
estimates suggest that a Priority 1 reclamation project is expected to receive roughly an additional
$224,000 per site, or roughly $146,000 per unit area reclaimed. Priority 2 projects are estimated to
receive roughly an additional $245,000 per site, or roughly $79,000 per unit area from AMLF allocations.
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Table 6. The determinants of receiving AMLF site funding, PL 112-141 to PL 113-40.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
House Appropriations Seniority −6.191 * −9.586 −3.056 ** 45.847
(3.224) (61.732) (1.527) (29.571)
Senate Appropriations Seniority 5.301 ** 1.664 2.028 * 0.161
(2.268) (4.219) (1.078) (2.027)
Environmental Group Strength −2.147 −34.625 −5.658 151.990
(10.854) (205.311) (5.178) (98.403)
PC Income (1000) 7.622 * 11.931 3.373 * 9.696
(3.952) (12.588) (1.905) (6.039)
Private Ownership 0.434 −0.051 0.348 0.412
(0.569) (0.628) (0.271) (0.305)
State Ownership 1.927 1.093 0.079 0.100
(1.808) (1.845) (0.879) (0.908)
Priority 1 89.946 223.694 *** 123.174 *** 145.645 ***
(70.781) (82.097) (33.687) (39.776)
Priority 2 185.607 *** 244.542 *** 68.527 ** 78.817 **
(62.766) (64.825) (29.791) (31.242)
Surface Site 245.520 324.284 120.021 161.992
(363.392) (363.093) (171.561) (173.803)
Underground Site 185.177 250.504 128.050 137.683
(361.812) (359.834) (170.785) (172.166)
Surface + UG Site 319.017 382.575 161.958 167.584
(363.769) (361.811) (171.681) (173.102)
Processing Site 1736.858 *** 2275.683 *** 206.145 240.879
(411.611) (425.240) (194.294) (203.458)
Constant −593.614 −618.558 −270.164 −2090.760 **
(414.049) (2124.185) (196.509) (1016.938)
State and Year Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes
Observations 832 832 816 816
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.117 0.018 0.015
Residual Std. Error 609.675 602.616 287.271 287.738
F Statistic 8.389 *** 4.448 *** 2.243 *** 1.382 *
Notes: Dependent variable in specification (1) and (2) is per site AMLF allocations in inflation-adjusted dollars,
while the dependent variable in specifications (3) and (4) is per site AMLF allocation per metric unit of the
mine site. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
Further bolstering the suggestion that AMLF distribution patterns returned to intended purposes
are the estimates on the ownership characteristic, political, and economic variables. In none of the
four specifications is there evidence that either private or state proportions of land ownership have
any influence on funding decisions. With respect to seniority of House and Senate Appropriations
committee members, there is evidence in specifications (1) and (3). However, when the state and year
fixed effects are introduced into the specifications, all statistical significance drops from the coefficient
estimates, thus suggesting that these influences are moot. A similar story can be told with respect to
the estimates on the environmental interest group variable. Again, the pattern holds with respect to
per capita income in a state; positive statistical significance is estimated on the coefficients in (1) and
(3), but significance drops in (2) and (4) once the fixed effects are included.
Once again, there is little evidence in the general trend that mine site type is an influential factor
in funding decisions. Out of the four mine types, only processing mines were estimated to receive
larger AMLF allocations. Coefficient estimates were found to be positive and statistically significant
only at the site level, at 1736.858 and 2275.683 in specifications (1) and (2), respectively. These estimates
suggest that processing sites during the July 2012–December 2013 time frame received upwards of two
million dollars in reclamation funding. However, when considering funding per unit area of a site,
there is no discernible relationship to be found for any of the potential abandoned mine types.
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6. Conclusions
This paper examines the question of what determines the size of disbursements from AMLF
to support reclamation projects on abandoned mine sites. Specifically, it examines if the severity of
environmental hazard is solely responsible for AMLF allocations and the magnitude thereof or whether
other political and economic forces influence the federal funding of abandoned mine site reclamation.
Overall, the evidence suggests that funding for abandoned mine reclamation is a mixture
of the products of public and political interests. With the exception of the 1984–1991 time span,
sites designated as Priority 1 or 2 consistently are predicted to receive larger disbursements. However,
in these time spans, political influences—especially through Senate Appropriations committee tenure
and state-ownership of lands—wield consistently strong and significant weight on allocation decisions.
This political influence is most pronounced in the years after the AMLF coffers are provided for with
Treasury funds in addition to fees levied on domestically extracted coal. After the allocations out of
Treasury funds are capped to states, the political influence wanes and the hazard level of sites again
becomes the primary influential factor in funding receipts—further bolstering a public interest view of
the AML program in total.
From a policy perspective, the biggest takeaway from our findings are that political institutions
can be changed to remove politics. While the AML program, and the mission of reclaiming abandoned
mine lands in total is but a small mission in the scope of federal activities, examination of the funding
distribution trends in light of differing institutional contexts analyzed here shed light on how similar
programs can be more effectively implemented under the federal umbrella. In short, a program with
minimal scope of objectives and funded via taxes/fees—implying a hard budget constraint—limit
the extent to which political influences can sway the decision-making calculus of monies allocated
through the program—furthermore, supposing the introduction of a softer budget constraint through
federal appropriations toward a given project in question, capping the distributions out of that portion
of funding likewise limit the extent of political sway. In this sense, our finding contributes to similar
papers in public choice showing how institutional reforms can reduce or remove the influence of
politics (Beaulier et al. 2011; Hall and Williams 2012; Sobel et al. 2007).
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Abstract: Pork-barrel spending is the use of federal money for localized projects that yield only
a narrow geographic benefit. It is a commonly held belief that politicians use this spending to
improve their chances of re-election. One way that an incumbent can increase their chances of
re-election is through increased fundraising. Political entrepreneurs see this opportunity and attempt
to benefit from these projects in exchange for campaign contributions. This paper investigates whether
incumbents are able to use their position to bolster their campaign contributions. I find pork-barrel
spending and political contributions to be positively related, but this effect is only present when the
incumbent properly times the project. I also find that general federal appropriations do not have the
same impact. This supports the claim that pork-barrel spending can be used as a currency in the
marketplace for political capital.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Advertising, Credit-Claiming, and Position-Taking
In his seminal work, Congress: The Electoral Connection, Mayhew (1974) claimed that members of
Congress devote resources to three basic activities when seeking re-election. They can advertise through
speeches, public openings, and campaign ads. They can credit-claim by showing off the positive things
they have done for their constituents. This can include federal money appropriated to their district, or
policies that have a net benefit for their voters. Finally, members of Congress can take positions by using
their voting behavior to form a political platform.
Targeted expenditures, which are also called pork-barrel spending, allow incumbents to both credit
claim and advertise simultaneously. They accomplish this through three channels. First, pork-barrel
spending allows an incumbent to advertise by initiating pork-barrel projects that are visible and useful
to the constituents. It is not surprising to see the legislator at the groundbreaking of a project or
toting oversized scissors at a grand opening. Second, an incumbent can credit-claim if the pork-barrel
spending results in improved economic conditions. If a constituent’s life is improved through a
pork-barrel project, that citizen is more likely to cast a vote for the incumbent. Third, an incumbent
can increase their ability to advertise through campaign contributions. In this scenario, political
entrepreneurs engage in rent-seeking behavior by making campaign contributions to incumbents
in exchange for preferential treatment, including the funneling of pork-barrel money to prominent
donors. For example, the owner of a concrete supplier may make a contribution to the incumbent’s
campaign, and in exchange, the donor receives a contract for a new sidewalk project in the district.
This paper focuses on the third channel. The main goal of this paper is to determine whether
rent-seeking does in fact occur by estimating the effect that pork-barrel spending has on fundraising.
While others have studied why politicians use pork-barrel spending, I use a novel approach to isolate
Economies 2019, 7, 16; doi:10.3390/economies7010016 www.mdpi.com/journal/economies105
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one specific way that politicians use pork-barrel money to their benefit. To accomplish this goal, I
test three hypotheses: first, whether pork-barrel spending has an impact on an incumbent’s ability to
fundraise, second, whether the timing of the pork-barrel appropriations matter, and third, whether
general federal appropriations do not have the same impact on fundraising that pork-barrel spending
does. If I can prove each hypothesis, then it provides evidence that political entrepreneurs are active in
the political market for pork-barrel spending, and that incumbents are more than happy to go along
with the process.
1.2. Political Entreprenurs and Rent-Seeking
A political entrepreneur is someone in the private sector that attempts to “change the direction
and flow of politics” through the act of rent-seeking. Political entrepreneurs create inefficiencies in
the market as they have “energies and talents that could be used elsewhere” (Schneider and Teske
1992). Instead of focusing their creative energies on enhancing the product or service they offer, they
use that energy and capital in an attempt to change laws and encourage projects that would benefit
their business.
By definition, those engaging in rent-seeking, including political entrepreneurs, attempt to
redistribute gains to themselves in the absence of the creation of any new gains (Tullock 1967; Krueger
1974; Posner 1975; Tullock et al. 1980). Political entrepreneurs have an incentive to lobby for less
regulations (or regulations that hurt competing industries) or for funding directed to projects that
can benefit the entrepreneur, even at the expense of the population at large. Rent-seeking is viewed
as “in-kind” where lobbyists use benefits such as fancy dinners and nice vacations to encourage
beneficial legislative changes (Mixon et al. 1994). Additionally, lobbyists can attempt to spur legislative
change through the use of indirect rent-seeking, where special-interest groups attempt to influence
legislation “by holding demonstrations, purchasing billboard, radio, or television advertising, or
by funding, publishing, and circulating policy-oriented journals and research (the type of activity
usually done by public policy institutes)” (Sobel and Garrett 2002). While exchanging political
favors for campaign contributions is not technically bribery, it is a form of in-kind rent-seeking. Past
studies have shown that the effect of rent-seeking can be as large as 22% of gross national product.
(Laband and Sophocleus 1988).
As is the case in the private market, the political entrepreneur must realize that a profit opportunity
exists, and must be willing to take action as they would in a private market (Holcombe 2002; McCaffrey
and Salerno 2011). The end result is a system of political capitalism where the political elite and the
economic elite cooperate in a way that is mutually beneficial (Holcombe 2015). Therefore, both the
politicians and the political entrepreneurs have motivation to work together while engaging in this
rent-seeking behavior. For the politician, this creates a scenario where the politician may betray their
political beliefs to gain political capital for future use (Lopez 2002). This can include “calling in favors”,
such as campaign donations, from those that have benefited from policies and projects made possible
by the legislator.
1.3. Pork-Barrel Spending and Campaign Contributions
Pork-barrel spending is defined as federal appropriations used to fund localized projects that
yield concentrated geographical benefits. There has been an abundant number of papers published
attempting to identify why legislators are so motivated to use pork-barrel money. Only a handful
are mentioned below. However, if pork-barrel spending can increase campaign contributions, that
by itself is a sufficient reason to expend resources to seek it. A long series of studies have shown
that campaign expenditures are directly related to success in an election (Dawson and Zinser 1976;
Jacobson 1981, 1990; Palda 1973, 1975; Samuels 2002; Stratmann 2013; Welch 1974, 1976). This is
even more important to incumbents facing a tight election. While campaign fundraising is typically
more important to challengers, as they must overcome the incumbency bias (Jacobson 1990), political
organizations are able to aid marginal incumbents from potentially damaging economic forces through
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additional campaign funding (Jacobson 1981). Therefore, political entrepreneurs may be able to identify
incumbents in the greatest need, and more importantly, those most willing to cooperate in exchange
for said campaign contributions.
Returning to the earlier theme of the paper, the use of pork-barrel spending would simultaneously
allow a legislator to engage in two types of re-election activity: credit-claiming and advertising. When a
legislator directs pork-barrel projects to those that return the favor through campaign contributions,
they are engaging in credit-claiming. At the same time, those political contributions can be used for
additional advertisements such as radio and television commercials.
The link between campaign contributions and corporate gains is largely anecdotal in the United
States (Milyo 1999; Stratmann 1995); however, empirical evidence of this effect has been shown in
other countries such as Brazil (Boas et al. 2014). For example, in 1993, individual members of the
Brazilian congressional Joint Budget Committee accepted kickbacks of up to 3% of a project’s value
in compensation for their assistance in funding approval (Boas et al. 2014; Krieger et al. 1994). Even
more recently, Andrade Gutierrez, one of the largest construction companies in Brazil, increased
its contributions in municipal elections from nearly $75,000 to $37.1 million. At the same time, the
company was awarded nearly $3 billion in construction contracts associated with the 2014 World Cup
(Payne 2014). It should be noted that the Brazilian political system is often seen as an anomaly, and
may not be directly comparable to the American political system. At the same time, the motivations
that exist within the Brazilian political system are the same as those that exist in the American
political system.
Pinpointing the relationship between corporate gains and fundraising in the United States has
been problematic for many reasons. First, due to campaign finance laws, corporations can only donate
money to political action committees (PACs), which then use the money to support a politician or
issue. Records of contributions to PACs are less detailed than those that record donations to candidates,
and therefore, it is difficult to measure corporate efforts to support incumbents. Moreover, the links
between corporate gains and public policy is rarely obvious.
Although it tends to be difficult to link corporate profits to national programs, this problem is
reduced for the case of targeted expenditures. Pork may be presumed to have the greatest effect on the
profits of firms in the district receiving the expenditures. Potential donors benefit both from contracts
to produce the services provided, necessary infrastructure for those projects, and indirectly through
expenditures by firms and their employees in the district of interest.
Of course, legislators may also attempt to use general appropriations to their advantage. Federal
aid programs are much larger than targeted expenditures. However, legislators have a more difficult
time claiming credit for general government spending. This is not to say that a legislator that pioneered
major changes to a national program cannot claim credit. Instead, voters are not likely to give credit
to their legislator for an annual increase in Social Security benefits or additional highway spending.
This is both because a single legislator’s vote is rarely decisive, and because many general federal
appropriations are formula-based, so individual legislators have very little control over the amount of
money that each state receives. As a consequence, large federal programs are very difficult to change
in a manner that generates state or district-specific benefits.
2. Methodology
2.1. The Model
Given the extensive research conducted on political fundraising and the effects of campaign
spending, there has been surprisingly little research on the effects of pork-barrel spending on campaign
contributions. Samuels (2002) found that increased pork-barrel spending leads to an increase in
incumbent fundraising, all other things being equal, in the Brazilian political system. Then, the
additional campaign contributions are used to increase the likelihood of re-election. However, his work
does not address the mechanism through which pork-barrel spending increases prospects for electoral
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success. This paper attempts to address this by examining the link between pork-barrel spending and
incumbent fundraising.
While Samuels (2002) posited that pork-barrel spending increases fundraising, Stratmann (2013)
contended that fundraising tends to increase pork. My results suggest that Stratmann has misidentified
the relationship. Specifically, I find that an increase in pork-barrel spending leads to more campaign
contributions. One possibility for the difference is that Stratmann’s work focuses on the House of
Representatives, whereas my work focuses on the Senate. Senators have more direct influence over
public policies, including the appropriation of pork-barrel monies, than members of the House. Their
six-year terms allow senators to reap benefits that may take longer to develop compared to the two-year
terms for representatives. Moreover, states are able to capture a larger percentage of the benefits of any
given project compared to that of a congressional district. While projects in a congressional district may
benefit a small handful of companies within the district, those benefits will spill over into neighboring
districts through the effects of sub-contracting, commuting, and shopping across district boundaries.
Therefore, the state is able to capture most of the benefits from a given pork-barrel project, compared
to only a portion at the district level.
This study is not without limitations. There is one significant disadvantage associated with a
state-level analysis as opposed to that of a district-level study. There are two senators per state elected
at-large. Therefore, it is impossible to untangle the effort of each senator. Further, it is also impossible
to separate the efforts of the senators from the efforts of representatives who also exerted energies
to obtain the funding. This implies that the Samuels and Stratmann’s framework can be applied at
the state-level only after several modifications are adopted. A more thorough look at the two senator
problem will be addressed later in this paper.
I use a fundraising model based on Samuels (2002), Krebs (2001), and Bonneau (2007) for the
purposes of estimation. The Samuels (2002) model estimates the percentage of campaign finance in
a Brazilian state based on factors such as previous electoral success, number of terms served, and
party leadership. Krebs (2001) analyzed fundraising in city council elections, and Bonneau (2007)
addressed the determinants of fundraising in state Supreme Court elections. While the last two papers
are not conducted at the federal level, many of the determinants still apply, regardless of the level of
government being discussed.
This study extends Samuels’s (2002) paper and complements Stratmann’s (2013) approach in
the following ways. First, the present study focuses on United States Senate elections from 2004 to
2018, rather than a single election. For three years, it was possible to trace pork-barrel spending to the
individual representative responsible for its appropriation. Due to changes in reporting rules and a
moratorium on pork-barrel spending starting in 2011, data can no longer be collected at the district
level. Therefore, in order to examine a longer time period, the state level must be used. While there is
an effort to use machine learning to allow artificial intelligence to identify pork-barrel spending deep
within spending bills1, that type of data is not currently available.
Second, unlike the Samuels (2002) paper, this paper focused on the United States. As mentioned,
there are major differences between the American and Brazilian political systems, especially with
respect to the acceptance of financial kickbacks. However, incumbents face the same pressures to
utilize whatever means necessary (and legal) in order to be re-elected.
Finally, this study focuses on the Senate, unlike the work of Krebs (2001), Bonneau (2007),
and Stratmann (2013), which examine other levels of government. If a linkage between campaign
fundraising and pork-barrel spending is found, then it is entirely plausible that this is evidence of
pork-barrel spending being used as political capital. This would reinforce the idea of pork-barrel
spending being used for both advertising and credit-claiming.
1 https://dssg.uchicago.edu/2014/12/04/using-data-for-a-more-transparent-government/.
108
Economies 2019, 7, 16
The general model that I use is as presented follows:
f undraising = β0 + βi·pork + β j·electoral variables + βk·year + ε
where fundraising is one of the two dependent variables used to measure the incumbent’s ability to
fundraise, pork is one of the variations of federal appropriations, electoral variables are control variables
concerned with the political attributed of the incumbent, year are time variables, and ε is the error term.
I discuss each type of variable in more depth below.
2.2. Fundraising Data
There are two dependent variables used in this study.
2.2.1. Incumbent Fundraising (in Millions of Dollars)
The first dependent variable is the total amount of money raised by the incumbent in millions of
dollars during the election cycle as in Krebs (2001) and Bonneau (2007). This data is collected from the
Center for Responsive Politics’ Open Secrets.
2.2.2. Share of Fundraising
The second dependent variable is the share of fundraising is the percentage of the overall
fundraising the incumbent accounted for in their specific race. For example, if the incumbent raised
$7 million and the challenger raised $3 million, then the incumbent would have a 70% share of the
fundraising, as they raised $7 million of the $10 million total raised in that specific electoral battle. Both
Samuels (2002) and Stratmann (2013) used the share of fundraising variable. The share of fundraising
has several advantages over the total fundraising variable. First, population does not matter when the
share of fundraising is used, as it is simply a percentage of total fundraising. In addition, price level
differences do not matter. Since the spending in Senate campaigns can vary drastically, the fundraising
advantage variable allows for a more straightforward comparison of Senate races. The fundraising
data are also collected from the Center for Responsive Politics’ Open Secrets.
2.3. Pork-Barrel and Appropriations Spending Data
Data on the incumbent was collected for all senators vying for re-election from 2004–2018.
Pork-barrel spending data is collected in two ways: aggregated by election cycle and disaggregated by
the year within the election cycle.
2.3.1. Total Pork-Barrel Spending
Data on pork-barrel spending are taken from the Citizens against Government Waste (CAGW)
dataset. The first variable measures the total amount of pork-barrel spending appropriated by the
Senator’s state during their six-year term. The data are presented in millions of dollars. I hypothesize
that there will be a positive correlation between fundraising and pork-barrel spending. One potential
issue is that if the timing of pork-barrel spending matters, then the relationship may be ambiguous.
2.3.2. Pork-Barrel Spending by Year
I also use a set of annual pork-barrel spending variables. The pork-barrel spending appropriated
to a state is linked to electoral cycles, rather than years per se. For instance, if a Senator was up
for re-election in 2008, I compute the amount of pork-barrel spending that went to the state from
2003–2008, both annually and in aggregate. This allows for a determination as to whether the timing
of pork-barrel spending impacts campaign contributions. Specifically, I test to determine whether the
pork-barrel spending appropriated in election years impacts fundraising. Since Senate terms are six
years long, data from 1999–2018 is used. Since it is impossible to distinguish between the individual
efforts of each senator, the total amount of pork-barrel spending appropriated by the state is used. Due
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to the inability to disaggregate, it is likely that free riding is occurring within the Senate (Rogers 2002).
As mentioned earlier, even though a district-level study would yield stronger results, there are 20 years
of pork barrel spending data available at the state level, but only three years of data at the district level.
To help illustrate the election cycles, I graph the average amount of pork-barrel spending from
each “year to election” in Figure 1. In Figure 1 below, it is apparent that pork-barrel spending follows a
political election cycle, as it spikes every two years, which corresponds with the Senate elections. I have
included two different iterations of the data on the figure below. The bars on the left are the average
pork-barrel appropriations from 1999–2018, whereas the bars on the right are the average pork-barrel
spending from 1999–2010. The reason for this distinction is a 2011 Congressional moratorium on
pork-barrel spending. The amount of pork-barrel spending has fallen drastically. The total pork-barrel
spending by year is shown in Figure 2. The effect of the moratorium is apparent starting in 2011.
 
Figure 1. Pork-Barrel Spending by Year.
Various estimations have shown that pork-barrel spending appropriations in non-election years
have no statistical impact. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, I use the pork-barrel spending
appropriated in years with Senate elections. It is expected that there is both a “what have you done
for me lately” attitude from both parties, in addition to some degree of interference being picked up
due to the specification of the variable. Again, it is problematic that state-level data is being used
as opposed to district-level data, as it is impossible to disaggregate the efforts of the two Senators.
However, district-level data is not available for more than three years.
To determine whether and to what degree pork-barrel appropriations impact fundraising, two
series of estimates are undertaken for each dependent variable. First, aggregated pork-barrel spending
and the other control variables are used to estimate the total amount of funds raised by the incumbent.
Next, the possibility of an electoral cycle in pork and pork-induced donations are estimated using
annual data for the three election years during each senator’s term. The inclusion of annual values
also explores whether timing is important when considering the effects of pork-barrel spending on
future fundraising.
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Figure 2. Pork-Barrel Spending by Year.
2.3.3. Federal Aid
In order to assess differences between the impacts of pork-barrel spending and general
appropriations on fundraising, I use a federal aid variable from the United States (US) Census. This
variable measures the amount of federal aid appropriated to each state. The federal aid is calculated
by federal outlays to states from a variety of federal agencies. The data are collected from the United
States Census Statistical Abstracts of the United States, and specifically from the section titled “Federal
Aid to State and Local Governments—Selected Programs by State”. The Federal Aid variable does
not include Social Security or Medicare. In addition, I removed Medicaid spending, since it is also
formula-based. As was the case with pork-barrel spending, two forms of this variable are used. The
first is the aggregate federal appropriations in billions of dollars during the Senator’s six-year term.
The second is the annual, disaggregated federal appropriation in the years prior to an incumbent’s
re-election year. Unfortunately, due to budget cuts, the US Census no longer collects these data. As a
result, the regressions that use federal appropriation data are restricted to 2004–2010.
It should not be surprising that federal aid can also be used by political entrepreneurs to
manipulate the political process. Even though I hypothesize that pork-barrel spending will have
a more intense impact on the ability to fundraise, past research has found federal aid being used for
political reasons as well. For example, one study found that states can move their caucus/primary
dates in order to obtain additional federal grants by making their primary/caucus more important
(Mixon and Hobson 2001).
By using the appropriations variable in addition to the pork-barrel spending variables, I am
able to determine whether general appropriation spending has the same impact on fundraising as
pork-barrel spending. If pork-barrel spending is shown to be more effective, then the estimates provide
an explanation for the attraction to pork-barrel spending.
2.4. Characteristics of the Incumbent
Characteristics of individual senators were also collected. I only use incumbents who served a full
term. Therefore, senators who were appointed during the previous term or won a special election are
not included, as they did not have the full six years to obtain funding. From 2004–2018, 196 incumbents
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met these criteria, and were included. The descriptive statistics and the sources for the dataset are
shown in Table 1.
2.4.1. Challenger Fundraising
When an incumbent feels challenged, they must increase their efforts to fundraise. One way to
determine the competiveness of the election is by considering how much the challenger fundraised.
Similar to the other fundraising data, the amount the challenger fundraised comes from Open Secrets. I
hypothesize that the more the challenger fundraised, the more vulnerable the incumbent was, and
thus, the more the incumbent would need to fundraise to stave off the added competition.
2.4.2. Cash-on-Hand
The amount of cash-on-hand is included since it can influence the need to fundraise. I hypothesize
that an incumbent with more cash-on-hand will need less campaign contributions.
2.4.3. Performance in Previous Senate Election
The percent of the vote received in the previous election is used to gauge the vulnerability of the
candidate. These data are collected from the Federal Election Commission (FEC). Candidates that win
elections by large margins do not need to raise large amounts of money, since they are not vulnerable.
For example, Robert C. Byrd never received less than 60% of the vote in a general election. At the
same time, because he was never vulnerable, he didn’t need to exert resources or energy on serious
fundraising. The most that Byrd ever needed to raise was $5 million in his bid for re-election in 2006
(with many years needing $1 million or less.) Since his passing, the same seat has required more
than $10 million in campaign financing. On the other hand, nearly $125 million was raised during
the Cruz/O’Rourke Senate election battle in 2018. Therefore, I hypothesize a negative relationship
between past performance and incumbent fundraising.
2.4.4. Number of Terms Served
This variable counts the number of full terms served by the incumbent in the United States Senate.
Similar to the previous variable, this variable measures the vulnerability of the seat. Senators that have
held the seat for a longer period of time often have more name recognition. Therefore, I hypothesize a
negative relationship between the number of terms served and campaign fundraising. It is possible
that the relationship will not be as strong, since there is often a push to “drain the swamp” and “stop
career politicians”, which could be a detriment to longer-serving Senators.
2.4.5. Democrat
This is a binary variable that has a value of one if the incumbent is a Democrat. This variable
measures the impact of the incumbent’s party on the incumbent’s ability to fundraise. Historically, the
Republican Party is thought to be connected to the super rich, and more likely to obtain campaign
funds. However, in my dataset, the average raised by the Democrat is $13.53 million per election,
compared to $10.77 million per election raised by Republicans. Therefore, I anticipate a positive
relationship between the Democrat variable and campaign fundraising.
2.4.6. Do the Senators Belong to the Same Party?
The next variable is another binary variable that has a value of one if the two senators belong
to the same party. If a state is red or blue, the two senators can work together under the party
name to advance their own re-election campaigns. On the other hand, senators may have a tougher
time in a purple state, since they may also need to compete against the state’s other senator. In
addition, Senators in purple states are more likely to be vulnerable, as there is less voter allegiance to
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a single party. Therefore, I hypothesize a positive relationship between the same party variable and
campaign fundraising.
2.4.7. Female
The final incumbent characteristic variable is a binary variable with a value of one if the incumbent
is female. There has also been some debate over whether or not females have greater difficulty in
raising funds due to the historical male-dominated environment of the United States political system
(Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986). More recent research has suggested that those differences may have
been eliminated over the past few decades with sex no longer having an impact on electability (Hayes
and Lawless 2015). The only issue that seems to remain is that news coverage still tends to rely on male
experts, which could lead to a bias against females (Freedman and Fico 2005). Therefore, I hypothesize
a positive relationship between the female variable and incumbent fundraising, because females may
need additional fundraising to overcome the remaining bias.
2.5. Time Variables
The final set of variables are time-based binary variables ranging from 2004 to 2016 (with 2018
being the omitted year). These variables are meant to measure any idiosyncratic differences between
different election cycles.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for State-Level Regression.
Variable Source Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
Incumbent Fundraising (millions of $) OpenSecrets 196 12.25 8.47 1.7 51.57
Fundraising Advantage (in %) OpenSecrets 196 78.59 19.28 17.33 100
Explanatory Variables
Challenger Fundraising (millions of $) OpenSecrets 196 5.97 10.68 0 85
Cash-on-Hand (millions of dollars) OpenSecrets 196 1.68 2.68 0 17.16
Total Pork-Barrel Funding (millions of $) CAGW 196 613.99 697.59 0 3640.2
Pork-Barrel Funding during Election Year CAGW 196 100.43 142.23 0 733.63
Pork-Barrel Funding Two Years Prior CAGW 196 113.05 140.26 0 671.8
Pork-Barrel Funding Four Years Prior CAGW 196 126.04 144.46 0 733.63
Total Federal Aid (Billions of $) Census 101 40.21 55.96 1.1 296.4
Federal Aid during Election Year Census 101 9.59 12.04 1.2 66.6
Federal Aid Two Years Prior Census 101 8.43 10.51 1.1 53.8
Federal Aid Four Years Prior Census 101 7.42 9.12 0.9 46
% of Vote in Previous General Election FEC 196 60.06 9.41 36.08 100
Number of Terms in Current Office Congress 196 2.33 1.60 1 8
Are Senators from Same Party? * Congress 196 0.709 0.455 0 1
Female * Congress 196 0.209 0.408 0 1
Democrat * Congress 196 0.536 0.5 0 1
* Variables marked with an asterisk are binary variables.
3. Results
3.1. Results
The first regression used a pooled ordinary least squares regression (OLS) approach to estimate
total fundraising. The second estimate utilized the yearly pork-barrel appropriations during the
election year and two years prior in lieu of the total, six-year pork-barrel appropriations. Regressions
three and four replicated the first two regressions using the share of fundraising variable in place of
the total fundraising variable.
Next, the same four regressions were repeated using federal aid to states instead of pork-barrel
appropriations. Regression five used the six-year federal outlays, while regression six replaced the
aggregate appropriation with annual outlays during the election year and two year prior in order to
explore the possibility of an electoral cycle in the effects of state appropriations on overall fundraising.
113
Economies 2019, 7, 16
Finally, regressions seven and eight replicated regressions five and six using the share of fundraising
variable in place of the total fundraising variable.
Unlike the work of Samuels (2002) and Stratmann (2013), the present study includes federal
elections from 2004 to 2018 instead of a single election cycle. Therefore, panel estimation techniques
can be used. Each of the eight regressions above were repeated using a fixed-effect panel approach
as well.
3.2. OLS Estimates of Fundraising with Pork-Barrel Spending
Table 2 displays the results of the pooled OLS estimates of both total fundraising (regressions one
to two) and share of fundraising (regressions three to four), including both the aggregate pork-barrel
appropriations and the yearly pork-barrel appropriations. For regressions one and two, the challenger
fundraising variable is both significant and positively correlated with pork-barrel spending in their
states. In addition, cash-on-hand and the log of the population are all significant and correlated with
incumbent fundraising.
Most of the variables behaved as expected. For example, pork-barrel spending appropriated
during the election year has a positive and statistically significant relationship with the total amount
of money fundraised. At the same time, no such relationship occurs between pork-barrel spending
and the incumbent’s share of fundraising. One possible explanation is that an incumbent reacts to
the degree of threat from the challenger. For instance, an incumbent with a low likelihood of being
unseated does not need to worry about fundraising. Yet, they are likely to control a large percentage
of the total fundraising, as a weak challenger is not able to fundraise. On the other hand, in a highly
competitive race, the incumbent may have to use pork-barrel spending to increase total fundraising.
However, even with the additional fundraising, the share is unaffected due to the higher fundraising
level by the challenger.
The female variable is statistically significant and positively related to total fundraising. As
discussed earlier, female performance is elections have become essentially equalized with male
performance, but there is still evidence of barriers to overcome in terms of public perception.
Regressions three and four used the share of fundraising as the dependent variable. The time
effects were not included, because we do not have to control for things such as price levels. In addition,
challenger fundraising is not included, since it is already part of the share of the fundraising variable.
As was the case with the first two regressions, the cash-on-hand variable is significant. Unlike the
first set of regressions, the previous general election performance is positively correlated with share of
fundraising. This again makes sense, as a relatively unchallenged incumbent will not need to fundraise
(explaining the negative relationship between total fundraising and past election performance), but
does not have a serious challenger. The end result is an incumbent with a low-level of total fundraising,
but a high percentage of the total fundraising share.
The ‘same party’ variable is positive and significant. This shows that when both senators belong
to the same party, the incumbent up for election enjoys a larger share of the total fundraising. This
again makes sense in terms of the competitiveness of the seat. If both senators belong to the same
party, it is likely that the state is either a deeper red or blue, indicating a greater degree of safety. When
senators serve in a purple state, they tend to be far more vulnerable.
3.3. OLS Estimates of Fundraising with Federal Appropriations
The next four regressions replicate the first four, this time using federal aid to states as opposed
to the more specific pork-barrel spending. As discussed, due to a reduction in federal funding, the
US Census stopped collecting the federal outlay data after 2010. Therefore, these regressions cover
the Senatorial general elections from 2004–2010. The results are displayed in Table 3. For each of the
regressions, the control variables behave in much the same way as they did in regressions one to four,
so I will not repeat the results. The main difference between pork-barrel spending and federal aid is
that there is no significant relationship between federal aid and fundraising other than the federal aid
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appropriated during the election year, which is actually negatively correlated with total fundraising.
These results support the hypothesis that general federal appropriations do not have the same impact
on fundraising. Even when federal spending such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are
excluded, there is still no discernable linkage between federal aid spending and fundraising.
Table 2. Pooled OLS Regressions using Federal Aid to States (Regressions One to Four).
Dependent Variable Total Fundraising (mil $) Share of Fundraising (%)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Challenger Fundraising 0.414 *** 0.401 ***
(in Millions of $) (0.047) (0.046)
Cash on Hand 1.013 *** 0.919 *** 2.377 *** 2.357 ***
(in Millions of $) (0.180) (0.181) (0.468) (0.473)
Total Pork Spending –0.000 –0.001
(in Millions of $) (0.001) (0.002)
Pork in Election Year 0.017 ** 0.008
(in Millions of $) (0.008) (0.015)
Pork Two Years Prior –0.008 –0.003
(in Millions of $) (0.009) (0.020)
Pork Four Years Prior 0.002 –0.015
(in Millions of $) (0.007) (0.016)
Previous Election Share –0.235 *** –0.231 *** 0.330 ** 0.317 **
(0.058) (0.057) (0.154) (0.155)
Terms 0.050 –0.049 1.227 1.342
(0.330) (0.328) (0.873) (0.885)
Senators in Same Party? –0.830 –1.230 7.699 *** 8.082 ***
(1.047) (1.044) (2.766) (2.817)
Female 3.267 *** 2.820 ** 0.367 1.062
(1.179) (1.203) (3.130) (3.189)
Democrat 1.239 1.185 –0.793 –0.636
(0.989) (0.977) (2.539) (2.556)
2004 Election –2.083 –4.067 *
(1.803) (2.075)
2006 Election –0.663 –2.983
(1.749) (1.988)
2008 Election –0.159 –2.626
(1.797) (2.013)
2010 Election –0.952 –2.447
(1.870) (2.103)
2012 Election –0.579 0.642
(1.985) (2.548)
2014 Election 1.069 0.451
(1.832) (1.977)
2016 Election 0.564 0.403
(1.797) (1.777)
Constant 21.743 *** 22.371 *** 47.503 *** 48.167 ***
(3.656) (3.603) (8.727) (8.733)
Observations 196 196 196 196
R-squared 0.494 0.514 0.256 0.262
F-statistic 11.71 *** 11.06 *** 9.25 *** 7.35 ***
Dependent Variables
Regressions One to Two: Total Fundraising by Incumbent (in millions of $)
Regressions Three to Four: Percentage of Fundraising by Incumbent
Standard errors in parentheses: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.
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Table 3. Pooled OLS Regressions using Federal Aid to States (Regressions Five to Eight).
Dependent Variable Total Fundraising (Mil $) Share of Fundraising (%)
Variable (5) (6) (7) (8)
Challenger Fundraising 0.763 *** 0.723 ***
(in Millions of $) (0.098) (0.085)
Cash on Hand 1.060 *** 0.671 *** 2.331 *** 2.510 ***
(in Millions of $) (0.200) (0.189) (0.610) (0.663)
Total Aid Spending 0.014 −0.499
(in Millions of $) (0.011) (0.033)
Aid in Election Year −0.925 *** −0.354
(in Millions of $) (0.299) (0.915)
Aid Two Years Prior 0.738 1.117
(in Millions of $) (0.586) (1.891)
Aid Four Years Prior 0.671 −1.107
(in Millions of $) (0.619) (1.995)
Previous Election Share −0.147 ** −0.103 * 0.282 0.299
(0.071) (0.061) (0.221) (0.226)
Terms −0.033 0.061 −0.393 −0.543
(0.380) (0.330) (1.205) (1.225)
Senators in Same Party? 2.104 1.215 10.043 ** 9.806 **
(1.375) (1.187) (4.263) (4.337)
Female 1.113 −0.666 −6.574 −6.871
(1.514) (1.330) (4.771) (4.895)
Democrat 0.770 0.302 3.040 3.686
(1.122) (0.983) (3.554) (3.623)
2004 Election −0.774 −1.786
(1.580) (1.527)
2006 Election −0.178 −2.985 *
(1.526) (1.600)
2008 Election 0.915 −1.156
(1.568) (1.530)
Constant 11.750 *** 10.650 54.353 *** 53.467
(4.233) (3.652) (12.216) (12.462)
Observations 101 101 101 101
R-squared 0.579 0.693 0.260 0.258
F-statistic 11.11 *** 15.12 4.66 *** 3.52 ***
Dependent Variables
Regressions Five to Six: Total Fundraising by Incumbent (in millions of $)
Regressions Seven to Eight: Percentage of Fundraising by Incumbent
Standard Errors in Parentheses: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.
This first set of results supports the three hypotheses laid out earlier. First, pork-barrel spending
can be used to advertise and credit-claim, as it was shown to positively impact an incumbent’s ability
to fundraise. Second, that the timing of the pork-barrel appropriations matter, as pork-barrel spending
appropriated during the election year had the largest impact. Third, general federal appropriations
does not have the same impact on fundraising that pork-barrel spending does, which demonstrates
that targeted expenditures is a potential tool that has powers that general aid spending does not.
3.4. Panel Estimates of Fundraising with Pork-Barrel Spending
Even though the pooled OLS results support the three hypotheses regarding the impact that
pork-barrel spending and appropriation spending have on fundraising, a panel approach was used as
a robustness check. I repeated the previous eight regressions using panel estimates. I continued to use
the election year binary variables in order to control for the election year. For example, the years after
the 2008 financial crisis would be associated with increased targeted and general spending, but donors
may have had less income from which to make donations.
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Table 4 gives the estimates for regressions nine to 12. The results are similar to the estimates from
regressions one to four, with only minor differences. First of all, the control variables in all four cases
continued to behave similarly to the pooled OLS regressions. Again, challenger fundraising, service
in the House of Representatives, the number of terms served, and being female are all significant
and positively correlated with total fundraising. Second, the regressions utilizing the total incumbent
fundraising variable continued to provide more robust results.
Table 4. Panel Regressions using Pork-Barrel Spending (Regressions Nine to 12).
Dependent Variable Total Fundraising (Mil $) Share of Fundraising (%)
Variable (9) (10) (11) (12)
Challenger Fundraising 0.319 *** 0.302 ***
(in Millions of $) (0.044) (0.044)
Cash on Hand 0.793 *** 0.632 ** 2.880 *** 2.666
(in Millions of $) (0.259) (0.262) (0.786) (0.794)
Total Pork Spending 0.002 ** 0.002
(in Millions of $) (0.001) (0.002)
Pork in Election Year 0.017 ** 0.008
(in Millions of $) (0.007) (0.015)
Pork Two Years Prior −0.006 0.011
(in Millions of $) (0.009) (0.022)
Pork Four Years Prior −0.005 −0.015
(in Millions of $) (0.006) (0.018)
Previous Election Share −0.185 *** −0.194 *** 0.035 0.028
(0.056) (0.056) (0.181) (0.183)
Terms 0.285 0.530 * 0.728 1.031
(0.337) (0.334) (1.048) (1.041)
Senators in Same Party? −1.050 −1.380 7.110 * 6.368
(1.178) (1.180) (3.728) (3.797)
Female 4.813 *** 4.562 *** 3.515 3.252
(1.355) (1.359) (4.306) (4.351)
Democrat 1.321 0.729 6.880* 6.903
(1.308) (1.290) (3.910) (3.907)
2004 Election −3.971 ** −5.752 ***
(1.587) (2.003)
2006 Election −2.442 * −3.842 **
(1.432) (1.894)
2008 Election −0.209 −1.994
(1.609) (2.050)
2010 Election −1.256 −2.102
(1.675) (2.107)
2012 Election −1.804 0.179
(1.658) (2.339)
2014 Election 1.199 1.440
(1.701) (1.874)
2016 Election −1.339 −1.889
(1.618) (1.623)
Constant 18.689 *** 20.903 *** 59.141 *** 60.969
(3.539) (3.470) (10.728) (10.562)
Observations 196 196 196 196
R-squared 0.497 0.507 0.198 0.167
F-statistic 8.62 *** 7.81 *** 3.56 *** 2.81 ***
Dependent Variables
Regressions Nine 10: Total Fundraising by Incumbent (in Millions of $)
Regressions 11 to 12: Percentage of Fundraising by Incumbent
Standard Errors in Parentheses: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% Significance Level.
Again, pork-barrel spending influences fundraising, but only when properly timed. Specifically,
when $1 million worth of pork-barrel money is brought into the state during the senator’s election
year, the senator is able to increase their fundraising by $17,000; that is, an additional dollar of
fundraising costs around $60 worth of pork-barrel money. A key difference between the panel results
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and pooled OLS results is that total pork-barrel spending is significant and positively correlated
with total fundraising. This indicates that pork-barrel spending throughout a senator’s entire term
does have a net positive effect on their fundraising. Additionally, pork-barrel spending continues to
influence the percent of fundraising by the incumbent, but only when properly timed.
3.5. Panel Estimates of Fundraising with Federal Aid
I continue the analysis by repeating the four fundraising regressions with a fixed-effects panel
estimation. Recall that this set of regressions utilized the federal aid variables instead of the pork-barrel
spending variables.
Table 5 gives the estimates for regressions 13 to 16. Again, the results are similar to the estimates
from regressions five to eight. The main difference is that the results are not as robust as the pooled
OLS estimates.
Table 5. Panel Regressions using Federal Aid (Regressions 13–16).
Dependent Variable Total Fundraising (Mil $) Share of Fundraising (%)
Variable (13) (14) (15) (16)
Challenger Fundraising 0.651 *** 0.665 ***
(in Millions of $) (0.110) (0.090)
Cash on Hand 0.270 0.145 3.379 *** 3.267 **
(in Millions of $) (0.342) (0.282) (1.268) (1.284)
Total Aid Spending −0.008 −0.022
(in Millions of $) (0.026) (0.099)
Aid in Election Year −1.737 *** −0.661
(in Millions of $) (0.242) (1.042)
Aid Two Years Prior 1.081 0.190
(in Millions of $) (0.851) (4.064)
Aid Four Years Prior 0.385 −0.393
(in Millions of $) (0.665) (2.964)
Previous Election Share −0.141 −0.079 −0.223 −0.123
(0.010) (0.081) (0.399) (0.410)
Terms 0.596 0.545 −0.168 −0.084
(0.500) (0.406) (1.978) (2.005)
Senators in Same Party? 3.237 2.748 8.823 7.597
(2.492) (2.026) (9.973) (10.166)
Female 4.334 * 3.807 ** −13.179 −13.632
(2.370) (1.901) (9.268) (9.102)
Democrat −1.906 −1.649 7.020 6.904
(2.133) (1.733) (8.075) (8.245)
2004 Election −1.251 −3.005 **
(1.486) (1.480)
2006 Election −0.197 −3.883 **
(1.668) (1.598)
2008 Election 1.690 −1.005
(1.550) (1.514)
Constant 12.236** 10.174* 81.996 *** 83.693 ***
(5.857) (5.863) (22.321) (26.403)
Observations 101 101 101 101
R-squared 0.598 0.749 0.181 0.200
F-statistic 5.55 *** 8.97 *** 1.41 1.19
Dependent Variables
Regressions 13 to 14: Total Fundraising by Incumbent (in millions of $)
Regressions 15 to 16: Percentage of Fundraising by Incumbent
Standard Errors in Parentheses: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% Significance Level.
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4. Discussion
Overall, the above results support the three hypotheses stated at the beginning of the paper. First,
pork-barrel spending can have a positive and significant impact on fundraising. Second, the timing
of the pork-barrel spending matters. To be specific, only pork-barrel spending in the election year
seems to have an impact on campaign contributions. Third, the relationship between federal aid to
states and incumbent fundraising is ambiguous; however, it is clear that the amount of fundraising per
dollar of pork-barrel spending is far greater than the amount of fundraising per dollar of federal aid.
This suggests that legislators should prefer pork-barrel spending over general appropriations for their
states, possibly because the former is more visible and easier to take credit for. It would be difficult for
a single senator to claim credit for a change in the entire Women, Infant, and Children (WIC) system
(unless they were actually responsible for a major change, but this is rare). However, a senator could
claim credit for a new highway, park, museum, or federal building in their state. This also lends
support to universalism hypothesis of Weingast (1994), which stated that politicians are likely to work
together on targeted spending bills, because it is in their respective fundraising interests to do so.
This shows that pork-barrel spending is used as a source of political capital for both politicians and
political entrepreneurs.
There are several variables that were not included in this study. First, some studies use per-capita
measures. This is problematic for several reasons. First, it does not allow for a simple interpretation of
the estimates. Instead of being able to estimate the number of dollars needed to increase fundraising
by $1, all of the values are based on the size of the population. More importantly, estimates of per
capita campaign spending are very weak.
Another possible change that could be made is to compare similar spending types. For example, I
could have compared the impact of pork-barrel spending when included in a transportation omnibus
bill compared to the impact of federal spending by the Department of Transportation. As previously
mentioned, senators have much less control over the amount of money spent by executive agencies of
the government. Therefore, incumbents can use pork-barrel spending to steer money to projects that
they believe will provide a greater personal benefit.
5. Conclusions
We again return to the work of (Mayhew 1974) and the tools utilized by members of Congress
to win re-election. This paper has demonstrated that incumbent senators can use their position to
appropriate targeted expenditures in return for political contributions. This allows senators to engage
in both credit-claiming and advertising. By taking credit for the pork-barrel money, they can use the
subsequent campaign donations to enhance the amount of advertising possible, further increasing
the likelihood of being re-elected. This also leads credence to the idea that political entrepreneurs
are able to manipulate incumbents, especially those in vulnerable seats. They can accomplish this
by rewarding incumbents with campaign dollars for targeted expenditures that directly benefit the
political entrepreneurs.
By extending past research by Krebs (2001), Samuels (2002), Bonneau (2007), and Stratmann (2013),
I was able to model and estimate an incumbent senator’s ability to fundraise for re-election. The main
novelty of the above estimates was the use of disaggregated pork-barrel appropriations. This furthers
the existing literature pertaining to the motivation that incumbents have to use a type of funding that
is often said to be inefficient.
In addition, the results are robust, as similar estimates are obtained using pooled OLS estimates
and fixed-effect panel estimates. The results also suggest that state federal appropriations may increase
fundraising by senators, although less so than targeted expenditures. This supports the hypothesis
that legislators prefer to use pork-barrel spending, all other things being equal, because the results are
more visible, easier to take credit for, and easier to direct to certain parties. Finally, as discussed earlier,
there is evidence that pork-barrel spending is used as political capital.
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This evidence also supports the claim that pork-barrel spending is used as a currency in the world
of political capitalism. Incumbents steer federal money to states and districts to support localized
projects. These projects directly benefit the particular businesses that win contracts associated with the
appropriation. The business owners then reward the incumbents with campaign donations, which can
be used to bolster their likelihood of re-election.
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Abstract: Local politicians and team owners frequently argue that the public financing of stadiums is
important for local economic development. The sports economics literature, however, has largely
found that new professional sport facilities do not generate any new net economic activity. We provide
context to this literature by exploring the public choice in the public financing of stadiums. In 2016,
San Diego had two ballot measures related to the San Diego Chargers. Measure C would allow
officials to raise hotel taxes to pay for a new downtown stadium for the Chargers. Measure D would
also raise hotel taxes, but explicitly prevented any money being spent on the Chargers. Both measures
failed to receive 50% of the votes cast. We find that zip codes with a higher voter turnout were
more likely to vote against both measures, highlighting the importance of the timing of referenda in
limiting the ability of clearly defined groups, such as Chargers fans, to have a large influence on the
voting outcome. Meanwhile, areas with more Trump voters were more likely to support higher taxes
for the purpose of building the Chargers a new stadium.
Keywords: voting behavior; National Football League; Donald Trump
JEL Classification: D72; Z20
1. Introduction
Professional sports stadiums have been largely publicly funded in recent decades
(Humphreys 2019). The public funding of stadiums is a topic of interest among economists and
are of policy relevance, due to the large costs associated with building stadiums (Matheson 2019).
The rationalization for public funding generally appears under the guise of economic growth,
such as economic expansion and job creation. This growth does not appear, suggesting that the
ability for professional sports to be a catalyst of economic growth has been overstated (Baade 1996).
While professional sports are not an engine of economic growth, support for professional sports
additionally comes from the potential social impacts. As stated in (Rosentraub 1996, p. 29), “Sports
is too important a part of Western society for us to think that cities can exist without the teams and
the events which define essential dimensions of our society and life.” The public funding of stadiums
has been partly responsible for stadiums returning to the city center, after decades of being located in
suburban areas (Chapin 1999). The San Diego Chargers attempted to construct a stadium in downtown
San Diego by securing public funding, through referenda included on the ballot during the 2016 US
presidential election.
Professional sport stadiums are largely publicly funded infrastructure projects that benefit the
owners and players, while providing no economic benefits to taxpayers (Baade 1996). The public
funding of stadium construction, combined with the lack of evidence in favor of net economic
benefits (Coates and Humphreys 2003a, 2003b, 2008), raises an important question: Why do voters
support or reject public financing of professional sports stadiums? We provide insight into this
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question using a public choice analysis of votes on public financing for a new football stadium for the
San Diego Chargers.
In 2016, on the same ballot as the US presidential election, the city of San Diego had two ballot
measures related to the financing of a new convention center in San Diego and whether the San Diego
Chargers of the National Football League would receive financing for a new stadium (Bonesteel 2016).
These measures were known as Measure C and Measure D (San Diego Registrar of Voters 2018).
Measure C was a downtown stadium initiative that would have raised the hotel occupancy tax by
six percentage points, primarily to fund a new convention center and a stadium for the Chargers
(Garrick 2016). Measure D was a response to Measure C being placed on the ballot (McSwain 2016).
While Measure D would have raised hotel taxes to possibly fund a new convention center, it was only
only by five percentage points (Showley 2016). The biggest difference, however, was that Measure D
explicitly prevented any public money being used for the construction of professional sports facilities
(Anderson 2016). Both measures failed at the ballot box, with both measures receiving under 45 percent
‘yes’ votes (Bonesteel 2016).
These two separate ballot measures, presented to San Diego voters at the same time, provide a
unique opportunity to better understand voter preferences with respect to public financing of sports
stadiums. In doing so, we contribute to the scholarly understanding of voter support for public
financing of sports stadiums (Ahlfeldt and Maennig 2012; Brown and Paul 1999; Coates and Wicker
2015; Friedman and Mason 2004). Our findings highlight the importance of the public choice literature
on electoral timing (Anzia 2011; Dunne et al. 1997; Holcombe and Kenny 2008; Meredith 2009), given
that we find that a higher voter turnout is associated with fewer ‘yes’ votes. Having these referenda on
the ballot at the same time as a Presidential election almost certainly reduced the likelihood of getting
a majority of cast votes for either measure.
Our brief empirical paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides additional information on the
San Diego ballot measures. Section 3 discusses our data and empirical approach, which builds off the
public choice and sports economics literature on referendums. We present our empirical results in
Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
2. The San Diego Referenda
Founded in 1960, the Chargers played in Los Angeles for one season before moving to San
Diego (Nunn and Rosentraub 1997). The team began playing in Qualcomm Stadium, now called the
San Diego County Credit Union Stadium, in 1967 (Peach 2004). With an aging stadium, ranked among
the worst in the NFL (Chase 2015), the Chargers pushed for a new stadium in San Diego. During the
2016 US presidential election, two measures appeared on the ballot regarding a new stadium for the
San Diego Chargers (Schrotenboer 2016).
Measure C provided funding for a new stadium in downtown San Diego by raising the transient
occupancy (i.e., hotel) tax six percentage points, from 10.5 to 16.5, with five-sixths of the fund
being used for the new convention center and stadium (Schrotenboer 2016). A two percentage
point assessment, which hotels charge to fund a tourism marketing district, would be eliminated
(Lewis 2015). One-sixth of the tax increase would be placed into an existing San Diego Tourism and
Marketing Fund. The tax increase would be decreased to three percentage points if the construction of
the new stadium was not completed within two years, following the last home game in Qualcomm
Stadium, or if all city bonds are re-paid, among other reasons. The stadium would seat 65,000 and
be expandable to 75,000; the convention center would contain over 300,000 square feet of meeting
space (Hazinski and Cotte 2016). The measure would fund $1.15 of $1.8 billion of the cost of stadium
initiative for land acquisition, construction of the convention center, and construction of the integrated
joint use portion. The remaining $650 million would be allotted to the construction of the stadium,
being privately funded by the Chargers. In addition to the $650 million contribution, the Chargers
would be required to give a 30-year commitment to play in the stadium, thus committing to the city of
San Diego (Nelson 2016).
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Arguments given in favor of Measure C included: No new taxes imposed on San Diego residents,
the city overseeing the stadiums design, construction, and operations, and jobs will be created
(Nelson 2016). The amount of jobs created were claimed to include 17,000 during construction, as well
as 3000 permanent jobs (Sklar 2016). Arguments against included: Taxes should be used for other
purposes, worsening San Diego’s parking and traffic situation, and hurting tourism in San Diego
(Hazinski and Cotte 2016). Sports have been shown to worsen traffic conditions, and the new stadium
would be moving into an already congested area (Humphreys and Pyun 2018). Also, large conventions,
such as the San Diego Comic-Con, were opposed to the measure (Cate et al. 2016). The Comic-Con
preferred an expansion of the current convention center in San Diego, instead of a new convention
center in a different area of San Diego.
Measure D would utilize an increase in transient occupancy taxes to fund a downtown convention
center, but not a stadium, prohibiting the use of public funds on construction of a new stadium
without a public vote (Anderson 2016). Hotels with 30 or more rooms, recreational vehicle parks, and
campgrounds would see an increase of five percentage points, while hotels with fewer than 30 rooms
would see an increase of 3.5 percentage points (San Diego City Attorney 2016). The measure would
also allow for the sale of Qualcomm Stadium to one or more colleges or universities in San Diego, or
the San Diego River Conservancy. While a stadium was not to be funded by the measure, it would
allow for a sports facility to be combined with the convention center. It could also permit a new facility
to be built in Mission Valley, the area where Qualcomm Stadium was located.
Ultimately, both measures failed to convince a majority of voters that they should be passed.
Measure C garnered only 44% support and Measure D also failed, with only 41% support
(Garrick 2016). Across the city, however, there were very different vote totals, suggesting that some
concerns (such as traffic) might have been more salient for some voters than others. With the measures
failing, the Chargers found another option by moving to Los Angeles, beginning in the 2017 NFL
season (Pelissero 2017). Following the completion of the Los Angeles Stadium at Hollywood park, the
Chargers and Rams will share the privately-funded venue (Chavez 2018).
3. Data and Empirical Approach
To better understand why San Diego voters vetoed both measures related to the San
Diego Chargers (and a new convention center), we employ an empirical median voter model
(Holcombe 1989). This model has been used extensively, in the sports economics literature, to better
understand the factors influencing public support for stadium financing and mega-events, such as the
Olympics. For example, Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2012) showed that voting in Munich, Germany for an
Allianz Arena exhibited a Not In My Backyard (NIMBY) character, where voters further away from the
stadium construction site were more supportive. Coates and Humphreys (2006) and Horn et al. (2015)
showed that voters in closer proximity to the stadium site were more supportive of the stadium being
built. Coates and Wicker (2015) found that areas with high rates of unemployment tended to be in
favor of putting in a bid for the Olympics.
As is typical in empirical median voter models (Hall and Karadas 2018; Matti and Zhou 2017),
a linear regression is used with the percentage of voters that voted yes as the dependent variable.
Measures C and D both had similar voting outcomes in aggregate, but are different at the sub-city
level. The linear model estimated is:
VoterSupporti = β1Populationi + β2Votingi + ei, (1)
where the dependent variable VoterSupport can represent the percentage of ‘yes’ votes on Measure C,
percentage of ‘yes’ votes on Measure D, or the difference between support for Measure C and Measure
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D. Vote data was retrieved from San Diego Registrar of Voters (2018) at the voting precinct level, and
aggregated up to the zip code level using precinct maps from the County of San Diego.1
Population includes various demographic characteristics representing the preferences of the
median voter. These variables were chosen based on the previous literature and concerns raised in
public debate over the measures. Variables include per capita income; population (log); median home
value; the percentage of the population that is foreign-born, white, and male; a dummy variable, equal
to one if the zip code contained the proposed stadium/convention center or was adjacent to it; and
average commute time.
All demographic data was obtained from the American Community Survey (ACS 2011–2015
five-year data profiles) at the zip code level. Per capita income, median home value, and population
are used to control for zip code size and income differences. Foreign-born population is included,
due to San Diego’s proximity to the border between Mexico and the United States, and potential
preference differences for professional football versus other sports, such as soccer. The motivation for
average commute time comes from the work of Humphreys and Pyun (2018) on congestion, related
to professional baseball games. Proximity is used because of its usage in similar research on stadium
finance voting and the potential externalities related to living near a professional sports stadium
(Coates and Humphreys 2006). Percentage of the population that is white and male provide further
demographic controls, possibly related to preferences for professional football. The correlation between
more % male and proximity to the proposed stadium is 0.52.
Voting includes the percentage of voters who voted for Donald Trump in the presidential election
and voter turnout rate, both from the same time as Measures C and D. These two additional variables,
from San Diego Registrar of Voters (2018), were added to address voter preferences and engagement.
The percentage of the votes for Donald Trump in the presidential election is included to control for any
possible partisan views on public financing of sports stadiums. The variation on this variable across
zip codes ranges from 9.41% to 46.72%. Voter turnout—that is, the percentage of registered voters that
voted in the election—is added to deal with differences in voter engagement and interest across zip codes.
Voter turnout is correlated with per capita income at 0.76. Voter turnout can be important, due to the
fact that low turnout can lead to a greater special interest influence (Dunne et al. 1997; Meredith 2009).
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary Statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Percent Voted Yes on Measure C 43.90 6.19 32.90 55.90
Percent Voted Yes on Measure D 41.18 5.22 33.66 51.72
Difference Between Measure C & D Support 2.72 6.74 −10.68 17.91
Per Capita Income (000s) 38.54 16.40 12.11 79.00
Proximity 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Population (log) 10.21 0.74 7.31 11.09
Percent of Population that is Foreign-born 24.67 9.97 6.10 45.00
Commute Time 23.31 2.58 19.20 28.30
Median Home Value (000s) 544.32 244.30 253.20 1200.00
Percent of Population that is White 67.23 16.89 22.40 91.40
Percent of Population that is Male 50.27 2.97 45.30 59.20
Percent Voted for Donald Trump 28.08 9.97 9.41 46.72
Voter Turnout Rate 80.65 6.45 63.63 89.86
Observations 34
1 Voting precincts do not perfectly map onto zip code boundaries, but very few precincts spanned multiple zip codes, thus
measurement error is minimized.
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4. Empirical Results
Table 2 presents the results of our ordinary least-squares regressions, with percentage of ‘yes’
votes on Measure C as the dependent variable. The regressions are broken into three important
parts. In column (1), the baseline results include population characteristics. Characteristics include
population, median home value, per capita income, and the percentage of the population that is
male, white, or foreign-born. This baseline reveals no significant results for any of the population
characteristics at conventional levels. Proximity and commute time are added in column (2). Average
commute time appears as a positive and significant variable. This is surprising, as traffic congestion
was cited as a reason to oppose the measure, and Humphreys and Pyun (2018) showed that congestion
is increased by professional sports. More congestion would presumably increase average commute
time, but perhaps areas with longer commute times preferred to see the stadium located downtown
and not elsewhere in the city.
Table 2. Regression Results: Percent Voted Yes on Measure C.
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Population (log) −1.56725 −1.37962 −0.18548
(−0.98) (−1.00) (−0.20)
Percent of Population that is Foreign-born 0.25765 0.11438 0.10184
(1.80) (0.87) (1.01)
Percent of Population that is White −0.01542 −0.00323 0.12049 *
(−0.19) (−0.04) (2.38)
Percent of Population that is Male −0.00089 0.58415 0.53991
(−0.00) (1.48) (1.69)
Median Home Value (000s) −0.00665 −0.00653 −0.00781
(−0.58) (−0.65) (−1.16)




Commute Time 1.33486 ** 0.98432 **
(3.18) (3.29)
Percent Voted for Donald Trump 0.46407 ***
(5.62)
Voter Turnout Rate −0.92239 **
(−3.75)
Observations 34 34 34
R2 0.303 0.516 0.817
Notes: *: p < 0.1; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01. t statistics in parentheses. Constant included, but not reported.
In the final column of Table 2, variables regarding political affiliation and voter turnout rate
are added. Each voting variable is significant, with zip codes with higher support for Trump being
more likely to support Measure C. A higher voter turnout rate was associated with less support of
Measure C.
Support for Measure D was tested using the same process as Measure C, with results being
displayed in Table 3. The baseline results for Measure D support indicate that the percent of the
population that is foreign-born and the percent male are significant and positive, while per capita
income is significant and negative. These results hold when adding proximity and commute time in
column (2), but lose significance when adding voting variables. Upon adding the voting variable in
column (3), voting on Measure D is very different; with the only similarity being that zip codes with
higher voter turnout were less likely to vote for the measure. Areas with more Trump voters were
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less likely to vote in support of Measure D, all other things being equal. This is surprising, given that
Measure D was colloquially known as the “Citizens’ plan” for its seemingly pro-taxpayer provisions
and constraints on public financing of stadium construction, especially as compared to Measure C.
However, Measure D still involved a tax increase and expansion of the convention center, which are
two of the reasons why it was opposed by the San Diego County Taxpayers Association.
When compared to voting on Measure C, our results suggest that Trump voters were against tax
increases for these public projects; but, if taxes were going to be raised, they wanted the Chargers to be
part of the deal. That is why it is important to remember that these coefficients represent the effect
of the variable holding everything else constant and one of the biggest differences between Measure
C and Measure D was the restriction on public funding of sports stadiums without explicit voter
approval through a referendum. The final interesting thing to note from the vote on Measure D is that
proximity to the expanded convention center/home of the Chargers under Measure C is negatively
related to voting ‘yes’ on Measure D.
Table 3. Regression Results: Percent Voted Yes on Measure D.
(1) (2) (3)
Population (log) −0.621 −0.547 −0.504
(−0.73) (−0.64) (−1.22)
Percent of Population that is Foreign-born 0.257 ** 0.217 * 0.038
(3.36) (2.68) (0.86)
Percent of Population that is White 0.049 0.049 −0.011
(1.11) (1.10) (−0.51)
Percent of Population that is Male 0.602 ** 0.719 ** 0.072
(3.06) (2.95) (0.51)
Median Home Value (000s) 0.001 0.001 −0.005
(0.21) (0.18) (−1.76)
Per Capita Income (000s) −0.213 * −0.201 * 0.020
(−2.31) (−2.15) (0.35)
Proximity −0.322 −1.677 *
(−0.20) (−2.24)
Commute Time 0.372 0.125
(1.43) (0.93)
Percent Voted for Donald Trump −0.316 ***
(−8.57)
Voter Turnout Rate −0.258 *
(−2.36)
Observations 34 34 34
R2 0.719 0.740 0.949
Notes: *: p < 0.1; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01. t statistics in parentheses. Constant included, but not reported.
With results differing between support for Measure C and Measure D, the within-zip code
difference between voting on Measures C and D is tested. The difference between support for Measures
C and D possibly captures fans of the San Diego Chargers. The results shown in Table 4 indicate
that areas with longer commute times had a greater differential (votes for Measure C higher than
Measure D).
Given that the reversion level was the Chargers possibly staying in Qualcomm, instead of leaving
for Los Angeles, this could reflect that many suburban commuters did not want to commute downtown
to attend Chargers games. Areas with a higher percentage of white voters had a preference for Measure
C over D, all other things being equal. Trump voters overwhelmingly preferred C to D. Finally, zip
codes with a higher voter turnout saw the difference between votes on Measure C and D shrink. Given
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the negative coefficients on voter turnout in the Measure C and Measure D specifications, this finding
seems to confirm that higher voter turnout is bad for publicly-funded stadiums. This is consistent
with the literature on low voter turnout being better for clearly-defined groups, such as Chargers fans
(Anzia 2011; Dunne et al. 1997; Meredith 2009).
Table 4. Regression Results: Difference Between Measure C and Measure D.
(1) (2) (3)
Population (log) −0.946 −0.832 0.319
(−0.50) (−0.45) (0.38)
Percent of Population that is Foreign-born 0.000 −0.103 0.064
(0.00) (−0.59) (0.69)
Percent of Population that is White −0.064 −0.052 0.132 **
(−0.66) (−0.54) (2.86)
Percent of Population that is Male −0.603 −0.135 0.467
(−1.38) (−0.26) (1.60)
Median Home Value (000s) −0.008 −0.008 −0.003
(−0.58) (−0.57) (−0.41)




Commute Time 0.963 0.860 **
(1.72) (3.15)
Percent Voted for Donald Trump 0.780 ***
(10.37)
Voter Turnout Rate −0.664 **
(−2.97)
Observations 34 34 34
R2 0.172 0.272 0.872
Notes: **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01. t statistics in parentheses. Constant included, but not reported.
The results in Table 4 highlight the importance of the timing of the referenda. Had the referenda
been included in an election that induced a lower voter turnout rate than the 2016 US presidential
election, San Diego Chargers fans could have dictated the outcome of the results.
5. Conclusions
The San Diego Chargers are now the Los Angeles Chargers. This is, in no small part, due to the
failure of the Chargers to secure public financing for a new stadium in downtown San Diego through
Measure C. Using zip code-level voting data, we find that areas with more Trump voters were in favor
of public subsidies for the Chargers. When looking at the vote on Measure D which prevented public
funding from going to sports stadiums, we find that Trump voters were against higher taxes for only
an expanded convention center.
Our other important finding is the importance of voter turnout. Zip codes with higher turnout
were less likely to vote for Measures C and D. Dunne et al. (1997), among others, showed how low voter
turnout enhanced the ability of special interests to get their preferred policies passed at the ballot box.
Our results are consistent with this literature and highlight how the timing of these measures—that is,
being at the same time as a Presidential election—likely depressed the percentage voting in favor of
each measure. Given that Measure C required the approval of two-thirds of the voters to become law
(a requirement in California for tax increases that have a specific use), the higher voter turnout likely
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influenced the outcome. In other settings, however, the timing of stadium funding referenda might
matter for the eventual outcome.
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Abstract: The 2017 U.S. Senate Special Election in Alabama, which was decided on 12 December 2017,
was one of the most contentious and scandal-laden political campaigns in recent memory.
The Republican candidate, Roy Moore, gained notoriety during the 2017 campaign when a number
of women alleged to national media that as teenagers they were subject to sexual advances by Moore,
who was then in his early 30s and serving as a local assistant district attorney. The process and results
of this particular election provide the heretofore unexamined impact of political scandal on localism
or friends-and-neighbors voting in political contests. Based on data from the 2017 special election in
Alabama, econometric results presented here suggest that a candidate who is embroiled in political
scandal suffers an erosion in the usual friends-and-neighbors effect on his or her local vote share.
In this particular case, the scandal hanging over Moore eroded all of the friends-and-neighbors effect
that would have been expected (e.g., about five percentage points) in his home county, as well as about
40% of the advantage Moore had at home over his opponent in terms of constituent political ideology.
Keywords: friends-and-neighbors voting; localism in elections; reputation capital; political scandal
JEL Classification: D70; D72
1. Introduction
The 2017 U.S. Senate Special Election in Alabama, which was decided on 12 December 2017,
encompassed one of the most contentious and scandal-laden political campaigns in recent memory.
The election was won by the Democratic candidate, Doug Jones, a lawyer from Birmingham. Jones
defeated Roy Moore, the Republican candidate from Gadsden, who had previously served as
Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court. Given the political intrigue that accompanied the
campaign, during which Moore faced accusations of sexual improprieties, the process and results
of this particular 2017 election provide an opportunity to explore the impact of political scandal
on friends-and-neighbors voting (or localism) in election contests. More specifically, the present
study fills a void in the public choice literature on localism (e.g., see Lewis-Beck and Rice 1983;
Rice and Macht 1987; Kjar and Laband 2002; Disarro et al. 2007; Mixon 2013) by exploring how political
scandal impacts the friends-and-neighbors advantage that typically accrues to local candidates in
situations not involving political scandal.
Aside from the possibility that political scandal does not impact friends-and-neighbors voting,
scandals, such as that faced by Moore, may lead to intensified support for the local candidate, as his
or her constituents refuse to believe accusations of scandal and instead rally behind the candidate.
On the other hand, local constituents may find allegations of scandal credible, and as a result they
may opt to support the local candidate’s rival in an effort to mitigate the higher expected agency costs
from electing an untrustworthy representative. Results from a decomposition approach presented in
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this study suggest that the latter effect prevailed in the 2017 U.S. Senate Special Election in Alabama,
as the political scandal that hung over Moore during the final weeks of the campaign eroded all the
friends-and-neighbors effect that would have been expected (e.g., about five percentage points) in his
home county. Moreover, in this case, the harshness of the political scandal reduced, by about 40%,
the advantage Moore had at home over his opponent in terms of constituent political ideology.
2. Conceptual Framework and Prior Literature
Before turning to the empirical results mentioned above, this section of the study provides both a
conceptual framework for studying the impact of political scandal on friends-and-neighbors voting
and a review of prior studies on localism in elections. The conceptual framework includes a brief
discussion of the agency costs of representative democracy, while the review of prior studies focuses on
the stream of literature that includes estimates of the friends-and-neighbors effect in electoral contests
in the U.S.
2.1. Conceptual Framework
As Kjar and Laband (2002) assert, voters reduce the agency costs of representative democracy
simply by electing family members into office or by voting for individuals who have lived for many
years in their respective political jurisdictions.1 Home grown candidates offer an advantage to voters
as they have relatively larger endowments of human capital in the form of information about the
conditions of the local political jurisdiction and of the electorate’s desires than do more distant
candidates (Faith and Tollison 1983; Kjar and Laband 2002).2 Moreover, voters face lower search costs
with regard to the discovery of candidates’ attributes in the case of local candidates. Lastly, given that
“firing” representatives is costly, if not impossible (e.g., see Mixon 2000), voters will rationally prefer
candidates with longstanding ties to the district as these candidates implicitly put more human and
other capital at risk as a Klein and Leffler (1981) type of performance bond than do non-local candidates
with fewer ties to the political jurisdiction (Kjar and Laband 2002). As Kjar and Laband (2002) assert,
voters understand and appreciate the implied efficiency of casting their ballots in favor of a candidate
who has much to lose locally from nonperformance in his or her capacity as an elected official.
In terms of political scandal, such as that faced by Moore in 2017, it may be the case that
a candidate’s friends and neighbors are unfazed by the allegations, and the effect of localism in
this situation is similar to that in elections that are untainted by political scandal. Alternatively,
the candidate’s constituents may be unwilling to believe the allegations and, in response to the scandal,
intensify their support for the local candidate. Thus, in this case, the scandal augments the traditional
friends-and-neighbors effect. Lastly, it is also possible that the candidate’s constituents do believe the
allegations and that they respond by rallying behind his or her political opponent in an attempt to
either punish the candidate, in the case of an incumbent, for betraying their trust, or to prevent the
candidate, in the case of a challenger, from reaching a position from which to cause them to suffer
political harm and/or to engage in costly monitoring efforts (i.e., to be exposed to agency costs).
2.2. Prior Literature
Academic research on localism in politics began with the pioneering work of Key and Heard (1949),
and extends to a series of more recent empirical studies. In the first of these, Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983)
find, using data from U.S. presidential elections from 1884 through to 1980, that candidates receive four
percentage points more support from voters in their home states than they do in other states. Later,
Rice and Macht (1987) come close to replicating this result in their analysis of U.S. gubernatorial
1 See Sass (1992) for an excellent discussion of the costs associated with constitutional choice in representative democracy.
2 Alternatively, problems associated with asymmetric information are not as severe for friends and neighbors (i.e., local
constituents) as they are for more distant constituents.
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and Senate elections from 1976 through to 1982, as county-level data in that study suggest a
friends-and-neighbors voting effect of about 3.7 percentage points. These two early studies laid the
foundation for a twenty-first century renaissance in the academic literature on friends-and-neighbors
voting that includes the study by Kjar and Laband (2002). These authors examined election returns
from the 1998 election for Alabama’s Third Congressional District, finding a friends-and-neighbors
voting effect ranging from 8.2 to 12.4 percentage points of the overall vote share. These numbers are
larger than that found in Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983), and likely reflect a greater “closeness” between
the candidates and constituencies associated with elections in U.S. Congressional districts vis-à-vis
those held statewide.
As indicated in Table 1, the study by Kjar and Laband (2002) is followed by a series of studies
of U.S. presidential elections.3 Mixon and Tyrone (2004), for example, find, in their examination of
U.S. presidential elections from 1972 through to 2000, a friends-and-neighbors voting effect ranging
from 5.2 to 6.7 percentage points, while Disarro et al. (2007) present a percentage point estimate
of 5.1 in their analysis of election returns data from 1880 through to 2004. Additional analyses of
U.S. presidential elections from 1972 through to 2004 by Mixon et al. (2008) and Kahane (2009)
produce percentage point estimates of the home state effect ranging from 4.9 to 7.7, and from 2.4 to 9.3,
respectively. Lastly, Mixon (2013) takes a novel approach to the subject by exploring home grown-ness
in the 1940 and 1944 presidential elections using countywide returns from Georgia, where incumbent
U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt spent significant portions of his time in Warm Springs seeking
warm water therapy for polio. That study finds that in Meriwether County, where Warm Springs is
located, and in its bordering counties, Roosevelt’s vote share was about 7.8 percentage points greater
than it was in Georgia’s other counties.
Table 1. Friends-and-neighbors effect estimates from prior studies.
Study Subject Friends-and-Neighbors Effect a
Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983) U.S. Presidential Elections, 1884–1980 4.0
Rice and Macht (1987) U.S. Gubernatorial and Senate Elections, 1976–1982 3.7
Kjar and Laband (2002) Alabama’s 3rd Congressional District, 1998 8.2–12.4
Mixon and Tyrone (2004) U.S. Presidential Elections, 1972–2000 5.2–6.7
Disarro et al. (2007) U.S. Presidential Elections, 1880–2004 5.1
Kahane (2009) U.S. Presidential Elections, 1972–2004 2.4–9.3
Mixon et al. (2008) U.S. Presidential Elections, 1972–2004 4.9–7.7
Mixon (2013) U.S. Presidential Elections, 1940–1944 7.8
a Friends-and neighbors effect is measured in percentage points.
The current study follows Mixon (2013) in extending the literature on friends-and-neighbors
voting by analyzing election returns from a statewide race—that of the 2017 U.S. Senate Special Election
in Alabama—pitting Republican candidate, Roy Moore, against Democratic candidate, Doug Jones.
Of interest here is the intense national focus on the scandal in Moore’s personal life, including various
allegations of sexual misconduct, which, in some cases, involved a minor. One would expect that
the electoral boost from friends-and-neighbors support, or localism, is eroded by political scandal,
as some, if not many, of a candidate’s local political supporters abandon him or her in response to
their concerns related to facing higher agency costs. Thus, if one takes the friends-and-neighbors effect
estimated by Mixon et al. (2008) of five percentage points (see Table 1) as a baseline, one would expect
political scandal would reduce that to something less than five percentage points. Quantifying this
expected erosion is the aim of this study. Before turning to this analysis, the next section of the study
offers a primer on the scandalous nature of this particular political contest.
3 As the current study tests elements of friends and neighbors voting in a U.S. election, this particular section focuses only on
empirical studies that examine U.S. elections.
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3. Alabama’s 2017 U.S. Senate Special Election: A Primer
Shortly after taking the oath as U.S. Attorney General in 2017, Alabamian, Jeff Sessions’,
U.S. Senate seat was turned over to Alabama Attorney General, Luther Strange, and preliminary
discussions began regarding a special election to replace Sessions on a permanent basis
(Smilowitz 2017). That decision was made by Alabama’s Republican Governor, Kay Ivey, in late
April of 2017 when 12 December 2017 was chosen as the date for the special election (Andone 2017).
Less than one week after Ivey’s announcement, Roy Moore, a resident of Etowah County and Chief
Justice of Alabama’s Supreme Court, resigned from his position and announced his intention to
compete against Strange, who, in December of 2016, stated his desire to permanently replace Sessions,
even before being nominated to hold the position on a temporary basis (Cason 2016, 2017).4
The Republican contest garnered national attention throughout the period leading up to the
primary election in September of 2017. That process culminated in an election-eve rally in Alabama,
and Moore’s victory in the Republican primary (Borchers 2017). Any celebration by Moore and
his campaign team was short-lived, however, as Leigh Corfman, a 53 year old customer service
representative at a payday loan business, alleged to national media in early November 2017 that as a
14 year old she met Moore, who was in his early 30s and working as a local assistant district attorney,
for the first time outside of a courtroom in Etowah County, Alabama. That meeting prompted what
Corfman alleged was initiation by Moore of a sexual encounter (McCrummen et al. 2017). Corfman’s
was not the only allegation of such behavior, as three other women, who were between the ages of 16
and 18 at the time Moore was in his early 30s, told The Washington Post during the weeks leading up to
Corfman’s allegation that they too had been pursued by Moore (McCrummen et al. 2017).
By 5 December 2017, one week before the special election, at least nine women had accused
Moore of inappropriate sexual behavior (Quinn 2017), causing Moore’s candidacy to unravel. That
trend continued through to 12 December 2017, when Doug Jones, a resident of Jefferson County and
an Alabama attorney who had (relatively) quietly won the Democratic primary, defeated Moore
in the general election by almost 22,000 votes, taking 50.8% of the major party vote share in a
Republican-leaning state. On 28 December 2017, Ivey certified the special election results, nullifying a
legal challenge by Moore, who had not conceded the race (Blinder 2017).
4. Econometric Model and Estimation Results
4.1. Econometric Model
This study takes an approach to modeling friends-and-neighbors voting that is similar to that
in the series of studies, beginning with Kjar and Laband (2002), presented in Table 1. As such,
the specification below:
Moore Vote Sharei = α + β1log Per Capita Incomei + β2% College Graduatei + β3%
Povertyi + β4% Blacki + β5Electorate Ideologyi + β6Moore Homei + εi,
(1)
where the dependent variable, Moore Vote Sharei, is equal to the two-party vote share (percent) in
Alabama county i captured by the Republican candidate, Roy Moore. This specification is proposed as
a foundation for a decomposition approach that is discussed later in the study. Among the regressors in
(1) are four demographic variables—log Per Capita Incomei, % College Graduatei, % Povertyi, and % Blacki.
The first of these is the natural logarithm of per capita income in the county, i, the second is the percent
county i’s population holding a college degree, while the third is the percent of county i’s population
living at or below the poverty level. Given the Democratic Party’s traditional affiliation with working
4 That nomination process was further contested when, in mid-May of 2017, U.S. Representative Mo Brooks announced his
candidacy (Hrynkiw 2017).
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class voters, estimates of β1, β2, and β3 are expected to be negatively signed. Support for Democratic
candidates among black voters is also traditionally high, and more so in the case of this particular
election given that a victory by Moore would be seen to further advance U.S. President Donald Trump’s
political agenda. As such, Blacki, which is the percent of county i’s population that is accounted for by
black residents, is expected to retain a negatively-signed parameter estimate.
Next, as a measure of political leaning of the constituents of the county, i, Electorate Ideologyi
is included on the right-hand side of (1). This variable is equal to the 2016 countywide vote share
(percent) for incumbent U.S. Senator, Richard Shelby, a Republican, and it serves as a baseline for how
conservative the voters are in a given county, i. As such, it is expected that the parameter estimate
for β5 will be positive as conservative Alabamians are more likely to support Moore, ceteris paribus.
Finally, Moore Homei is a dummy variable equal to 1 if county, i, represents Moore’s home county,
and 0 otherwise. As indicated earlier, the estimate for β6 will be greater than zero if local constituents
are unfazed by the allegations of scandal, or if they are unwilling to believe such allegations and,
in response, intensify their support for Moore. This study posits, however, that the allegations were
of such an extreme nature (i.e., inappropriate, and perhaps illegal, sexual behavior) that they were
believed by a large portion of the local constituency, who became distrustful of Moore and concerned
about the additional agency costs he might impose on them as a U.S. Representative. These concerns,
coupled with the smaller gap on a unidimensional ideological spectrum between Republicans and
Democrats in a state, such as Alabama (as opposed to states, such as New York or California), it is
expected that the estimate of β6 will be negative, as local constituents turn to Jones.
4.2. Estimation Results
To estimate (1), data from Alabama’s 67 counties are collected.5 Summary statistics (i.e., means
and standard deviations) are presented in Table 2. Although not included, the mean of Moore Vote
Sharei is 54.9, with a standard deviation of 19.2. In terms of the regressors, the average income across
the 67 Alabama’s counties is about $40,000, approximately 16.5% of each county’s population holds a
college degree, while about 22% of the typical county’s residents live at or beneath the poverty level.
Additionally, about 28.5% of the typical county’s population is accounted for by black residents. Based
on the political ideology variable, the state’s voters lean conservative in national elections. As indicated
in Table 2, the typical countywide election in 2016 produced about a 65% vote share for the Republican
candidate, Richard Shelby.




% College Graduate % Poverty % Black Electorate Ideology
log Per Capita Income 10.6[0.2] +0.633 −0.898 −0.644 +0.608
% College Graduate 16.7[7.0] • −0.418 −0.041 −0.035
% Poverty 22.0[6.6] • • +0.807 −0.788
% Black 28.6[22.3] • • • −0.974
Electorate Ideology 64.7[18.4] • • • •
5 Demographic data are collected from us-places.com, alabamapossible.org and al.com. Elections results are collected from
al.com and The New York Times.
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Pearson correlation coefficients are also presented in Table 2. These indicate that the variable log
Per Capita Income is relatively highly correlated with each of the other four regressors included in the
table, and that Electorate Ideology is relatively highly correlated with three of the other four regressors.
Additionally, two variables—% Poverty and % Black—display a strongly positive association. As such,
OLS estimation of (1) above is likely to exhibit some of the negative effects (e.g., incorrectly signed
regression coefficients and/or insignificant regression coefficients) of multicollinearity.
To explore the potential impact of collinearity among some of the variables, Table 3 presents OLS
estimation results from three separate restricted specifications of the model in (1) above. Version (1),
which includes only log Per Capita Income, % Poverty, % Black, and Moore Home, is jointly significant at
the 0.01 level, while it produces an R2 of 0.909. In this case, log Per Capita Income is negatively signed
and significant, as expected, while both % Poverty and % Black retain negatively-signed coefficient
estimates, as expected, with the latter reaching statistical significance.6 The insignificance of at least one
of these two variables, which in this case is % Poverty, is unsurprising given the relatively large Pearson
correlation coefficient between them of +0.807. Lastly, the variable, Moore Home, is negatively-signed
and significant, representing a departure from prior studies discussed above and summarized in
Table 1. The result suggests that Moore’s vote share in his home county is about 5.2 percentage points
lower than that in the other Alabama counties, ceteris paribus.
Table 3. Summary of OLS results.
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant
350.3 * 93.61 * −11.32 * −4.093
(4.13) (23.50) (−6.92) (−0.11)
log Per Capita Income −25.04 * −1.595
(−3.31) (−0.50)
% College Graduate −0.719 * −0.301 *
(−7.22) (−3.65)
% Poverty −0.215 −0.213 0.247
(−0.71) (−1.17) (1.77)
% Black
−0.908 * −0.769 * 0.041
(−17.22) (−14.57) (0.90)
Electorate Ideology 1.025 * 1.149 *
(42.09) (17.69)
Moore Home
−5.231 * −5.899 * −2.985 * −2.765 *
(−5.80) (−7.85) (−5.66) (−8.74)
F-statistic 155.4 * 227.7 * 718.5 * 690.6 *
R2 0.909 0.936 0.957 0.986
Notes: The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates above are robust t-ratios (White 1980). * denotes
the 0.05 level of significance.
Version (2) of Table 3 substitutes % College Graduate for log Per Capita Income.7 Here, % College
Graduate is negatively signed and significant, as expected, while the results for % Poverty, % Black,
and Moore Home are similar to those found in version (1) of Table 3. The third restricted specification,
which is presented in version (3) of Table 3, includes only Constituent Ideology and Moore Home, thus,
creating a “political model” (versus the demographic-oriented models in version 1 and 2 of Table 3)
6 The coefficient estimate attached to % Black suggests that a four percentage point increase in the percent of a county’s
population comprised of black residents leads to a 3.5 percentage point decrease, ceteris paribus, in Moore’s vote share in
that county.
7 The Pearson correlation coefficient between these two variables is +0.633. This specification is jointly significant at the
0.01 level, while it produces an R2 of 0.936.
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of voting in this 2017 special election.8 In this case, the positively-signed and statistically significant
parameter estimate attached to Constituent Ideology suggests that Moore benefited, ceteris paribus,
from the conservative preferences of the local constituency. Also, in this case, the size of the parameter
estimate attached to Moore Home of −2.985 is about one-half of that (in absolute value) found in either
version (1) or version (2).
Lastly, the results from the unrestricted specification in (1) are found in the final column of Table 3.
This version is jointly significant at the 0.01 level, while it produces an R2 of 0.986, which is quite
remarkable for the cross-section data employed here. In terms of individual results, although the
result for Electorate Ideology is similar to that in version 3, % Poverty and % Black are, unexpectedly,
positively related to Moore Vote Share, although neither is significant. Given that the variance inflation
factor (VIF) for % Black is slightly above 20, which is the reported threshold for a problematic
degree of multicollinearity in Belsley et al. (1980), multicollinearity plays a role in producing these
counterintuitive results.9 Next, log Per Capita Income is negatively signed, as expected, but not
statistically significant. The Pearson correlation coefficients shown in Table 2 suggest that this result
is impacted to some degree by multicollinearity. Finally, the coefficient estimate for Moore Home is,
at −2.765, similar to that found in version 3, and again runs counter to findings from prior research
that are summarized in Table 1.
4.3. A Decomposition Approach
The foundational regressions above inform a decomposition of the vote share differences based
on county classification (i.e., Moore home vs. other counties) into “explained” and “unexplained”
portions. This approach employs a technique often used by labor economists in identifying the
effect of gender or race discrimination on wages (see Kitagawa 1955; Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973;
Oaxaca and Ransom 1999). First, the vote share for Moore in his home of Etowah County is compared
to the mean of Moore’s vote shares in the remaining 66 countywide election contests. In this case,
Moore garnered 59.9% of the Etowah County vote, while he captured an average of 54.8% of the total
from Alabama’s other countywide election contests. As indicated in Table 4, the difference here of 5.1
percentage points (i.e., 59.9 minus 54.8) represents the total effect, and it is statistically significant.
Table 4. Decomposition results.
Moore Vote Share
Home County Non-Home Counties Total Effect Endowment Effect Residual Effect
59.9 54.8 5.1 * 8.3 −3.2 †
(p = 0.037)
Notes: * denotes the 0.05 level of significance. † denotes that the observation-specific nature of the variable, Moore
Home, prevented stochastic treatment of the residual effect.
The “explained” portion of the total effect is referred to as the endowment effect. To estimate
its magnitude, Moore Vote Sharei is regressed on % College Graduatei and Electoral Ideologyi using a
sub-sample of the data excluding Etowah County (i.e., Moore’s home county).10 OLS results are
provided below:
Moore Vote Share = −3.539 − 0.443% College Graduate + 1.019 Electoral Ideology,
(−2.56) (−10.01) (54.14) (2)
8 This specification is jointly significant at the 0.01 level, while it produces an R2 of 0.957.
9 Kennedy (2008) states that harmful multicollinearity is likely present for VIF greater than 10. Even this rule of thumb applies
only to estimates for % Black and Electorate Ideology.
10 This parsimonious specification is employed to avoid the incorrectly-signed estimates associated with % Poverty and % Black.
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where the numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. This restricted specification is jointly significant and
produces an R2 of 0.984. Substituting the mean values of the regressors from the 66 counties in
the sub-sample, this model predicts that Moore would have garnered an average of 54.9% of vote
totals in these 66 individual countywide election contests. When mean values of the regressors from
Etowah County are substituted, the model predicts that Moore would have captured 63.2% of his
home county’s vote had he been viewed by Etowah County’s voters in a way comparable to how he
was viewed by voters in the 66 sub-sample counties.
As indicated in Table 4, the difference between these two estimates, referred to as the “explained
portion” or the endowment effect, is 8.3 percentage points (i.e., 63.2 minus 54.9), suggesting that
endowment advantages accruing to Moore in Etowah County predict he should have performed
8.3 percentage points better in Etowah County than he did in the 66 remaining counties. The remaining
difference represents the “unexplained” portion of the total effect and is referred to as the residual
effect. In this case, Moore’s performance at home exceeded his performance elsewhere by fewer
percentage points (i.e., 5.1 percentage points) than would have been predicted (i.e., 8.3 percentage
points) by differences in the endowments (regressors) included in (2) above. Thus, as indicated in
Table 4, the residual effect in this case is −3.2 percentage points.11
To provide greater context for the estimate of the residual effect, Mixon et al. (2008) use the
residual effect from a decomposition approach to estimate a “friends and neighbors” benefit of five
percentage points. Using that study as a benchmark, and assuming the Moore-Jones contest were
free of scandal, one might have expected that Moore’s performance in Etowah County would have
exceeded, by five percentage points, what the endowment effect would have predicted. Recalling
that the endowment effect suggests that Moore would have performed 8.3 percentage points better at
home than elsewhere simply as a result of the difference between his home county’s endowments and
those of the other counties, then, with the “friends and neighbors” bonus, one would expect Moore’s
performance in Etowah County to have been 13.3 percentage points better than elsewhere. Instead,
Moore’s actual home county vote share exceeded that of Jones by only 5.1 percentage points (i.e., the
total effect). As such, the political scandal that hampered Moore’s candidacy not only erased all of
the expected “friends and neighbors” effect (of, perhaps, five percentage points), but it also eroded
some of the benefit that should have accrued to Moore as a result of the difference between his home
county’s endowments and those of the other counties (i.e., the endowment effect).
The decomposition approach suggests that Moore’s constituents did believe the allegations that
arose during the final weeks of the election, and that they responded by switching their political
support to Moore’s opponent. Etowah County voters may have decided to pursue this course to
prevent Moore from reaching a position, such as that of U.S. Representative, from which to cause them
to suffer political harm and/or to engage in costly monitoring efforts (i.e., to be exposed to higher
agency costs). This particular election involved a relatively moderate Democratic candidate in Doug
Jones, which perhaps explains the intensity of the local electorate’s reversal, which erased all of the
friends-and-neighbors effect and a portion of the endowment effect. In cases involving scandal where
the candidates’ platforms exhibit more extreme bimodality (i.e., they are not as closely associated as
in a state such as Alabama), complete erosion of the benefits of localism may not occur. In any case,
the exploration of the impact of political scandal on friends-and-neighbors voting undertaken in this
study indicates that this genre of the public choice literature is perhaps under-theorized, thus, opening
up avenues for future research.
11 Treating the residual effect stochastically, as is done with the total effect, requires subtracting the SSE from an OLS regression
of (2) using the full sample from the SSE from an OLS regression of (2) using the full sample that also includes Moore Home
and interaction terms involving Moore Home and the other two regressors, % College Graduate and Electoral Ideology. In this
particular case, however, stochastic treatment of the residual effect was prevented by estimation issues associated with the
observation-specific nature of Moore Home.
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5. Concluding Comments
The 2017 U.S. Senate Special Election in Alabama—a contest between Democratic candidate,
Doug Jones, a lawyer from Birmingham, and Roy Moore, the Republican candidate from Gadsden
who had previously served as Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court—was one of the most
scandal-laden political contests in American history. During the last few months of the campaign,
a number of women alleged to national media that as teenagers (as young as 14) they were subjected to
sexual advances by Moore, who was then in his early 30s and working as an assistant district attorney.
With only one week left in the fall 2017 campaign, the number of such accusers stood at nine, as Moore
was living in a proverbial glass house while his campaign for the U.S. was unraveling.
This study addresses a void in the literature in this regard by presenting an econometric
exploration of the countywide vote shares from this particular election, suggesting that the usual
friends-and-neighbors, or localism, advantage that accrues to the local candidate in an election is
eroded when that candidate is embroiled in political scandal. In fact, results from a decomposition
approach presented in this study suggest not only that all the usual friends-and-neighbors effect is
lost due to the presence of a major political scandal, but that almost one-half of the benefit of political
ideology alignment that is expected to accrue to the local candidate is also eroded due to the scandal.
That Jones eventually defeated Moore in the 2017 special election, even in Republican-leaning Alabama,
attests to the deleterious effects of a scandal-induced erosion in friends-and-neighbors voting as a way
of mitigating the agency costs faced by a constituency in a representative democracy.
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